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comes from the possibility of re-formulating quantum communication protocols, and algorithms,
in terms of games between quantum and classical players. The possibility led to the view that
quantum games have a potential to provide helpful insight into working of quantum algorithms,
and even in finding new ones. This thesis analyzes and compares some interesting games when
played classically and quantum mechanically. A large part of the thesis concerns investigations
into a refinement notion of the Nash equilibrium concept. The refinement, called an evolu-
tionarily stable strategy (ESS), was originally introduced in 1970s by mathematical biologists
to model an evolving population using techniques borrowed from game theory. Analysis is
developed around a situation when quantization changes ESSs without affecting corresponding
Nash equilibria. Effects of quantization on solution-concepts other than Nash equilibrium are
presented and discussed. For this purpose the notions of value of coalition, backwards-induction
outcome, and subgame-perfect outcome are selected. Repeated games are known to have dif-
ferent information structure than one-shot games. Investigation is presented into a possible
way where quantization changes the outcome of a repeated game. Lastly, two new suggestions
are put forward to play quantum versions of classical matrix games. The first one uses the
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Game theory [1] is a branch of mathematics that presents formal analysis of the interaction
among a group of rational players. The players have choices available to them, so as to select
particular course of action. They are supposed to behave strategically and are motivated to
increase their utilities that depend on the collective course of action.
Modern game theory started with the work of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern
[2] in 1930s. During the same years von Neumann [3] also made important contributions in
quantum mechanics, a branch of physics developed in 1920s to understand the microworld
of atoms and molecules. However, game theory and quantum mechanics were developed as
separate fields with apparently different domains of applications.
The early years of development in both of these fields could not find some common ground,
or physical situation, that could motivate an interplay between the two fields. More than fifty
years afterwards, quantum computation [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] was developed in 1980s as a new field
of research that combined elements from quantum mechanics and the theory of computation
[10]. Computer science extensively uses the theory of information and communication [11].
Quantum computation motivated the development of quantum information [12]; thus providing
an environment where the two distinct interests of von Neumann, i.e. quantum mechanics and
game theory, could be shown to have some sort of interplay. Certain quantum communication
protocols, and algorithms, were reformulated in the language of game theory [13, 14, 15, 16, 17,
18]. It was not long before the first systematic procedures [19, 20] were proposed to quantize
well-known classical games [1].
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Classical bits are the entities that are used to physically implement classical information.
Quantum information [21], on the other hand, uses quantum bits (qubits) for its physical
implementation. It is known that the problems of classical game theory can be translated into
physical set-ups that use classical bits. It immediately motivates the question of how games can
be transformed when implemented with qubits. Like it is the case with quantum information,
it helps to quantize classical games when qubits, instead of classical bits, are used in physical
set-ups to play games.
This thesis follows a particular approach in the theory of quantum games. The thesis
builds up on proposed convincing procedures telling how to quantize well-known games from
the classical game theory. A large part of this thesis concerns studying the concept of an
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) [22] from mathematical population biology within the
context of quantum games. The thesis argues that importing a population setting towards
quantum games is not unusual though it may give such an impression. It is observed that
even John Nash [23, 24] had a population setting in his mind when he introduced his solution
concept of the Nash equilibrium for non-cooperative games. The study of evolutionary stability
in quantum games is presented with the view that importing the concept of an ESS, and its
associated population setting, to quantum games is natural to an equal extent as it is to study
Nash equilibrium in quantum games.
Game theory [1] also offers solution concepts that are relevant to certain types of games.
The notions of value of coalition, backwards-induction outcome and subgame-perfect outcome
present a few examples. The types of games for which these concepts are appropriate are known
to be the cooperative, the sequential (with moves made in order) and repeated (with moves made
simultaneously in one stage) games, respectively. To show how quantization affects solutions
of these games, the relevant solution concepts are investigated in relation to quantization of
these games. This study shows that quantum versions of these games may have outcomes that
are often extraordinary and sometimes may even be counter-intuitive, from the point of view
of classical game theory.
Motivated by our preferred approach towards quantum games, i.e. to rely on proposed
convincing procedures to quantize known games from the classical game theory, two new sug-
gestions are put forward about quantum versions of two-player two-strategy games. The first
12
suggestion presents a set-up that uses the association of De Broglie waves with travelling mate-
rial objects to play a quantum version of a two-player two-strategy game. The second suggestion
uses an EPR type setting in which spatially separated players make measurements along chosen
directions to play a game.
The concluding chapter collects together main results obtained in the thesis.
13
Chapter 2
Elements of game theory
2.1 Introduction
Many decision making problems in sociology, politics and economics deal with situations in
which the results depend not only on the action of one individual but also on the actions
of others. Game theory is a branch of mathematics which is used in modelling situations in
which many individuals with conflicting interests interact, such that the results depend on the
actions of all the participants. It is considered a formal way to analyze interaction among a
group of individuals who behave rationally and strategically. The participants in a game strive
to maximize their (expected) utilities by choosing particular courses of action. Because the
actions of the others matter, a player’s final utility depends on the profile of courses of action
chosen by all the individuals. A game deals with the following concepts:
• Players. These are the individuals who compete in the game. A player can be an indi-
vidual or a set of individuals.
• A move will be a player’s action.
• A player’s (pure) strategy will be a rule (or function) that associates a player’s move with
the information available to her at the time when she decides which move to choose.
• A player’s mixed strategy is a probability measure on the player’s space of pure strategies.
• Payoffs are real numbers representing the players’ utilities.
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Although first attempts to analyze such problems are apparently rather old [25], modern
game theory started with the work of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern who wrote
the book Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour [2]. Game theory is now widely used in
research in diverse areas ranging from economics, social science, to evolutionary biology and
population dynamics.
2.2 Representations of games
There are different ways to represent a strategic interaction between players. In game theory
[1] two representations are well known:
2.2.1 Normal form
A normal (strategic) form of a game consists of:
1. A finite set of N agents or players
2. Strategy sets S1, S2, ...SN for the N players
3. Payoff functions Pi, i = 1, 2, ...N , are mappings from the set S1 × S2× ...× SN to the set
of real numbers R.
The set S1 × S2 × ... × SN is called the strategy space S. A member s ∈ S is known as a
strategy profile with s = (s1, s2, ...sN ) and si ∈ Si.
2.2.2 Extensive form
The extensive form of a game is a complete description of:
1. the set of players
2. who moves when and what their choices are
3. the players’ payoffs as a function of the choices that are made
4. what players know when they move
15
The extensive form of a game, as opposed to the normal (or strategic) form, provides a more
appropriate framework for the analysis of strategic interactions that involve sequential moves.
It gives a richer specification of a strategic interaction by specifying who moves when, doing
what and with what information. The easiest way to represent an extensive form game is to
use a game tree, which is multi-person generalization of a decision tree [1].
2.3 Information structure in games
The information at the disposal of a player, when she has to select a move, is described by the
information structure in the game. Based on this structure games can usually be put in either
one of the following two broad classes, which also form the two main branches of game theory.
2.3.1 Cooperative games
In cooperative games the players are allowed to form binding agreements. These are restrictions
on the possible actions decided by two or more players. To be binding an agreements usually
requires an outside authority that can monitor the agreement at no cost and impose on violators
sanctions so severe that cheating is prevented. For players in a binding agreement there is a
strong incentive to work together to receive the largest total payoff. The agreements may
include, for example, commitments and threats.
2.3.2 Non-cooperative games
In non-cooperative games the players may not form binding agreements. Neither do the players
cooperate nor do they enter into negotiation for achieving a common course of action. However
the players know how the actions, their own and the actions of the other players, will determine
the payoffs of every player.
2.4 Matrix games
One way to describe a game is to list the players participating in the game, and to list the
alternative choices or moves available to each player. In the case of a two-player game, the
moves of the first player form the rows, and the moves of the second player the columns of
16
a matrix. The entries in the matrix are two numbers representing the payoff to the first and
second player, respectively. Such a description of a game makes possible to completely represent
the players’ payoffs by a matrix. In game theory these games are recognized as matrix games.
The example below is a matrix game between two players:
Alice
S1
S2
...
SN
Bob
S1 S2 ... SN

(a11, b11) (a12, b12) ... (a1N , b1N )
(a21, b21) (a22, b22) ... (a2N , b2N )
... ... ... ...
(aN1, bN1) (aN2, bN2) ... (aNN , bNN )


(2.1)
2.4.1 Constant-sum games
In a constant-sum game, the sum of all players’ payoffs is the same for any outcome. Hence, a
gain for one participant is always at the expense of another, such as in most sporting events.
2.4.2 Zero-sum game
A zero-sum game is a special case of a constant sum game in which all outcomes involve a sum
of all player’s payoffs of 0. Since payoffs can always be normalized, a constant sum game may
be represented as (and is equivalent to) a zero-sum game.
2.4.3 Bi-matrix games
A class of games that have attracted much attention because of the relative simplicity of their
mathematical analysis involve two players Alice and Bob. Each player has his own payoff matrix
written as aij and bij, respectively. Games of this kind are called bi-matrix games.
2.5 Examples of matrix games
The following examples describe some well-known matrix games.
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2.5.1 Prisoners’ Dilemma
The most popular bi-matrix game is the so-called the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) describing the
following situation:
• Two criminals are arrested after having committed a crime together and wait for their
trial.
• Each suspect is placed in a separate cell and offered the opportunity to confess to the
crime.
• Each suspect may choose between two strategies namely confessing (D) and not confessing
(C), where C and D stand for cooperation and defection.
• If neither suspect confesses, i.e. (C,C), they go free, and split the proceeds of their crime
which we represent by 3 units of payoff for each suspect.
• However, if one prisoner confesses (D) and the other does not (C), the prisoner who
confesses testifies against the other in exchange for going free and gets the entire 5 units
of payoff, while the prisoner who did not confess goes to prison and gets nothing.
• If both prisoners confess, i.e. (D,D), then both are given a reduced term, but both are
convicted, which we represent by giving each 1 unit of payoff: better than having the
other prisoner confess, but not so good as going free.
The game can be represented by the following matrix of payoffs:
Alice
C
D
Bob
C D
 (3, 3) (0, 5)
(5, 0) (1, 1)

 (2.2)
where the first and the second entry correspond to Alice’s and Bob’s payoff, respectively.
For either choice of the opponent it is hence advantageous to defect (D). On the other hand,
if both defect (D,D) the payoff remains less than in the case when both cooperate (C,C). This
is the origin of dilemma.
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A generalized matrix for the PD is given as:
Alice
C
D
Bob
C D
 (r, r) (s, t)
(t, s) (u, u)

 (2.3)
where s < u < r < t.
2.5.2 Battle of Sexes
Battle of Sexes (BoS) is a bi-matrix game that can be described as follows:
• Alice and Bob agree to meet in the evening, but cannot recall if they will be attending
the opera or a boxing match.
• Alice prefers the opera and Bob prefers the boxing match.
• Both prefer being together to being apart.
Thus, while both parties prefer to find themselves at the same place, Alice and Bob cannot
agree which event to attend. The game has the following matrix representation:
Alice
S1
S2
Bob
S1 S2
 (α, β) (γ, γ)
(γ, γ) (β, α)

 (2.4)
where α > β > γ.
2.5.3 Matching Pennies
Matching Pennies is a zero-sum game with two players Alice and Bob. Each shows either heads
or tails from a coin. If both are heads or both are tails then Alice wins, otherwise Bob wins.
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The payoff matrix is given as
Alice
H
T
Bob
H T
 (1,−1) (−1, 1)
(−1, 1) (1,−1)

 (2.5)
with a winner getting a reward of 1 against the loser getting −1.
2.5.4 Rock-Scissors-Paper
Two children, Alice and Bob, simultaneously make one of three symbols with their fists - a
rock, paper, or scissors (RSP). Simple rules of “rock breaks scissors, scissors cut paper, and
paper covers rock” dictate which symbol beats the other. If both symbols are the same, the
game is a tie:
Alice
R
S
P
Bob
R S P

0 1 −1
−1 0 1
1 −1 0

 (2.6)
2.6 Solution concepts
Solving a game means finding a set of moves for the players which represent their rational
choices. Unlike in other fields, the notion of a “solution” is more tenuous in game theory. In
game theory a solution is generally thought of as a systematic description of the outcomes that
may emerge during the play of a game.
2.6.1 Rational “solution” of Prisoners’ Dilemma
For the bi-matrix PD it is self-evident how an intelligent individual should behave. No matter
what a suspect believes his partner is going to do, it is always best to confess (D):
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• If the partner in the other cell is not confessing (C), it is possible to get 5 instead of 3.
• If the partner in the other cell is confessing (D), it is possible to get 1 instead of 0.
Yet the pursuit of individually sensible behavior results in each player getting only 1 unit
of payoff, much less than the 3 units each that they would get if neither confessed (C,C). This
conflict between the pursuit of individual goals and the common good is at the heart of many
game theoretic problems. For PD the rational choice for both players is to defect.
2.6.2 Nash equilibrium
A Nash equilibrium (NE), named after John Nash, is a set of strategies, one for each player, such
that no player has an incentive to unilaterally change her action. Players are in equilibrium if a
change in strategies by any one of them would lead that player to earn less than if she remained
with her current strategy.
The implicit assumption behind the concept of a NE is that players make their choices
simultaneously and independently. This idea also assumes that each player participating in
a game behaves rational and searches to maximize his/her own payoff. A strategy profile
s = (s∗1, s
∗
2, ...s
∗
N ) is a NE if none of them is left with a motivation to deviate unilaterally.
Suppose Pi is the ith-player’s payoff then the following condition defines the NE:
Pi(s
∗
1, s
∗
2, ...s
∗
i−1, s
∗
i , s
∗
i+1..., s
∗
N ) ≥ Pi(s∗1, s∗2, ...s∗i−1, si, s∗i+1..., s∗N ) (2.7)
When the N players are playing the strategy profile s = (s∗1, s
∗
2, ...s
∗
N ) the ith player’s decision
to play si instead of s
∗
i cannot increase his/her payoff. A NE thus defines a set of strategies that
represents a best choice for each single player if all the other players take their best decisions
too.
The well-known Nash Theorem [23] in game theory guarantees the existence of a set of
mixed strategies for finite non-cooperative games of two or more players in which no player can
improve his payoff by unilaterally changing his/her strategy.
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2.6.3 Nash equilibrium in the Prisoners’ Dilemma
Let Alice play C with probability p and play D with probability (1 − p). Similarly, let Bob
play C with probability q and play D with probability (1− q). The players’ payoffs for the PD
matrix (2.2) are
PA(p, q) = pq(3) + p(1− q)(0) + (1− p)q(5) + (1− p)(1− q)(1)
= −p+ 4q − pq + 1 (2.8)
PB(p, q) = pq(3) + p(1− q)(5) + (1− p)q(0) + (1− p)(1− q)(1)
= 4p− q − pq + 1 (2.9)
The inequalities defining the NE in PD can be written as
PA(p
∗, q∗)− PA(p, q∗) = −(p∗ − p)(1 + q∗) ≥ 0
PB(p
∗, q∗)− PB(p∗, q) = −(q∗ − q)(1 + p∗) ≥ 0 (2.10)
which produces a unique NE in the PD: p∗ = q∗ = 0. The NE corresponds to both players
playing the pure strategy D.
2.6.4 Nash equilibrium in the Battle of Sexes
Similar to the case of PD we assume that the numbers p, q ∈ [0, 1] are the probabilities with
which Alice and Bob play the strategy S1, respectively. They then play S2 with the probabilities
(1− p) and (1− q), respectively. Players’ payoffs for the BoS matrix (2.4) are [52]:
PA(p, q) = p [q(α− 2γ + β) + γ − β] + q(γ − β) + β
PA(p, q) = q [p(α− 2γ + β) + γ − α] + p(γ − α) + α (2.11)
The NE (p∗, q∗) is then found from the inequalities:
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PA(p
∗, q∗)− PA(p, q∗) = (p∗ − p) [q∗(α+ β − 2γ) − β + γ] ≥ 0
PB(p
∗, q∗)− PB(p∗, q) = (q∗ − q) [p∗(α+ β − 2γ)− α+ γ] ≥ 0 (2.12)
Three NE arise:
1. p∗1 = q
∗
1 = 1,
Both players play the pure strategy S1. The Nash inequalities are
PA(1, 1) − PA(p, 1) = (1− p)(α− γ) ≥ 0
PB(1, 1) − PB(1, q) = (1− q)(β − γ) ≥ 0 (2.13)
and the payoffs they obtain are
PA(1, 1) = α PB(1, 1) = β (2.14)
2. p∗2 = q
∗
2 = 0,
Both players now play the pure strategy S2 and the Nash inequalities are
PA(0, 0) − PA(p, 0) = p(β − γ) ≥ 0
PB(0, 0) − PB(0, q) = q(α− γ) ≥ 0 (2.15)
The players get
PA(0, 0) = β PB(0, 0) = α (2.16)
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3. p∗3 =
α−γ
α+β−2γ , q
∗
3 =
β−γ
α+β−2γ .
Players play a mixed strategy because p∗3, q
∗
3 ∈ (0, 1). The players’ payoffs are
PA(p
∗
3, q
∗
3) = PB(p
∗
3, q
∗
3) =
αβ − γ2
α+ β − 2γ (2.17)
Compared to the equilibria (p∗1, q
∗
1) and (p
∗
2, q
∗
2) the players now get strictly smaller payoffs
because
γ < PA(B)(p
∗
3, q
∗
3) < β < α (2.18)
2.7 Evolutionary game theory
Game theory suggests static ‘solutions’ obtained by analyzing the behavior of ‘rational agents’.
Such models are obviously unrealistic because real life behavior is shaped by trial and error. Real
life ‘players’ are subjected to the pressures of adaptation and are forced to learn individually. In
situations where players do not have the capacity to learn individually, natural selection favors
better players through step-wise adaptation. John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, in
their pioneering work on game theory [2], also realized the need for such a dynamic approach
towards game theory. After all, the word game itself suggests ‘motion’ in one way or the other.
In 1970’s Maynard Smith developed game-theoretic models of evolution in a population
which is subjected to Darwinian selection. In his book Evolution and the Theory of Games
[22] he diverted attention away from the prevalent view – treating players as rational beings
– and presented an evolutionary approach in game theory. This approach can be seen as a
large population model of adjustment to a NE i.e. an adjustment of population segments by
evolution as opposed to learning. Maynard Smith’s model consisted of strategic interaction
among the members of a population continuing over time in which higher payoff strategies
gradually displace strategies with lower payoffs. To distinguish evolutionary from revolutionary
changes some inertia is involved, guaranteeing that aggregate behavior does not change too
abruptly.
Most important feature of evolutionary game theory is that the assumption of rational
players – borrowed from game theory – does not remain crucial. It is achieved when players’
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payoffs are equated to success in terms of their survival. Players in an evolutionary model are
programmed to play only one strategy. Step-wise selection assures survival of better players at
the expense of others. In other words, an initial collection of strategies play a tournament and
the average scores are recorded. Successful strategies increase their share of the population.
Changing the population mix changes the expected payoff. Again successful strategies increase
in the population, and the expected payoff is calculated. A population equilibrium occurs when
the population shares are such that the expected payoffs for all strategies are equal.
Many successful applications of evolutionary game theory appeared in mathematical biology
[26] to predict the behavior of bacteria and insects, that can hardly be said to think at all.
Economists too did not like game theory that mostly concerned itself with hyper-rational
players who are always trying to maximize their payoffs. Hence the population setting of game
theory, invented by mathematical biologists, was welcomed by the economists too. Even John
Nash himself, as it was found later [27], had a population setting in his mind when he introduced
his equilibrium notion. In his unpublished thesis he wrote ‘it is unnecessary to assume that
the participants have...... the ability to go through any complex reasoning process. But the
participants are supposed to accumulate empirical information on the various pure strategies at
their disposal.......We assume that there is a population .......of participants......and that there
is a stable average frequency with which a pure strategy is employed by the “average member”
of the appropriate population’[24, 28].
2.7.1 Evolutionarily stable strategies
Maynard Smith introduced the idea of an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) in a seminal
paper ‘The logic of animal conflict’ [29]. In rough terms [30] an ESS is a strategy which, if
played by almost all the members of a population, cannot be displaced by a small invading
group that plays any alternative strategy. So that, a population playing an ESS can withstand
invasion by a small group. The concept was developed by combining ingredients from game
theory and some work on the evolution of the sex ratio [31].
Maynard Smith considers a large population in which members are matched repeatedly and
randomly in pairs to play a bi-matrix game. The players are anonymous, that is, any pair of
players plays the same symmetric bi-matrix game. Also the players are identical with respect
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to their set of strategies and their payoff functions. The symmetry of a bi-matrix game means
that for a strategy set S Alice’s payoff when she plays S1 ∈ S and Bob plays S2 ∈ S is the same
as Bob’s payoff when he plays S1 and Alice plays S2. In game theory [1] a symmetric bi-matrix
game is represented by an expression G = (M,MT ) where M is the first player’s payoff matrix
and MT , its transpose, is the second players’ payoff matrix. In a symmetric pair-wise contest
P (x, y) gives the payoff to a x-player against a y-player. In such contest exchange of strategies
by the two players also exchanges their respective payoffs. Hence, a player’s payoff is defined
by his/her strategy and not by his/her identity.
Mathematically speaking, [32] x is an ESS when for each strategy y 6= x the inequality:
P [x, (1− ǫ)x+ ǫy] > P [y, (1− ǫ)x+ ǫy] (2.19)
should hold for all sufficiently small ǫ > 0. The left side of (2.19) is the payoff to the strategy x
when played against the strategy (1− ǫ)x+ ǫy where ǫ ∈ [0, ǫ0). For ǫ becoming greater than ǫ0
the inequality (2.19) does not hold and x does not remain an ESS. The situation when ǫ > ǫ0
is also known as the invasion by the mutant strategy. The quantity ǫ0 is called the invasion
barrier.
To be precise [27] a strategy x is an ESS:
• If for each mutant strategy y there exists a positive invasion barrier.
• The invasion barrier exists such that if the population share of individuals playing the
mutant strategy y falls below this barrier, then x earns a higher expected payoff than y.
This condition for an ESS can be shown [22] equivalent to the following two requirements:
1. P (x, x) > P (y, x)
2. If P (x, x) = P (y, x) then P (x, y) > P (y, y) (2.20)
An ESS, therefore, is a symmetric NE which also possesses a property of stability against small
mutations. Condition 1 in the definition (2.20) shows (x, x) is a NE for the bi-matrix game
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G = (M,MT ) if x is an ESS. Nevertheless, the converse is not true. That is, if (x, x) is a NE
then x is an ESS only if x satisfies condition 2 in the definition.
In evolutionary game theory the concept of fitness [33] of a strategy is considered crucial.
Suppose x and y are pure strategies played in a population setting. Their fitnesses are defined
as:
W (x) = P (x, x)Fx + P (x, y)Fy
W (y) = P (y, x)Fx + P (y, y)Fy (2.21)
where Fx and Fy are frequencies (the relative proportions) of the pure strategies x and y
respectively.
The concept of evolutionary stability provided much of the motivation for the development
of evolutionary game theory. Presently, the ESS concept is considered as the central model of
evolutionary dynamics of a populations of interacting individuals. It asks, and finds answer to
it, a basic question: Which states of a population – during the course of a selection process that
favors better performing strategies – are stable against perturbations induced by mutations?
The theory is inspired by Darwinian natural selection which is formulated as an algorithm
called replicator dynamics. Iterations of selections from randomly mutating replicators is the
important feature of the dynamics. The dynamics is a mathematical statement saying that in
a population the proportion of players which play better strategies increase with time. With
replicator dynamics being the underlying selection mechanism in a population, ESSs come out
[34] as stable strategies against small perturbations. In other words ESSs are rest points of the
replicator dynamics.
2.7.2 ESS as a refinement of Nash equilibrium
In the history of game theory elaborate definitions of rationality, on the behalf of the players,
led to many refinements [35] of the NE concept. In situations where multiple NE appear as
potential solutions to a game, a refinement is required to prefer some over the others. Refine-
ments of NE are popular as well as numerous in classical game theory. Speaking historically,
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the set of refinements became so large that eventually almost any NE could be justified in
terms of someone or other’s refinement. The concept of an ESS is a refinement on the set of
symmetric Nash equilibria [32]. Apart from being a symmetric NE it has robustness against
small mutations [36]. For symmetric bi-matrix games this relationship is described as [37]:
△ESS ⊂ △PE ⊂ △NE (2.22)
where △PE 6= Φ and △NE , △PE, △ESS are the sets of symmetric Nash equilibria, symmetric
proper equilibrium, and ESSs respectively.
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Chapter 3
Review of quantum mechanics
Quantum mechanics: Real Black Magic Calculus
– Albert Einstein
3.1 Introduction
Quantum theory is the theoretical basis of modern physics that explains the nature and behavior
of matter and energy on the atomic and subatomic level. The physical systems at these levels are
known as quantum systems. Thus quantum mechanics is a mathematical model of the physical
world that describes the behavior of quantum systems. A physical model is characterized by
how it represents physical states, observables, measurements, and dynamics of the system under
consideration. A quantum description of a physical model is based on the following concepts:
3.2 Fundamental concepts
A state is a complete description of a physical system. Quantum mechanics associates a ray in
Hilbert space to the physical state of a system. What is Hilbert space?
• Hilbert space is a complex linear vector space. In Dirac’s ket-bra notation states are
denoted by ket vectors |ψ〉 in Hilbert space. Any two state vectors differing only by an
overall phase factor eiθ (θ real) represent the same state.
29
• Corresponding to a ket vector |ψ〉 there is another kind of state vector called bra vector,
which is denoted by 〈ψ|. The inner product of a bra 〈ψ| and ket |φ〉 is defined as follows:
〈ψ| {|φ1〉+ |φ2〉} = 〈ψ | φ1〉+ 〈ψ | φ2〉
〈ψ| {c |φ1〉} = c 〈ψ | φ1〉 (3.1)
for any c ∈ C, the set of complex numbers. There is a one-to-one correspondence between
the bras and the kets. Furthermore
〈ψ | φ〉 = 〈φ | ψ〉∗
〈ψ | ψ〉 > 0 for |ψ〉 6= 0 (3.2)
• The state vectors in Hilbert space are normalized which means that the inner product of
a state vector with itself gives unity, i.e.,
〈ψ | ψ〉 = 1 (3.3)
• Operations can be performed on a ket |ψ〉 and transform it to another ket |χ〉. There are
operations on kets which are called linear operators, which have the following properties.
For a linear operator αˆ we have
αˆ {|ψ〉+ |χ〉} = αˆ |ψ〉+ αˆ |χ〉
αˆ {c |ψ〉} = cαˆ |ψ〉 (3.4)
for any c ∈ C.
• The sum and product of two linear operators αˆ and βˆ are defined as:
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{
αˆ+ βˆ
}
|ψ〉 = αˆ |ψ〉+ βˆ |ψ〉{
αˆβˆ
}
|ψ〉 = αˆ
{
βˆ |ψ〉
}
(3.5)
Generally speaking αˆβˆ is not necessarily equal to βˆαˆ, i.e.
[
αˆ, βˆ
]
6= 0
• The adjoint αˆ† of an operator αˆ is defined by the requirement:
〈ψ | αˆχ〉 =
〈
αˆ†ψ | χ
〉
(3.6)
for all kets |ψ〉, |χ〉 in the Hilbert space.
• An operator αˆ is said to be self-adjoint or Hermitian if:
αˆ† = αˆ (3.7)
Hermitian operators are the counterparts of real numbers in operators. In quantum me-
chanics, the dynamical variables of physical systems are represented by Hermitian operators.
More specifically, every experimental arrangement in quantum mechanics is associated with a
set of operators describing the dynamical variables that can be observed. These operators are
usually called observables.
3.3 Postulates of quantum mechanics
For an isolated quantum system, quantum theory is based on the following postulates:
• A ket vector |ψ〉 in Hilbert space gives a complete description of the state of the physical
system.
• Dynamics are specified by Hermitian operators and time evolution is given by Schro¨dinger’s
equation:
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i~
∂ |ψ〉
∂t
= Hˆ |ψ〉 (3.8)
where Hˆ is the Hamiltonian operator. Schro¨dinger’s equation is a deterministic equation of
motion that allows one to determine the state vector at any time once the initial conditions are
provided.
Classical games can be played when players share coins. Coins are physical systems that
represent classical bits which takes one of the two possible values {0, 1}, or simply head and
tail. A bit is also the indivisible unit of classical information. For example in non-cooperative
games coins are distributed among the players and they do their actions on them. At the end
of the game the coins are collected by a referee who rewards the players, after observing the
collected coins. The earliest suggestions for playing quantum games can be thought of letting
players act on qubits, which are a quantum generalization of classical two level systems like a
coin.
3.4 Qubits
In two-dimensional Hilbert space an orthonormal basis can be written as {|0〉 , |1〉}. A general
qubit state is then
|ψ〉 = a |0〉+ b |1〉 (3.9)
where a, b ∈ C satisfying |a|2+ |b|2 = 1. In other words, |ψ〉 is a unit vector in two-dimensional
complex vector space for which a particular basis has been fixed. One of the simplest physical
examples of a qubit is the spin 1/2 of an electron. The spin-up and spin-down states of an
electron can be taken as the states |0〉, |1〉 of a qubit.
A non-cooperative classical game can be played by coin distribution and players’ rewards are
decided after observing the coins. Likewise, a non-cooperative quantum game can be played by
distributing qubits among the players. After the players’ moves the qubits are brought together
for an observation which is known as quantum measurement.
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3.5 Quantum measurement
Unlike observation of coins by a referee who organizes a classical game, the concept of mea-
surement of a quantum state of many qubits is subtle and lies at the heart of quantum theory.
The measurement postulate of quantum mechanics states [39]:
• Mutually exclusive measurement outcomes correspond to orthogonal projection operators{
Pˆ0, Pˆ1, ...
}
and the probability of a particular outcome i is
〈
ψ | Pˆi | ψ
〉
. If the outcome
i is attained the (normalized) quantum state after the measurement becomes
Pˆi |ψ〉√
〈ψ | Pi | ψ〉
(3.10)
Consider a measurement made on a qubit whose state vector resides in two-dimensional
Hilbert space. A measuring device has associated an orthonormal basis with respect to which
the quantum measurement takes place. Measurement transforms the state of the qubit into
one of measuring device’s associated basis vectors. Assume the measurement is performed on
the qubit that has the state (3.9). The measurement projects the state (3.9) to the basis
{|0〉 , |1〉}. Now in this case the measurement postulate says that the outcome |0〉 will happen
with probability |a|2 and the outcome |1〉 with probability |b|2.
Furthermore, measurement of a quantum state changes the state according to the result of
the measurement. That is, if the measurement of |ψ〉 = a |0〉 + b |1〉 results in |0〉, then the
state |ψ〉 changes to |0〉 and a second measurement, with respect to the same basis, will return
|0〉 with probability 1. Thus, unless the original state happened to be one of the basis vectors,
measurement will change that state, and it is not possible to determine what the original state
was.
Although a qubit can be put in infinitely many superposition states, only a single classical
bit’s worth of information can be extracted from it. It is because the measurement changes the
state of the qubit to one of the basis states.
Measurement made with orthogonal projection operators
{
Pˆ0, Pˆ1, ...
}
is also called projec-
tive measurement.
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3.5.1 Positive Operator-Valued Measure
Apart from projective measurement the quantum theory also uses another important concept of
measurement, whose implementation can be useful. It is the concept of positive operator-valued
measure (POVM). A POVM consists of a set of non-negative quantum mechanical Hermitian
operators that add up to the identity. The probability that a quantum system is in a particular
state is given by the expectation value of the POVM operator corresponding to that state.
POVMs are sometimes also referred to as the “generalized measurements”.
Nielsen and Chuang [21] have discussed a simple example showing the utility of POVM
formalism. Suppose Alice gives Bob a qubit prepared in one of two states, |ψ1〉 = |0〉 or
|ψ2〉 = (|0〉 + |1〉)/
√
2. It can be shown that there is no quantum measurement capable of
distinguishing the two states with perfect reliability. However, using a POVM Bob can perform
a measurement that distinguishes the two states some of the time, but never makes an error of
misidentification.
In this connection Neumark’s theorem [38] needs to be mentioned here that states that, at
least in principle, any POVM can be implemented by the adjunction of an ancilla 1 in a known
state, followed by a standard measurement in the enlarged Hilbert space.
3.6 Pure and mixed states
In quantum mechanics a pure state is defined as a quantum state that can be described by a
ket vector:
|ψ〉 =
∑
k
ck |ψk〉 (3.11)
Such a state evolves in time according to the time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation (3.8). A
mixed quantum state is a statistical mixture of pure states. In such a state the exact quantum-
mechanical state of the system is not known and only the probability of the system being in a
certain state can be given, which is accomplished by the density matrix.
1Ancilla bits are extra scratch qubits that quantum operations often use.
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3.7 Density matrix
A quantum game involves two or more players having access to parts of a quantum system.
These parts are usually the subsystems of a bigger quantum system. To use the system for
playing a game one must know it detailed statistical state. Quantum mechanics uses the
concept of a density matrix to describe the statistical state of a quantum system. It is the
quantum-mechanical analogue to a phase-space density (probability distribution of position
and momentum) in classical statistical mechanics. Suppose the quantum state of a system is
expressed in terms of a denumerable orthonormal basis {|φn〉 , n = 1, 2, 3...}. The state |ψ(t)〉
of the system at time t in the basis is given as
|ψ(t)〉 =
∑
n
an(t) |φn〉 (3.12)
Let |ψ(t)〉 be normalized
〈ψ(t) | ψ(t)〉 = 1 =
∑
n
∑
m
an(t)a
∗
m(t) 〈φm | φn〉 =
∑
n
|an(t)|2 (3.13)
The matrix elements of a self-adjoint operator Oˆ in the basis are
Oˆmn =
〈
φm | Oˆφn
〉
=
〈
Oˆφm | φn
〉
= 〈φm| Oˆ |φn〉 (3.14)
The average (expectation) value of Oˆ at time t for the system in state |ψ(t)〉 is
〈
Oˆ
〉
=
〈
ψ(t) | Oˆψ(t)
〉
=
∑
n
∑
m
a∗m(t)an(t)Oˆmn (3.15)
Consider the operator |ψ(t)〉 〈ψ(t)|. It has matrix elements
〈φm | ψ(t)〉 〈ψ(t) | φn〉 = am(t)a∗n(t) (3.16)
The calculation of
〈
Oˆ
〉
involves these matrix elements. Hence define
ρ(t) = |ψ(t)〉 〈ψ(t)| (3.17)
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which is known as the density matrix of the pure state |ψ(t)〉. It is a Hermitian operator, acting
on the Hilbert space of the system in question, with matrix elements
ρmn = 〈φm | ρ(t)φn〉 = am(t)a∗n(t) (3.18)
Eq. (3.17) shows that for a pure state the density matrix is given by the projection operator of
this state.
Since |ψ(t)〉 is normalized, we also have
1 =
∑
n
|an(t)|2 =
∑
n
ρnn(t) = Tr [ρ(t)] (3.19)
The expectation value of the observable Oˆ can now be re-expressed using the density operator:
〈
Oˆ
〉
=
∑
m
∑
n
am(t)a
∗
n(t)Oˆmn =
∑
m
∑
n
ρnm(t)Oˆmn
=
∑
n
[
ρ(t)Oˆ
]
nm
= Tr
[
ρ(t)Oˆ
]
(3.20)
For a mixed state, where a quantum system is in the state |ψj(t)〉 with probability pj , the
density matrix is the sum of the projectors weighted with the appropriate probabilities:
ρ(t) =
∑
j
pj |ψj(t)〉 〈ψj(t)| (3.21)
Density matrix is a powerful tool in quantum games because a game usually involves a multi-
partite quantum system. Compared to the description of a quantum game based on state
vectors, density matrix provides much compact notation.
3.8 Quantum Entanglement
Some of the most interesting investigations in quantum games concern the relationship between
game-theoretic solution concepts and entanglement present within the quantum system that
players are using to play the game. The phenomenon of entanglement can be traced back to
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Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR)’s famous paper [40] of 1935. EPR argued that quantum
mechanical description of physical reality can not be considered complete because of its rather
strange predictions about two particles that once have interacted but now are separate from one
another and do not interact. Quantum mechanics predicts that the particles can be entangled
even after separation. Entangled particles have correlated properties and these correlations are
at the heart of the EPR paradox.
Consider a system that can be divided into two subsystems. Assume HA and HB to be
the Hilbert spaces corresponding to the subsystems. Let |i〉A (where i = 1, 2, ...) be a complete
orthonormal basis for HA, and |j〉B (where j = 1, 2, ...) be a complete orthonormal basis for
HB. In quantum mechanics the Hilbert space HA ⊗HB (tensor product) is associated to the
two subsystems taken together. The tensor product Hilbert space HA ⊗HB is spanned by the
states |i〉A ⊗ |j〉B. By dropping the tensor product sign |i〉A ⊗ |j〉B is also written as |i〉A |j〉B .
Any state of the system |Ψ〉AB is a linear combination of the basis states |i〉A |j〉B i.e.
|Ψ〉AB =
∑
cij
i,j
|i〉A |j〉B (3.22)
where cij are complex coefficients. State |Ψ〉AB is usually taken to be normalized
∑
|cij |2
i,j
= 1 (3.23)
A state |Ψ〉AB is a direct product state when it factors into a normalized state
∣∣ψ(A)〉
A
=∑
i
c
(A)
i |i〉A in HA and a normalized state
∣∣ψ(B)〉
B
=
∑
j
c
(B)
j |j〉B in HB i.e.
|Ψ〉AB =
∣∣∣ψ(A)〉
A
∣∣∣ψ(B)〉
B
=
(∑
i
c
(A)
i |i〉A
)∑
j
c
(B)
j |j〉B

 (3.24)
Now, interestingly, there exist some states in HA ⊗ HB that can not be written as product
states. The state (|1〉A |1〉B + |2〉A |2〉B)upslope
√
2 is one example. When |Ψ〉AB is not a product
state it is called entangled [41, 21].
Quantum games have extensively used entangled states to see the resulting affects on solu-
tions of a game. However, it is considered a usual requirement in quantum games that players’
access to product states leads to the classical game.
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Chapter 4
Quantum games
4.1 Introduction
It is difficult to trace back the earliest work on quantum games. Many situations in quantum
theory can be reformulated in terms of game theory. Several works in the literature of quantum
physics can be identified having game-like underlying structure. For example:
• Wiesner’s work on quantum money [13].
• Mermin’s account [42] of Greeberger, Horne, and Zeilinger (GHZ)’s [43] version of the
Bell’s theorem [44, 38] without inequalities.
• Elitzur-Vaidman bomb detector [45], suggesting an interferometer which splits a photon
in two and then puts it back together again (interaction-free measurement).
• Vaidman’s illustration [15] of GHZ’s version of the Bell’s theorem.
• Meyer’s demonstration [19] of a quantum version of a penny-flip game.
• Eisert, Wilkens, and Lewenstein’s [20] quantization of the famous game of Prisoners’
Dilemma (PD).
In general, a quantum game can be thought of as strategic manoeuvreing of a quantum
system by parties who have necessary means for such actions. Some of its essential parts can
be recognized as follows:
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• A definition of the physical system which can be analyzed using the tools of quantum
mechanics.
• Existence of one or more parties, usually referred to as players, who are able to manipulate
the quantum system.
• Players’ knowledge about the quantum system on which they will make their moves or
actions.
• A definition of what constitutes a strategy for a player.
• A definition of strategy space for the players, which is the set of all possible actions that
players can take on the quantum system.
• A definition of the pay-off functions or utilities associated with the players’ strategies.
A two-player quantum game, for example, is a set [46]:
Γ = (H, ρ, SA, SB , PA, PB) (4.1)
consisting of an underlying Hilbert space H of the physical system, the initial state ρ, the sets
SA and SB of allowed quantum operations for two players, and the pay-off functions or utilities
PA and PB . In most of the existing set-ups to play quantum games the initial state ρ is the
state of one or more qubits. More complex quantum systems like qutrits (three-dimensional
quantum systems) or even qudits (d-dimensional quantum system) can also be used to play
quantum games.
4.2 Why games in the quantum world?
The question why game theory can be interesting in the quantum world has been addressed in
the earliest suggestions for quantum games. Some of the stated reasons [19, 20] are:
• Classical game theory is based on probability to a large extent. Generalizing it to quantum
probability is fundamentally interesting.
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• Quantum algorithms may be thought of as games between classical and quantum agents.
Only a few quantum algorithms are known to date. It appears reasonable that an analysis
of quantum games may help finding new quantum algorithms.
• There is an intimate connection between the theory of games and theory of quantum
communication. Eavesdropping [16, 17] and optimal cloning [18] can readily be conceived
as games between players.
• Quantum mechanics may assure fairness in remote gambling [14].
• If the ‘Selfish Gene’ [47] is a reality then the games of survival are already being played
at molecular level, where quantum mechanics dictates the rules.
4.3 Examples of quantum games
As the subject of quantum games has developed during recent years, many examples have been
put forward illustrating how such game can be different from their classical analogues. Here
are some of the well known quantum games:
4.3.1 Vaidman’s game
Vaidman [15] presented an example of a game for a team of three players that can only be won
if played in the quantum world. Three players are sent to remote locations A, B and C. At a
certain time t each player is asked one of the two possible questions:
1. What X?
2. What Y ?
Both of these questions have +1 or −1 as possible answers. Rules of the game are such that:
• Either all players are asked the X question or
• Only one player is asked the X question and the other two are asked the Y question.
The team wins if
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• The product of their three answers is −1 in the case of three X questions or
• The product of three answers is 1 in the case of one X and two Y questions.
What should the team do? Let XA be the answer of player A to the X question. Similarly,
one can define XB ,XC etc. The winning condition can now be written as
XAXBXC = −1
XAYBYC = 1
YAXBYC = 1
YAYBXC = 1 (4.2)
The product of all left hand sides of Eqs. (4.2) is X2AX
2
BX
2
CY
2
AY
2
BY
2
C = 1, because each of the X
or Y take the values ±1 only. The product of right sides is −1, which leads to a contradiction.
Therefore, the game cannot be won, with a success probability of 1, by a team of classical
players. Eqs. (4.2) show that the probability of winning the game by classical players can not
exceed 3/4. However, Vaidman showed that a quantum solution exists for the team. Three
particles are prepared in a correlated state (GHZ):
|GHZ〉 = 1√
2
{|↑Z〉A |↑Z〉B |↑Z〉C − |↓Z〉A |↓Z〉B |↓Z〉C} (4.3)
If a member of the team is asked the X question, she measures σˆx. If she is asked the Y
question, she measures σˆy instead. Quantum mechanics implies that for the GHZ state one
gets [15]
σˆAxσˆBx σˆCx = −1
σˆAx σˆBy σˆCy = 1
σˆAy σˆBx σˆCy = 1
σˆAy σˆBy σˆCx = 1 (4.4)
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The Vaidman’s game can, therefore, be won by a group of quantum players with 100% success
probability.
There remains a subtle point in Vaidman’s argument. The contradiction obtained by com-
paring the four equations in (4.2) assume that all four equations hold simultaneously. In fact,
the four equations represent four incompatible situations.
4.3.2 Meyer’s PQ Penny-Flip
Two players can play a simple game if they share a coin having two possible states, head or
tail. The first strong argument for quantum games was presented by Meyer [19] as a coin flip
game played by two characters, Captain Picard and Q, from the popular American science
fiction series Star Trek. In a quantum version of the game the flipping action is performed on
a “quantum coin”, which can be thought of as an electron that, on measurement, is found to
exist either in spin-up (H) or in spin-down (T ) state.
In Meyer’s interesting description of a quantum game, the story starts when starship En-
terprise faces some imminent catastrophe. Q appears on the bridge and offers Picard to rescue
the ship if he can beat him in a penny-flip game. Q asks Picard to place the penny in a box,
head up. Then Q, Picard, and finally Q play their moves. Q wins if the penny is head up when
the box is opened. For classical version of this game the payoff matrix can be constructed as
Picard
N
F
Q
NN NF FN FF
 −1 1 1 −1
1 −1 −1 1

 (4.5)
where rows and columns are Picard’s and Q’s pure strategies respectively. Let (H,T ) be the
basis of a 2-dimensional vector space. The players’ moves can be represented by a sequence of
2 × 2 matrices. In the matrix (4.5) the moves ‘to flip’ and ‘not to flip’ are represented by F
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and N , respectively:
F :
H
T
H T
 0 1
1 0

 N : H
T
H T
 1 0
0 1

 (4.6)
defined to act, on left multiplication, on a vector representing the state of the coin. A general
mixed strategy is described by the matrix:
H
T
H T
 1− p p
p 1− p

 (4.7)
where p ∈ [0, 1] is the probability with which the player flips the coin. A sequence of mixed
actions puts the state of the coin into a convex linear combination aH+(1−a)T where 0 ≤ a ≤ 1.
The coin is then in H state with probability a. Q plays his move first, after Picard puts the
coin in the H state.
Now Meyer presents a look at a quantum version of this game. Q has studied quantum
theory and implements his strategy as a sequence of unitary rather than stochastic matrices.
Such action requires a description of the state of the coin in two-dimensional Hilbert space. Let
its basis be the kets |H〉 and |T 〉, in Dirac notation. A pure state of the coin is a |H〉 + b |T 〉
where a, b ∈ C and aa∗ + bb∗ = 1.
Given the coin is initially in the state |H〉, the following unitary action U(a, b) by Q puts
the coin into the state a |H〉+ b |T 〉:
U(a, b) =
H
T
H T
 a b
b∗ −a∗

 (4.8)
Using the density matrix notation, the initial state of the coin can be written as
ρ0 = |H〉 〈H| (4.9)
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Q’s unitary action U(a, b) changes the state ρ0 to
ρ1 = Uρ0U
† =

 aa∗ ab∗
ba∗ bb∗

 (4.10)
because unitary transformations act on density matrices by conjugation. Picard is restricted to
use only a classical mixed strategy (4.7) by flipping the coin with probability p. After his action
the coin is in the pure state b |H〉+ a |T 〉 with probability p and in the pure state a |H〉+ b |T 〉
with probability (1 − p). Picard’s action acts on the density matrix ρ1, not as a stochastic
matrix on a probabilistic state, but as a convex linear combination of unitary (deterministic)
transformations:
ρ2 = pFρ1F
† + (1− p)Nρ1N †
=

 pbb∗ + (1− p)aa† pba∗ + (1− p)ab†
pab∗ + (1− p)ba∗ paa∗ + (1− p)bb†

 (4.11)
Interestingly, Q has at his disposal a move:
U1 = U(
1√
2
,
1√
2
) =
1√
2

 1 1
1 −1

 (4.12)
that can put the coin into a simultaneous eigenstate with eigenvalue 1 of both F and N, which
then becomes an invariant under any mixed strategy pF + (1 − p)N of Picard. In his second
action Q acts again with U( 1√
2
, 1√
2
) and gets back the state ρ0 = |H〉 〈H| and wins. The game
can also be understood with the following chart.
|H〉
Q
−→
Hˆ
1√
2
(|H〉+ |T 〉)
Picard
−→
σx or Iˆ
1√
2
(|H〉+ |T 〉)
Q
−→
Hˆ
|H〉 (4.13)
where Hˆ = 1√
2

 1 1
1 −1

 is a Hadamard transformation and σx =

 0 1
1 0

 is the flipping
44
operator. |H〉 is the head state of the coin and Iˆ is the identity operator. Q plays a quantum
strategy by putting the coin into a symmetric superposition of head and tail. Now, whether
Picard flips the coin or not, it remains in the symmetric superposition which Q can rotate back
to head applying Hˆ again since Hˆ = Hˆ−1.
4.3.3 Eisert, Wilkens and Lewenstein’s quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma
Eisert, Wilkens, and Lewenstein [20] gave a physical model of the PD and suggested that the
players can escape the dilemma if they both resort to quantum strategies. Their physical model
consists of
• A source making available two bits, one for each player.
• Physical instruments enabling the players to manipulate, in a strategic manner, their own
bits.
• A measurement device that determines the players’ payoffs from the final state of the two
bits.
In a quantum formulation the classical strategies C and D are assigned two basis vectors
|C〉 and |D〉 in Hilbert space of a qubit. A vector in the tensor product space, which is spanned
by the classical game basis |CC〉 , |CD〉 , |DC〉 and |DD〉 describes the state of the game.
The game’s initial state is |ψin〉 = Jˆ |CC〉 where Jˆ is a unitary operator known to both
players. Alice and Bob’s strategic moves are associated with unitary operators UˆA and UˆB
respectively, chosen from a strategic space S. The players’ actions are local i.e. each operates
on his/her qubit. After players’ moves the state of the game changes to (UˆA ⊗ UˆB)Jˆ |CC〉.
Measurements are now performed to determine the players’ payoffs. Measurement consists
of applying a reverse unitary operator Jˆ† followed by a pair of Stern-Gerlach type detectors.
Before detection the final state of the game is given by
|ψf 〉 = Jˆ†(UˆA ⊗ UˆB)Jˆ |CC〉 (4.14)
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Eisert et al. [20] define Alice’s expected payoff as
PA = r |〈CC | ψf 〉|2 + s |〈CD | ψf 〉|2 + t |〈DC | ψf 〉|2 + u |〈DD | ψf 〉|2 (4.15)
where the quantities r, s, t and u are from the PD matrix (2.3). Bob’s payoff PB is obtained by
interchanging s↔ t in Eq. (4.15). Eisert and Wilkens [46] use following matrix representations
of unitary operators of their one- and two-parameter strategies, respectively:
U(θ) =

 cos(θ/2) sin(θ/2)
- sin(θ/2) cos(θ/2)

 (4.16)
U(θ, φ) =

 eiφ cos(θ/2) sin(θ/2)
- sin(θ/2) e−iφ cos(θ/2)

 (4.17)
where 0 ≤ θ ≤ π and 0 ≤ φ ≤ π/2. To ensure that the ordinary PD is faithfully represented in
its quantum version, Eisert et al. imposed additional conditions on Jˆ :
[
Jˆ , Dˆ ⊗ Dˆ
]
= 0,
[
Jˆ , Dˆ ⊗ Cˆ
]
= 0,
[
Jˆ , Cˆ ⊗ Dˆ
]
= 0 (4.18)
where Cˆ and Dˆ are the operators corresponding to the strategies of cooperation and defection
respectively. A unitary operator satisfying the condition (4.18) is
Jˆ = exp
{
iγDˆ ⊗ Dˆ/2
}
(4.19)
where γ ∈ [0, π/2]. Jˆ can be called a measure of the game’s entanglement. At γ = 0 the game
reduces to its classical form. For a maximally entangled game γ = π/2 the classical NE Dˆ⊗ Dˆ
is replaced by a different unique equilibrium Qˆ⊗ Qˆ with Qˆ ∼ Uˆ(0, π/2). The new equilibrium
is also found to be Pareto optimal, that is, a player cannot increase his/her payoff by deviating
from this pair of strategies without reducing the other player’s payoff. Classically (C,C) is
Pareto optimal, but is not an equilibrium. Eisert et al. claimed that in its quantum version the
dilemma in PD disappears from the game and quantum strategies give a superior performance
if entanglement is present.
46
      
   
 
  Measurement 
Alice’s payoff 
Bob’s payoff 
Final 
quantum 
state 
ˆ ( )U θ or    
ˆ ( , )U θ φ  
En
ta
n
gl
in
g 
ga
te
 
 
 
 
 
Jˆ
 
In
v
er
se
 
 
ga
te
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
†
ˆJ
 
ˆ ( )U θ  or 
ˆ ( , )U θ φ  
Two 
qubits 
A maximally entangled  
two-qubit quantum 
state 
Set of unitary operators 
Alice 
Bob 
ˆ
AU  
ˆ
BU  
Figure 4-1: Eisert et al.’s scheme to play a quantum game.
In density matrix notation, the players’ actions change the initial state ρ to
σˆ = (UˆA ⊗ UˆB)ρ(UˆA ⊗ UˆB)† (4.20)
The arbiter applies the following operators on σ:
πˆCC = |ψCC〉 〈ψCC | , πˆCD = |ψCD〉 〈ψCD|
πˆDC = |ψDC〉 〈ψDC | , πˆDD = |ψDD〉 〈ψDD| (4.21)
The expected payoffs are
PA,B = [PCC ]A,BTr[πˆCC σˆ] + [PCD]A,BTr[πˆCDσˆ]
+ [PDC ]A,BTr[πˆDC σˆ] + [PDD]A,BTr[πˆDDσˆ] (4.22)
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Where, for example, [PCD]A is the Alice’s classical payoff when she plays C and Bob plays D.
For one-parameter strategies the classical pure strategies C and D are realized as Uˆ(0) and
Uˆ(π), respectively; while for two-parameter strategies the classical pure strategies C and D are
realized as Uˆ(0, 0) and Uˆ(π, 0), respectively. Fig. (4-1) shows Eisert et al.’s scheme to play a
quantum game.
Many recent investigations [48, 49, 50, 51] in quantum games have been motivated by the
Eisert et. al.’s scheme.
4.3.4 Quantum Battle of Sexes
Motivated by the Eisert et al.’s proposal, Marinatto and Weber [52] introduced a new scheme
for quantizing bi-matrix games by presenting a quantized version of the BoS. In this scheme
a state in a 2 ⊗ 2 dimensional Hilbert space is referred to as a strategy. At the start of the
game the players are supplied with this strategy. The players manipulate the strategy, in the
next phase, by playing their tactics. The state is finally measured and the payoffs are rewarded
depending on the results of the measurement. A player can do actions within a two-dimensional
subspace. Tactics are therefore local actions on a player’s qubit. The final measurement, made
independently on each qubit, takes into consideration the local nature of players’ manipulations.
It is achieved by selecting a measurement basis that respects the division of Hilbert space into
two equal parts.
Essentially, the scheme differs from the earlier proposed scheme of Eisert et al. [20] by the
absence of reverse gate J†. The gate makes sure that the classical game remains a subset of
its quantum version. In Marinatto and Weber’s scheme the state is measured without passing
it through the reverse gate. They showed that the classical game still remains a subset of the
quantum game if the players’ tactics are limited to a probabilistic choice between applying the
identity Iˆ and the Pauli spin-flip operator σˆx. Also the classical game results when the players
are forwarded an initial strategy |ψin〉 = |00〉.
Suppose ρin is the initial strategy, which the players Alice and Bob receive at the start of
the game. Let Alice acts with identity Iˆ on ρin with probability p and with σˆx with probability
(1− p). Similarly, let Bob acts with identity Iˆ with probability q and with σˆx with probability
(1− q). After the players’ actions the state changes to
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ρfin = pqIˆA ⊗ IˆBρinIˆ†A ⊗ Iˆ†B + p(1− q)IˆA ⊗ σˆxBρinIˆ†A ⊗ σˆ†xB+
q(1− p)σˆxA ⊗ IˆBρinσˆ†xA ⊗ Iˆ†B+
(1− p)(1− q)σˆxA ⊗ σˆxBρinσˆ†xA ⊗ σˆ†xB (4.23)
For the bi-matrix:
Alice
S1
S2
Bob
S1 S2
 (αA, αB) (βA, βB)
(γA, γB) (δA, δB)

 (4.24)
Marinatto and Weber defined the following payoff operators
(PA)oper = αA |00〉 〈00|+ βA |01〉 〈01|+ γA |10〉 〈10| + δA |11〉 〈11|
(PB)oper = αB |00〉 〈00| + βB |01〉 〈01|+ γB |10〉 〈10|+ δB |11〉 〈11| (4.25)
where the states |0〉 and |1〉 are used for the measurement basis, corresponding to the pure
strategies S1 and S2, respectively. The payoff functions are then obtained as mean values of
these operators:
PA,B = Tr {(PA,B)operρfin} (4.26)
Fig. (4-2) sketches the idea of playing a quantum game in Marinatto and Weber’s scheme.
The scheme was developed for the BoS given by the matrix (2.4). On receiving an initial
strategy:
ψini =
1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉) (4.27)
the players’ tactics cannot change it, and the final strategy remains identical to the initial one.
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Figure 4-2: Marinatto and Weber’s scheme to play a quantum game.
The players’ expected payoffs are maximized for the tactics p∗ = q∗ = 0 or p∗ = q∗ = 1, that
is, both players either apply σˆx with certainty or Iˆ with certainty. In either case the expected
payoff is (α+ β)/2 to each player. Marinatto and Weber suggested that a unique solution thus
exists in the game.
4.3.5 Quantum version of the Monty Hall problem
Monty Hall is a game in which Alice secretly selects one door out of three to place a prize there.
It is now Bob’s turn who picks a door. Alice then opens a different door showing that the prize
is not behind it. Bob now has the option of changing to the untouched door or sticking with
his current selection. In classical version of the game Bob’s optimum strategy is to alter his
choice of door and it doubles his chances of winning.
Li et al. [53], Flitney and Abbot [54] and D’Ariano et al. [55] have proposed various
quantum versions of the Monty Hall problem.
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4.3.6 Quantum market games
During recent years Piotrowski and Sladkowski [56, 57, 58] have proposed quantum-like descrip-
tion of markets and economics. This development can be shown having roots in quantum game
theory and is considered part of new field of econophysics. In econophysics [60] mathematical
techniques developed by physicists are used to analyze the complex financial and economic
systems. Developments in econophysics have motivated some authors [61] to ask about the
possibility of a meaning of Heisenberg uncertainty principle in economics. Others have even
claimed that quantum mechanics and mathematical economics are isomorphic [62].
4.3.7 Quantum Parrondo’s Games
A Parrondo’s game is an interesting problem in game theory. Two games that are losing when
played individually can be combined to produce a winning game. The game can be put into
the form of a gambling utilizing a set of biased coins.
Flitney and Abbott [63, 64] studied a quantum version of the Parrondo’s game where the
rotation operators representing the toss of a classical biased coin are replaced by general SU(2)
operators to transform the game into the quantum domain. They found that superposition of
qubits can couple the two games and produce interference leading to different payoffs than in
the classical case.
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Chapter 5
Comments on proposed set-ups to
play quantum games
Meyer [19] demonstrated with the example of a penny-flip game how quantum mechanics can
affect game theory. He introduced a game where a suitable quantum strategy can beat any
classical strategy. Comments and criticism followed soon after this demonstration of the power
of quantum strategies, which are reviewed in the following.
5.1 Enk’s comment on Meyer’s quantum Penny-Flip
Though agreeing that Meyer reached a correct conclusion, Enk [65] commented that Meyer’s
particular example is flawed for the following reasons:
• Q’s quantum strategy can also be implemented classically.
• Meyer’s game only shows the superiority of an extended set of strategies over a restricted
one, which is not surprising.
• A single qubit is not truly a quantum system because its dynamics and its response to
measurements can also be described by a classical hidden-variable model. Bell’s inequal-
ities, or the Kochen-Specker theorem, do not exist for a two-dimensional system, thus
making it possible to explicitly construct classical models for such systems.
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5.1.1 Meyer’s reply
Meyer replied [66] and disagreed with Enk’s claim that the existence of classical models for
Q’s strategy necessarily prevents it from being called quantum mechanical. He argued as the
following:
• Enk’s claim implies that P’s strategy is also not classical because quantum models exist
for flipping a two-state system.
• Though classical models do indeed exist for qubit systems but they scale exponentially
as the number of qubits increase.
Entangled qubits do not possess classical models but entanglement itself has been shown
unnecessary to outperform a quantum algorithm from a classical one. For example, Grover’s
algorithm [8], although discovered in the context of quantum computation, can be implemented
using a system allowing superposition of states, like classical coupled simple harmonic oscillators
[67]. It does not seem fair to claim that such an implementation prohibits calling it a quantum
algorithm.
Related to the third point in Enk’s comment, it seems related to mention that recently
Khrennikov [68] proved an analogue of Bell’s inequality for conditional probabilities. Interest-
ingly the inequality can be applied not only to pairs of correlated particles, but also to a single
particle. The inequality is violated for spin projections of the single particle. Khrennikov con-
cludes that a realistic pre-quantum model does not exist even for the two-dimensional Hilbert
space.
5.2 Benjamin and Hayden’s comment on quantization of Pris-
oners’ Dilemma
Eisert et al. obtained Qˆ as the new quantum equilibrium in PD, when both players have
access to a two-parameter set (4.17) of unitary 2 × 2 matrices. Benjamin and Hayden [69]
observed that when their two-parameter set is extended to all local unitary operations (i.e. all
of SU(2)) the strategy Qˆ does not remain an equilibrium. They showed that in the full space
of deterministic quantum strategies there exists no equilibrium for Eisert et al.’s quantum PD.
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They also observed that Eisert’s set of two-parameter quantum strategies is not closed under
composition, which is reasonable requirement for a set of quantum strategies.
5.3 Benjamin’s comment on Marinatto and Weber’s quantum
Battle of Sexes
In his comment Benjamin [70] made two observations about Marinatto and Weber’s quantum
battle of sexes:
• The overall quantization scheme is fundamentally very similar to the Eisert et al.’s pre-
viously proposed scheme [20].
• The quantum BoS does not have a unique solution. Though the dilemma may be easier
to resolve in its quantum version, the players still face it as they do in the traditional
game.
In the quantum BoS the players’s expected payoffs are maximized when their tactics consist
of either both applying Iˆ with certainty (p∗ = 1, q∗ = 1) or both applying σˆx with certainty (p∗ =
0, q∗ = 0). Marinatto and Weber concluded that an entangled initial strategy (|00〉+ |11〉)/√2,
therefore, gives a unique solution in the game. Given that the players’ tactics are independent,
the players are faced with a dilemma once again in opting for (p∗ = 1, q∗ = 1) or (p∗ = 0, q∗ = 0).
Mismatched tactics, i.e. (p∗ = 1, q∗ = 0) or (p∗ = 0, q∗ = 1), both lead to a worst-case situation.
Benjamin [70] also pointed out a difference in terminology. In Marinatto and Weber’s set-up
an initial strategy, in the form of a quantum state, is forwarded to the players who then apply
their tactics to modify the state. In the Eisert et al.’s scheme, on the other hand, players’
‘moves’ are their manipulations, and their overall act of choosing what move to play is their
strategy.
Recently Nawaz and Toor [71] showed that by using a more general initial quantum state
the dilemma in the classical BoS can be resolved, and a unique solution can be found.
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5.3.1 Marinatto and Weber’s reply
In a reply Marinatto and Weber [72] defended their choice of calling strategies the quantum
states instead of operators used to manipulate them. They claimed that their choice is very
natural and consistent with the spirit of classical game theory, where at the start of a game
each player has at her disposal an ensemble of strategies.
Regarding Benjamin’s claim that the dilemma persists in quantum BoS since players cannot
decide between the two options, i.e. (p∗ = 0, q∗ = 0) and (p∗ = 1, q∗ = 1), Marinatto and Weber
replied that the second option of doing nothing (p∗ = 1, q∗ = 1) amounts to the most rational
behavior of the two players. According to them no incentive exists for a player for doing
something (i.e. p∗ = 0 or q∗ = 0) because:
• It cannot lead to a better payoff and each player knows that.
• It only generates the extra risk of incurring a loss.
• It is more expensive than doing nothing, in terms of resources needed to operate on the
strategies.
5.3.2 ‘Quantum form’ of a matrix game and initial quantum states
In Eisert et al.’s set-up when the parameter γ of the initial quantum state is different from zero,
the players’ payoffs are generally non-classical, except for special moves available to them that
can result in the classical payoffs. Eisert et al. allow a range of values to the parameter γ and
found how it affects the equilibria of the game.
Marinatto and Weber [52] forward an initial strategy to the two players who then apply
their ‘tactics’ on it. In their scheme the classical game corresponds to the initial state |00〉.
Suppose the players receive pure two-qubit states, different from |00〉, but the measurement
uses the same payoff operators. The payoff operators used in measurement in Marinatto and
Weber’s scheme contains all the information about what matrix game is being played. Given
the measurement apparatus remains the same, a ‘quantum form’ of the matrix game can be
obtained by only choosing among different initial states. Hence, this approach translates the
problem of finding a quantum form of a matrix game to the problem of finding a pure initial
state.
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The approach should be seen from the view that the only restriction on a ‘quantum form’ of
a game is that the corresponding classical game must be reproducible as a special case. Because
a product initial state results in a classical game, therefore, the above approach is within the
mentioned restriction.
The Eisert et al.’s set-up suggests studying the behavior of equilibria in relation to the
parameter γ. The above approach, on the other hand, suggests studying the behavior of
equilibria in relation to different pure initial states.
5.4 Enk and Pike’s comment on quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma
More recently Enk and Pike [73] have argued that the quantum solutions of PD, found by
Eisert et al. [20], are neither quantum mechanical nor do they solve the classical game. Their
argument is based on the observation that it is possible to capture the essence of quantized PD
by simply extending the payoff matrix of the classical game, by only including an additional
purely classical move corresponding to Qˆ, which Eisert et al. obtained as a new quantum-
mechanical ‘solution-move’ that could remove the dilemma inherent in the game. Enk and Pike
maintained that when Eisert’s quantum solution to PD can be reconstructed in a classical way,
the only defense that remains for its quantum solution is its efficiency, which does not play a
role in PD.
Enk and Pike also suggested that a quantum game that exploits non-classical correlations
in entangled states, similar to those that violate the Bell’s inequality, should be worthy of in-
vestigation. Such correlations are without a role in Eisert et al.’s set-up, and other quantization
procedures derived from it, even though entangled states may be present. It is because various
qubits, after their local unitary manipulations, are brought together during the final stage of
the game to make the payoffs-generating measurement.
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Chapter 6
Evolutionary stability in quantum
games
6.1 Introduction
As discussed in Section (2.7), the concept of an ESS was introduced in classical game theory
for two reasons:
1. Two player games can have multiple Nash equilibria and ESS offers its refinement notion.
2. Population biology problems can be modelled with the help of the ESS concept.
The reasons for claim that (1) holds for quantum as well as classical games are not far from
obvious. In our opinion the reason (2) also has a meaning in a quantum context. Like NE, the
ESS is a game-theoretic concept. The concept assumes a population setting which is relevant
to problems in evolutionary biology. As a game-theoretic concept, the ESS is equally worthy
of investigation as the concept of NE is in relation to quantization of games. The view that
a population setting of evolutionary biology can not be relevant in quantum games is based
on the assumption that the participants in a quantum game must always be rational agents.
We believe that when the rewards for players, forming a population, not only depend on their
individual moves but also on whether the game they play is classical or quantum in nature,
then the concepts fundamentally developed for a population setting also become relevant in
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a quantum context. As mentioned in the Section (2.7), John Nash himself had a population
setting in his mind when he introduced his equilibrium notion. His equilibrium notion is well-
known from the early known studies in quantum games. The fact that a population setting was
behind the notion of a NE provides an almost natural relevance of this setting for the quantum
games as well. The idea of a population of ‘quantum players’ itself is not very much beyond
imagination. Such a population may, for example, consist of a large number of interacting
molecules where ‘decisions’ are taken in individual quantum interactions. These interactions
can easily be imagined pair-wise and also random, which are the fundamental assumptions
behind the concept of an ESS.
In quantum setting the players’ payoffs become sensitive to quantum affects. Which direc-
tion evolution drives the population of quantum players now? The direction should, of course,
be decided by the nature of quantum affects.
6.2 Quantization as a refinement notion of Nash equilibrium?
Research in quantum games [20, 52] has shown appearance of entirely new equilibria on quanti-
zation of a game. The next logical question is to ask whether quantization can provide another
refinement to the NE concept? Such a question is relevant in a situation where an equilibrium
is retained, whether the game is played classically or quantum mechanically, but some property
of the equilibrium changes during such a switch-over. ESS, being a refinement notion of the
NE concept, is a symmetric NE with an extra property of stability against small perturbations.
We believe the question whether quantization can affect stability of a symmetric NE is equally
interesting as the question how quantization leads to different equilibria.
6.3 Quantization changing evolutionary stability?
Our motivation is how game-theoretic models, of evolutionary dynamics in a population, shape
themselves in the new setting recently provided to game theory by quantum mechanics? This
motivation is, in a sense, a portion of a bigger question: Can quantum mechanics have a role
in directing, or even dictating, the dynamics of evolution? To study evolution in a quantum
setting we have chosen the ESS concept firstly for its beauty and simplicity. Secondly, because
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ESS is a game-theoretical concept, the new developments in quantum games themselves pro-
vide a motivation to look at the resulting effects on such concepts. Following questions arise
immediately:
• How ESSs are affected when a classical game, played by a population, changes itself to
one of its quantum forms?
• How pure and mixed ESSs are distinguished from one another when such a change in the
form of a game takes place?
And most importantly
• How and if evolutionary dynamics can be related to quantum entanglement?
Imagine a population of players in which a classical strategy has established itself as an
ESS. We ask:
• What happens when ‘mutants’ of ESS theory come up with quantum strategies and try
to invade the classical ESS?
• What happens if such an invasion is successful and a new ESS is established – an ESS
that is quantum in nature?
• Suppose afterwards another small group of mutants appears which is equipped with some
other quantum strategy. Would it be successful now to invade the quantum ESS?
In the following we present an analysis based on these questions considering a population
in which symmetric pair-wise contests are taking place.
In trying to extend an idea, originally proposed for problems in population biology, to
quantum domain we give an analysis using Eisert et al.’s quantization of the symmetric bi-
matrix game of PD.
6.4 ESSs in Eisert, Wilkens and Lewenstein’s scheme
For PD Cooperation (C) and Defection (D) are the pure classical strategies. Which strategies
are likely to be stable and persistent when the game is played by a population engaged in
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pair-wise contests? In each such contest PD is played. Straightforward analysis [33] shows that
D will be the pure classical strategy prevalent in the population and hence the classical ESS.
Eisert et al. used the matrix (2.2) in their quantum version of PD. Assume a population
setting where in each pair-wise encounter the players play PD with the same matrix. Consider
the following three situations:
1. A small group of mutants appear equipped with one-parameter quantum strategy Uˆ(θ)
when D exists as a classical ESS.
2. The mutants are equipped with two-parameter quantum strategy Uˆ(θ, φ) against the
classical ESS.
3. The mutants have successfully invaded and a two-parameter quantum strategy Qˆ ∼
Uˆ(0, π/2) has established itself as a new quantum ESS. Again another small group of
mutants appear, using some other two-parameter quantum strategy, and try to invade
the quantum ESS, that is Qˆ.
6.4.1 Case (1)
In quantum PD with the matrix (2.2):

 (3, 3) (0, 5)
(5, 0) (1, 1)

 (6.1)
the players are anonymous and one can denote, for example, P (Uˆ (θ),D) to represent the payoff
to Uˆ(θ)-player against the D-player. Here Uˆ(θ) is the Eisert et al.’s one-parameter quantum
strategy set (4.16). Players’ payoffs can be found as
P (Uˆ(θ),D) = sin2(θ/2)
P (Uˆ(θ), Uˆ(θ)) = 2 cos2(θ/2) + 5 cos2(θ/2) sin2(θ/2) + 1
P (D, Uˆ(θ)) = 5 cos2(θ/2) + sin2(θ/2)
P (D,D) = 1 (6.2)
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Now P (D,D) > P (Uˆ(θ),D) for all θ ∈ [0, π). Hence the first condition for an ESS holds and
D ∼ Uˆ(π) is an ESS. The case θ = π corresponds to one-parameter mutant strategy coinciding
with the ESS, which is ruled out. If D ∼ Uˆ(π) is played by almost all the members of the
population – which corresponds to high frequency FD for D – we then have W (D) > W (θ) for
all θ ∈ [0, π). The fitness of a one-parameter quantum strategy1, therefore, cannot be greater
than that of a classical ESS. And a one-parameter quantum strategy cannot invade a classical
ESS.
6.4.2 Case (2)
Let Uˆ(θ, φ) be a two-parameter strategy from the set (4.17). The expected payoffs are
P (D,D) = 1
P (D, Uˆ(θ, φ)) = 5 cos2(φ) cos2(θ/2) + sin2(θ/2)
P (Uˆ(θ, φ),D) = 5 sin2(φ) cos2(θ/2) + sin2(θ/2)
P (Uˆ(θ, φ), Uˆ (θ, φ)) = 3
∣∣cos(2φ) cos2(θ/2)∣∣2 + 5cos2(θ/2) sin2(θ/2) |sin(φ)− cos(φ)|2+∣∣sin(2φ) cos2(θ/2) + sin2(θ/2)∣∣2 (6.3)
Here P (D,D) > P (Uˆ (θ, φ),D) if φ < arcsin(1/
√
5) and if P (D,D) = P (Uˆ(θ, φ),D) then
P (D, Uˆ (θ, φ)) > P (Uˆ(θ, φ), Uˆ (θ, φ)). Therefore D is an ESS if φ < arcsin(1/
√
5) otherwise the
strategy Uˆ(θ, φ) will be in position to invade D. Alternatively if most of the members of the
population play D ∼ Uˆ(π, 0) – meaning high frequency FD for D – then the fitness W (D)
will remain greater than the fitness W [Uˆ(θ, φ)] if φ < arcsin(1/
√
5). For φ > arcsin(1/
√
5) the
strategy Uˆ(θ, φ) can invade the strategy D, which is the classical ESS.
In this analysis the possession of a richer strategy by the mutants leads to invasion ofD when
φ > arcsin(1/
√
5). Such an invasion may seem not so unusual given the mutants exploiting
richer strategies. But it leads to the third case when ‘quantum mutants’ have successfully
invaded and a two-parameter strategy Uˆ has established itself. Can now some new mutants
1In Eisert et al.’s set-up one-parameter quantum strategies correspond to mixed (randomized) classical
strategies.
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coming up with Qˆ ∼ Uˆ(0, π/2) and invade the ‘quantum ESS’?
6.4.3 Case (3)
Eisert et al. [20, 46] showed that in their quantum PD the quantum strategy Qˆ, played by both
the players, is the unique NE. How mutants playing Qˆ come up against Uˆ(θ, φ) which already
exists as an ESS? To find it following payoffs are obtained.
P (Qˆ, Qˆ) = 3
P (Uˆ(θ, φ), Qˆ) = [3− 2 cos2(φ)] cos2(θ/2)
P (Qˆ, Uˆ (θ, φ)) = [3− 2 cos2(φ)] cos2(θ/2) + 5 sin2(θ/2) (6.4)
Now the inequality P (Qˆ, Qˆ) > P (Uˆ(θ, φ), Qˆ) holds for all θ ∈ [0, π] and φ ∈ [0, π/2] except
when θ = 0 and φ = π/2, which is the case when the mutant strategy Uˆ(θ, φ) is the same as Qˆ.
This case is obviously ruled out. The first condition for Qˆ to be an ESS, therefore, holds. The
condition P (Qˆ, Qˆ) = P (Uˆ (θ, φ), Qˆ) implies θ = 0 and φ = π/2. Again we have the situation
of mutant strategy same as Qˆ and the case is neglected. If Qˆ is played by most of the players,
meaning high frequency F
Qˆ
for Qˆ, then W (Qˆ) > W [Uˆ(θ, φ)] for all θ ∈ (0, π] and φ ∈ [0, π/2).
A two parameter quantum strategy Uˆ(θ, φ), therefore, cannot invade the quantum ESS (i.e.
the strategy Qˆ ∼ Uˆ(0, π/2)). Mutants’ access to richer strategies, as it happens in the case (B),
does not continue to be an advantage and most of the population also have access to it. Hence
Qˆ comes out as the unique NE and ESS of the game.
6.5 ESSs in Marinatto and Weber’s scheme
What happens to PD, from the point of view of evolutionary stability, when it is played via
Marinatto and Weber’s scheme [52]? In our view this scheme is more suitable for consideration
of evolutionary stability in quantum regime for the following reasons:
• In a symmetric bi-matrix game, played in a population setting, players have access to two
pure strategies. Players can also play a mixed strategy by combining the pure strategies
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with certain probabilities. In a similar way players in Marinatto and Weber’s scheme can
be said to play a mixed strategy when they apply the two unitary operators, on the initial
state, with a probabilistic combination.
• Definition (2.21) of fitness of a pure strategy in evolutionary games [33] can be given a
straightforward extension in Marinatto and Weber’s scheme. It corresponds to a situation
when, in the quantum game, a player uses only one unitary operator out of the two.
• Theory of ESSs, in the classical domain, deals with anonymous players possessing a dis-
crete number of pure strategies. Eisert’s scheme involves players possessing a continuum
of pure quantum strategies. The concept of an ESS as a stable equilibrium is confronted
with problems [74] when players possess a continuum of pure strategies.
6.5.1 Example of quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma
Assume the PD, defined by the matrix (6.1), is played with Marinatto and Weber’s scheme.
The initial state made available to the players is
|ψin〉 = a |CC〉+ b |DD〉 , with |a|2 + |b|2 = 1 (6.5)
where |C〉 ∼ |0〉 and |D〉 ∼ |1〉. Payoffs to Alice and Bob can be found as
PA(p, q) = 3{pq |a|2 + (1− p)(1− q) |b|2}+ 5{p(1− q) |b|2 + q(1− p) |a|2}+
{pq |b|2 + (1− p)(1− q) |a|2}
PB(p, q) = 3{pq |a|2 + (1− p)(1− q) |b|2}+ 5{p(1− q) |a|2 + q(1− p) |b|2}+
{pq |b|2 + (1− p)(1− q) |a|2} (6.6)
where p and q are the probabilities for Alice and Bob, respectively, to act with the operator
Iˆ. We look for symmetric Nash equilibria from the Nash inequalities while using only the
parameter b ∈ C of the initial state |ψin〉. For the state (6.5) the game is reduced to the
classical game when |b|2 = 0, i.e. when it is a product state. Nash inequalities are then
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PA(
⋆
p,
⋆
q)− PA(p, ⋆q) = (⋆p− p){3 |b|2 − (⋆q + 1)} ≥ 0
PB(
⋆
p,
⋆
q)− PB(⋆p, q) = (⋆q − q){3 |b|2 − (⋆p+ 1)} ≥ 0 (6.7)
Here the parameter b decides what should be the Nash equilibria of the game. Three symmetric
equilibria arise:
1.
⋆
p =
⋆
q = 0 when 3 |b|2 ≤ 1
2.
⋆
p =
⋆
q = 1 when 3 |b|2 ≥ 2
3.
⋆
p =
⋆
q = 3 |b|2 − 1 when 1 < 3 |b|2 < 2 (6.8)
The first two equilibria are independent of the parameter b while the third depends on it. We
ask which of these equilibria are evolutionary stable assuming that an equilibrium exists for
initial states of the form (6.5). Because the players play a symmetric game, the payoff to a
player using Iˆ with probability p, when opponent uses it with the probability q, can be written
as
P (p, q) = 3{pq |a|2 + (1− p)(1− q) |b|2}+ 5{p(1− q) |b|2 + q(1− p) |a|2}+
{pq |b|2 + (1− p)(1− q) |a|2} (6.9)
which can also be identified as the payoff to the p-player against the q-player. For the strategy
pair
⋆
p =
⋆
q = 0 one gets P (0, 0) > P (p, 0) when 3 |b|2 < 1 and P (0, 0) = P (p, 0) imply 3 |b|2 = 1.
Also P (q, q) = −q2 + 53(q + 1) and P (0, q) = 53(q + 1). Now P (0, q) > P (q, q) when q 6= 0.
Therefore the pair
⋆
p =
⋆
q = 0 is an ESS when 3 |b|2 ≤ 1.
For the pair
⋆
p =
⋆
q = 1 we have P (1, 1) > P (p, 1) which means 3 |b|2 > 2 if p 6= 1. And
P (1, 1) = P (p, 1) means for p 6= 1 we have 3 |b|2 = 2. In such case P (q, q) = −q2+ 13(q+7) and
P (1, q) = 53(2 − q). Now P (1, q) > P (q, q) because (1− q)2 > 0 for q 6= 1. Therefore
⋆
p =
⋆
q = 1
is an ESS when 3 |b|2 ≥ 2.
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For the third pair,
⋆
p =
⋆
q = 3 |b|2−1, we get P (3 |b|2−1, 3 |b|2−1) = −36 |b|6+36 |b|4−5 |b|2+6.
Also we find P (p, 3 |b|2−1) = −21 |b|4+21 |b|2−3. Hence, the condition P (3 |b|2−1, 3 |b|2−1) >
P (p, 3 |b|2 − 1) holds and the pair ⋆p = ⋆q = 3 |b|2 − 1 is an ESS for 1 < 3 |b|2 < 2.
All three symmetric equilibria, definable for different ranges of |b|2, are also ESSs. Each of
the three sets of initial states |ψin〉 give a unique equilibrium which is an ESS too. Switching
from one to the other set of initial states also changes the equilibrium and ESS accordingly.
A question arises here: Is it possible that a particular equilibrium switches-over between
‘ESS’ and ‘not ESS’ when the initial state changes between some of its possible choices? The
question is relevant given the fact that transition between classical and quantum game is also
achieved by a change in the initial state: classical payoffs are obtained when the initial state is
a product state. It implies that it may be possible for a symmetric NE to switch-over between
being ‘ESS’ and being ‘not ESS’ when a game changes between its ‘classical’ and ‘quantum’
forms. This possibility makes the ESS concept interesting also from the point of view of
quantum games. Because the quantum PD, in the form considered above, does not allow such
a possibility, therefore, asymmetric bi-matrix games are investigated now.
6.5.2 ESSs in two-player two-strategy asymmetric games
ESS for an asymmetric bi-matrix game, i.e. G = (M,N) when N 6= MT , is defined as a strict
NE [32]. A strategy pair (
⋆
x,
⋆
y) ∈ S is an ESS of the game G if it is a strict NE:
1. PA(
⋆
x,
⋆
y) > PA(x,
⋆
y) for all x 6= ⋆x
2. PB(
⋆
x,
⋆
y) > PB(
⋆
x, y) for all y 6= ⋆y (6.10)
For example, consider BoS with the matrix:

 (α, β) (γ, γ)
(γ, γ) (β, α)

 (6.11)
where α > β > γ. It is a asymmetric game with three classical NE [52]:
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1.
⋆
p1 =
⋆
q1 = 0
2.
⋆
p2 =
⋆
q2 = 1
3.
⋆
p3 =
α− γ
α+ β − 2γ
⋆
q3 =
β − γ
α+ β − 2γ (6.12)
The equilibria (1) and (2) are also ESS’s but (3) is not because it is not a strict NE. The
asymmetric game (6.11) played with an initial state |ψin〉 = a |S1S1〉+ b |S2S2〉, where S1 and
S2 are players’ pure classical strategies, has the following three Nash equilibria [52]:
1.
⋆
p1 =
⋆
q1 = 1
2.
⋆
p2 =
⋆
q2 = 0
3.
⋆
p3 =
(α− γ) |a|2 + (β − γ) |b|2
α+ β − 2γ
⋆
q3 =
(α− γ) |b|2 + (β − γ) |a|2
α+ β − 2γ
(6.13)
Similar to the classical case, the equilibria (1) and (2) are ESSs while (3) is not. First two
ESSs do not depend on the parameters a and b of the initial state while the third NE does.
Interestingly, playing BoS game with a different initial state:
|ψin〉 = a |S1S2〉+ b |S2S1〉 (6.14)
changes the scene. The payoffs to Alice and Bob are:
PA(p, q) = p
{
−q(α+ β − 2γ) + α |a|2 + β |b|2 − γ
}
+
q
{
α |b|2 + β |a|2 − γ
}
+ γ
PB(p, q) = q
{
−p(α+ β − 2γ) + β |a|2 + α |b|2 − γ
}
+
p
{
β |b|2 + α |a|2 − γ
}
+ γ (6.15)
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and there is only one NE i.e.
⋆
p =
β |a|2 + α |b|2 − γ
α+ β − γ
⋆
q3 =
α |a|2 + β |b|2 − γ
α+ β − γ (6.16)
which is not an ESS. So that no ESS exists when BoS is played with the state (6.14).
An essential requirement on a quantum version of a game is that the corresponding classical
game must be its subset. Suppose for a quantum game, corresponding to an asymmetric bi-
matrix classical game, a particular strategy pair (
⋆
x,
⋆
y) is an ESS for all initial states |ψin〉 given
in some particular form. That is, it remains an ESS for all a and b when |ψin〉 is given in terms
of a and b. Because classical game is a subset of the quantum game, the strategy pair (
⋆
x,
⋆
y)
must then also be an ESS in the classical game. On the other hand a strategy pair (
⋆
x,
⋆
y) which
is an ESS in a classical game may not remain so in its quantum version.
Quantization of an asymmetric classical game can thus make disappear the classical ESSs
but it cannot make appear new ESSs, provided an ESS in quantum version remains so for every
possible choice of the parameters a and b. However when an ESS is defined as a strict NE
existing only for a set of initial states for which that NE exists, the statement that quantization
can only make disappear classically available ESSs may not remain valid. In such a case
quantization may make appear new ESSs definable for certain ranges of the parameters a and
b.
To find games with the property that a particular NE switches over between ‘ESS’ and ‘not
ESS’ when the initial state changes between its possible choices, we now look at the following
asymmetric quantum game:

 (α1, α2) (β1, β2)
(γ1, γ2) (σ1, σ2)

 (6.17)
where

 α1 β1
γ1 σ1

 6=

 α2 β2
γ2 σ2


T
(6.18)
For the initial state |ψin〉 = a |S1S1〉+ b |S2S2〉 the players’ payoffs are:
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PA,B(p, q) = α1,2
{
pq |a|2 + (1− p)(1− q) |b|2
}
+
β1,2
{
p(1− q) |a|2 + q(1− p) |b|2
}
+
γ1,2
{
p(1− q) |b|2 + q(1− p) |a|2
}
+
σ1,2
{
pq |b|2 + (1− p)(1− q) |a|2
}
(6.19)
The NE conditions are
PA(
⋆
p,
⋆
q)− PA(p, ⋆q) =
(
⋆
p − p)
[
|a|2 (β1 − σ1) + |b|2 (γ1 − α1)− ⋆q {(β1 − σ1) + (γ1 − α1)}
]
≥ 0 (6.20)
PB(
⋆
p,
⋆
q)− PB(⋆p, q) =
(
⋆
q − q)
[
|a|2 (γ2 − σ2) + |b|2 (β2 − α2)− ⋆p {(γ2 − σ2) + (β2 − α2)}
]
≥ 0 (6.21)
Let now
⋆
p =
⋆
q = 0 be a NE:
PA(0, 0) − PA(p, 0) = −p
[
(β1 − σ1) + |b|2 {(γ1 − α1)− (β1 − σ1)}
]
≥ 0
PB(0, 0) − PB(0, q) = −q
[
(γ2 − σ2) + |b|2 {(β2 − α2)− (γ2 − σ2)}
]
≥ 0
(6.22)
When the strategy pair (0, 0) is an ESS in the classical game (i.e. |b|2 = 0) we should have
PA(0, 0) − PA(p, 0) = −p(β1 − σ1) > 0 for all p 6= 0
PB(0, 0) − PB(0, q) = −q(γ2 − σ2) > 0 for all q 6= 0 (6.23)
It implies (β1 − σ1) < 0 and (γ2 − σ2) < 0.
For the pair (0, 0) to be not an ESS for some |b|2 6= 0, let take γ1 = α1 and β2 = α2. We
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have
PA(0, 0) − PA(p, 0) = −p(β1 − σ1)
{
1− |b|2
}
PB(0, 0) − PB(0, q) = −q(γ2 − σ2)
{
1− |b|2
}
(6.24)
and the pair (0, 0) doesn’t remain an ESS at |b|2 = 1. A game with these properties is given by
the matrix:

 (1, 1) (1, 2)
(2, 1) (3, 2)

 (6.25)
For this game the pair (0, 0) is an ESS when |b|2 = 0 (classical game) but it is not when for
example |b|2 = 12 , though it remains a NE in both the cases. The example shows a NE can be
switched between ESS and ‘not ESS’ by adjusting the parameters a and b of the initial state.
Opposite to the previous case, the initial states - different from the one corresponding to the
classical game - can also make a strategy pair an ESS. An example of a game for which it
happens is
S1
S2
S1 S2
 (2, 1) (1, 0)
(1, 0) (1, 0)

 (6.26)
Playing this game again via |ψin〉 = a |S1S1〉+ b |S2S2〉 gives the following payoff differences for
the strategy pair (0, 0):
PA(0, 0) − PA(p, 0) = p |b|2 and PB(0, 0) − PB(0, q) = q |b|2 (6.27)
for Alice and Bob respectively. Therefore (6.26) is an example of a game for which the pair
(0, 0) is not an ESS when the initial state corresponds to the classical game. But the pair is an
ESS for other initial states for which 0 < |b|2 < 1.
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6.5.3 ESSs in two-player two-strategy symmetric games
To explore a possible relation between evolutionary stability and quantization consider the
following symmetric bi-matrix game:
Alice
S1
S2
Bob
S1 S2
 (α,α) (β, γ)
(γ, β) (δ, δ)

 (6.28)
which is played by an initial state:
|ψin〉 = a |S1S1〉+ b |S2S2〉 , with |a|2 + |b|2 = 1 (6.29)
Let Alice’s strategy consists of applying the identity operator Iˆ with probability p and the
operator σˆx with probability (1− p), on the initial state written ρin in density matrix notation.
Similarly Bob applies the operators Iˆ and σˆx with the probabilities q and (1− q) respectively.
The final state is
ρfin =
∑
Uˆ=Iˆ ,σˆx
Pr(UˆA) Pr(UˆB)[UˆA ⊗ UˆBρinUˆ †A ⊗ Uˆ †B ] (6.30)
where unitary and Hermitian operator Uˆ is either Iˆ or σˆx. Pr(UˆA), Pr(UˆB) are the probabilities,
for Alice and Bob respectively, to apply the operator on the initial state. The matrix ρfin is
obtained from ρin by a convex combination of players’ possible quantum operations. Payoff
operators for Alice and Bob are [52]
(PA,B)oper = α,α |S1S1〉 〈S1S1|+ β, γ |S1S2〉 〈S1S2|+ γ, β |S2S1〉 〈S2S1|+ δ, δ |S2S2〉 〈S2S2|
(6.31)
The payoffs are then obtained as mean values of these operators i.e. PA,B =Tr[(PA,B)operρfin].
Because the quantum game is symmetric with the initial state (6.29) and the payoff matrix
(6.28), there is no need for subscripts. We can , then, write the payoff to a p-player against a
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q-player as P (p, q), where the first number is the focal player’s move. When
⋆
p is a NE we find
the following payoff difference:
P (
⋆
p,
⋆
p)− P (p, ⋆p) = (⋆p− p)[ |a|2 (β − δ)+
|b|2 (γ − α)− ⋆p {(β − δ) + (γ − α)} ] (6.32)
Now the ESS conditions for the pure strategy p = 0 are given as
1. |b|2 {(β − δ)− (γ − α)} > (β − δ)
2. If |b|2 {(β − δ)− (γ − α)} = (β − δ)
then q2 {(β − δ) + (γ − α)} > 0 (6.33)
where 1 is the NE condition. Similarly the ESS conditions for the pure strategy p = 1 are
1. |b|2 {(γ − α)− (β − δ)} > (γ − α)
2. If |b|2 {(γ − α)− (β − δ)} = (γ − α)
then (1− q)2 {(β − δ) + (γ − α)} > 0 (6.34)
Because these conditions, for both the pure strategies p = 1 and p = 0, depend on |b|2,
therefore, there can be examples of two-player symmetric games for which the evolutionary
stability of pure strategies can be changed while playing the game using initial state in the
form |ψin〉 = a |S1S1〉 + b |S2S2〉. However, for the mixed NE, given as ⋆p = |a|
2(β−δ)+|b|2(γ−α)
(β−δ)+(γ−α) ,
the corresponding payoff difference (6.32) becomes identically zero. From the second condition
of an ESS we find for the mixed NE
⋆
p the difference
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P (
⋆
p, q)− P (q, q) = 1
(β − δ) + (γ − α)×
[(β − δ) − q {(β − δ) + (γ − α)} − |b|2 {(β − δ) − (γ − α)} ]2 (6.35)
Therefore, the mixed strategy
⋆
p is an ESS when {(β − δ) + (γ − α)} > 0. This condition,
making the mixed NE
⋆
p an ESS, is independent 2 of |b|2. So that, in this symmetric two-player
quantum game, evolutionary stability of the mixed NE
⋆
p can not be changed when the game is
played using initial quantum states of the form (6.29).
However, evolutionary stability of pure strategies can be affected, with this form of the
initial states, for two-player symmetric games. Examples of the games with this property are
easy to find. The class of games for which γ = α and (β − δ) < 0 the strategies p = 0 and
p = 1 remain NE for all |b|2 ∈ [0, 1]; but the strategy p = 1 is not an ESS when |b|2 = 0 and
the strategy p = 0 is not an ESS when |b|2 = 1.
An example
Consider the symmetric bi-matrix game (6.28) with the constants α, β, γ, δ satisfying the con-
ditions:
α, β, γ, δ ≥ 0
(δ − β) > 0
(γ − α) ≥ 0
(γ − α) < (δ − β) (6.36)
The condition making (p⋆, p⋆) a NE is given by (6.32). For this game three Nash equilibria
arise i.e. two pure strategies p∗ = 0, p∗ = 1, and one mixed strategy p∗ = (δ−β)|a|
2−(γ−α)|b|2
(δ−β)−(γ−α) .
2An alternative possibility is to adjust |b|2= (β−δ)−q{(β−δ)+(γ−α)}
{(β−δ)−(γ−α)}
which makes the difference{
P (
⋆
p, q)− P (q, q)
}
identically zero. The mixed strategy
⋆
p then does not remain an ESS. However such ‘mutant
dependent’ adjustment of |b|2 is not reasonable because the mutant strategy q can be anything in the range [0, 1].
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These three cases are considered below.
Case p⋆ = 0 For the strategy p⋆ = 0 to be a NE one requires
P (0, 0) − P (p, 0) = p
(γ − α) + (δ − β)
[
|a|2 − (γ − α)
(γ − α) + (δ − β)
]
≥ 0 (6.37)
and the difference {P (0, 0) − P (p, 0)} > 0 when 1 ≥ |a|2 > (γ−α)(γ−α)+(δ−β) . In this range of |a|2
the equilibrium p⋆ = 0 is a pure ESS. However, when |a|2 = (γ−α)(γ−α)+(δ−β) we have the difference
{P (0, 0) − P (p, 0)} identically zero. The strategy p⋆ = 0 can be an ESS if
P (0, p) − P (p, p)
= p {(γ − α) + (δ − β)}
{
|a|2 − (1− p)(γ − α) + p(δ − β)
(γ − α) + (δ − β)
}
> 0 (6.38)
that can be written as
P (0, p) − P (p, p) = p {(γ − α) + (δ − β)}
{
|a|2 −̥
}
> 0 (6.39)
where (γ−α)(γ−α)+(δ−β) ≤ ̥ ≤ (δ−β)(γ−α)+(δ−β) when 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. The strategy p⋆ = 0 can be an ESS only
when |a|2 > (δ−β)(γ−α)+(δ−β) which is not possible because |a|2 is fixed at (γ−α)(γ−α)+(δ−β) . Therefore the
strategy p⋆ = 0 is an ESS for 1 ≥ |a|2 > (γ−α)(γ−α)+(δ−β) and for |a|2 =
(γ−α)
(γ−α)+(δ−β) this NE becomes
unstable. The classical game is obtained by taking |a|2 = 1 for which p⋆ = 0 is an ESS or a
stable NE. However this NE does not remain stable for |a|2 = (γ−α)(γ−α)+(δ−β) which corresponds
to an entangled initial state; though the NE remains intact in both forms of the game.
Case p⋆ = 1 Similar to the last case the NE condition for the strategy p⋆ = 1 can be written
as
P (1, 1) − P (p, 1) = (1− p)
(γ − α) + (δ − β)
[
− |a|2 + (δ − β)
(γ − α) + (δ − β)
]
≥ 0 (6.40)
Now p⋆ = 1 is a pure ESS for 0 ≤ |a|2 < (δ−β)(γ−α)+(δ−β) . For |a|2 =
(δ−β)
(γ−α)+(δ−β) the difference
{P (1, 1) − P (p, 1)} becomes identically zero. The strategy p⋆ = 1 is an ESS when
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P (1, p)− P (p, p)
= (1− p) {(γ − α) + (δ − β)}
{
− |a|2 + (1 − p)(γ − α) + p(δ − β)
(γ − α) + (δ − β)
}
> 0
(6.41)
It is possible only if |a|2 < (γ−α)(γ−α)+(δ−β) . Therefore the strategy p⋆ = 1 is a stable NE (ESS) for
0 ≤ |a|2 < (δ−β)(γ−α)+(δ−β) . It is not stable classically (i.e. for |a|2 = 1) but becomes stable for an
entangled initial state.
Case p⋆ = (δ−β)|a|
2−(γ−α)|b|2
(δ−β)−(γ−α) In case of the mixed strategy:
p⋆ =
(δ − β) |a|2 − (γ − α) |b|2
(δ − β)− (γ − α) (6.42)
the NE condition (6.32) turns into
P (p⋆, p⋆)− P (p, p⋆) = 0 (6.43)
The mixed strategy (6.42) can be an ESS if
P (p⋆, p)− P (p, p)
= (p⋆ − p)
[
− |a|2 (δ − β) + |b|2 (γ − α) + p {(δ − β)− (γ − α)}
]
> 0
(6.44)
for all p 6= p⋆. Write now the strategy p as p = p⋆+△. For the mixed strategy (6.42) the payoff
difference of the Eq. (6.44) is reduced to
P (p⋆, p)− P (p, p) = −△2 {(δ − β)− (γ − α)} (6.45)
Hence, for the game defined in the conditions (6.36), the mixed strategy p⋆ = (δ−β)|a|
2−(γ−α)|b|2
(δ−β)−(γ−α)
cannot be an ESS, though it can be a NE of the symmetric game.
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It is to be pointed out that above considerations apply when the game is played with the
initial state (6.29).
To find examples of symmetric quantum games, where evolutionary stability of the mixed
strategies may also be affected by controlling the initial states, the number of players are now
increased from two to three.
6.5.4 ESSs in three-player two-strategy symmetric games
In extending the two-player scheme to a three-player case, we assume that three players A,B,
and C play their strategies by applying the identity operator Iˆ with the probabilities p, q
and r respectively on the initial state |ψin〉. Therefore, they apply the operator σˆx with the
probabilities (1− p), (1− q) and (1− r) respectively. The final state becomes
ρfin =
∑
Uˆ=Iˆ ,σˆx
Pr(UˆA) Pr(UˆB) Pr(UˆC)
[
UˆA ⊗ UˆB ⊗ UˆCρinUˆ †A ⊗ Uˆ †B ⊗ Uˆ †C
]
(6.46)
where the 8 basis vectors are |SiSjSk〉, for i, j, k = 1, 2. Again we use initial quantum state
in the form |ψin〉 = a |S1S1S1〉 + b |S2S2S2〉, where |a|2 + |b|2 = 1. It is a quantum state in
2 ⊗ 2 ⊗ 2 dimensional Hilbert space that can be prepared from a system of three two-state
quantum systems or qubits. Similar to the two-player case, the payoff operators for the players
A, B, and C can be defined as
(PA,B,C)oper =
α1, β1, η1 |S1S1S1〉 〈S1S1S1|+ α2, β2, η2 |S2S1S1〉 〈S2S1S1|+
α3, β3, η3 |S1S2S1〉 〈S1S2S1|+ α4, β4, η4 |S1S1S2〉 〈S1S1S2|+
α5, β5, η5 |S1S2S2〉 〈S1S2S2|+ α6, β6, η6 |S2S1S2〉 〈S2S1S2|+
α7, β7, η7 |S2S2S1〉 〈S2S2S1|+ α8, β8, η8 |S2S2S2〉 〈S2S2S2| (6.47)
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where αl, βl, ηl for 1 ≤ l ≤ 8 are 24 constants of the matrix of this three-player game. Payoffs
to the players A,B, and C are then obtained as mean values of these operators
PA,B,C(p, q, r) = Tr [(PA,B,C)operρfin] (6.48)
Here, similar to the two-player case, the classical payoffs can be obtained by making the initial
quantum state unentangled and fixing |b|2 = 0. To get a symmetric game we define PA(x, y, z)
as the payoff to player A when players A, B, and C play the strategies x, y, and z respectively.
With following relations the players’ payoffs become identity-independent.
PA(x, y, z) = PA(x, z, y) = PB(y, x, z)
= PB(z, x, y) = PC(y, z, x) = PC(z, y, x) (6.49)
The players in the game then become anonymous and their payoffs depend only on their strate-
gies. The relations (6.49) hold with the following replacements for βi and ηi:
β1 → α1 β2 → α3 β3 → α2 β4 → α3
β5 → α6 β6 → α5 β7 → α6 β8 → α8
η1 → α1 η2 → α3 η3 → α3 η4 → α2
η5 → α6 η6 → α6 η7 → α5 η8 → α8 (6.50)
Also, it is now necessary that we should have
α6 = α7, α3 = α4 (6.51)
A symmetric game between three players, therefore, can be defined by only six constants of the
payoff matrix. These constants can be taken as α1, α2, α3, α5, α6, and α8. Payoff to a p-player,
when other two players play q and r, can now be written as P (p, q, r). A symmetric NE
⋆
p is
now found from the Nash condition P (
⋆
p,
⋆
p,
⋆
p)− P (p, ⋆p, ⋆p) ≥ 0 i.e.
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P (
⋆
p,
⋆
p,
⋆
p)− P (p, ⋆p, ⋆p) = (⋆p− p)[⋆p2(1− 2 |b|2)(σ + ω − 2η)+
2
⋆
p
{
|b|2 (σ + ω − 2η)− ω + η
}
+
{
ω − |b|2 (σ + ω)
}
] ≥ 0 (6.52)
where
(α1 − α2) = σ
(α3 − α6) = η
(α5 − α8) = ω (6.53)
Three possible NE are found as
⋆
p1 =
{(ω−η)−|b|2(σ+ω−2η)}±√{(σ+ω)2−(2η)2}|b|2(1−|b|2)+(η2−σω)
(1−2|b|2)(σ+ω−2η)
⋆
p2 = 0
⋆
p3 = 1


(6.54)
It is observed that the mixed NE
⋆
p1 makes the difference
{
P (
⋆
p,
⋆
p,
⋆
p)− P (p, ⋆p, ⋆p)
}
identically
zero and two values for
⋆
p1 can be found for a given |b|2. Apart from
⋆
p1 the other two NE (i.e.
⋆
p2
and
⋆
p3) are pure strategies. Also now
⋆
p1 comes out a NE without imposing further restrictions
on the matrix of the symmetric three-player game. However, the pure strategies
⋆
p2 and
⋆
p3 can
be NE when further restriction are imposed on the matrix of the game. For example,
⋆
p3 can be
a NE provided σ ≥ (ω+σ) |b|2 for all |b|2 ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly ⋆p2 can be NE when ω ≤ (ω+σ) |b|2.
Now we address the question: How evolutionary stability of these three NE can be affected
while playing the game via initial quantum states given in the following form?
|ψin〉 = a |S1S1S1〉+ b |S2S2S2〉 (6.55)
For the two-player asymmetric game of BoS we showed that out of three NE only two can be
evolutionary stable. In classical evolutionary game theory the concept of an ESS is well-known
[75, 76] to be extendable to multi-player case. When mutants are allowed to play only one
77
strategy the definition of an ESS for the three-player case is written as [75]
1. P (p, p, p) > P (q, p, p)
2. If P (p, p, p) = P (q, p, p) then P (p, q, p) > P (q, q, p) (6.56)
Here p is a NE if it satisfies the condition 1 against all q 6= p. For our case the ESS conditions
for the pure strategies
⋆
p2 and
⋆
p3 can be written as follows. For example
⋆
p2 = 0 is an ESS when
1. σ |b|2 > ω |a|2
2. If σ |b|2 = ω |a|2 then − ηq2(|a|2 − |b|2) > 0 (6.57)
where 1 is NE condition for the strategy
⋆
p2 = 0. Similarly
⋆
p3 = 1 is an ESS when
1. σ |a|2 > ω |b|2
2. If σ |a|2 = ω |b|2 then η(1− q)2(|a|2 − |b|2) > 0 (6.58)
and both the pure strategies
⋆
p2 and
⋆
p3 are ESSs when |a|2 = |b|2. The conditions (6.58) can
also be written as
1. σ > (ω + σ) |b|2
2. If σ = |b|2 (ω + σ) then γ(ω − σ)
(ω + σ)
> 0 (6.59)
For the strategy
⋆
p2 = 0 the ESS conditions (6.57) reduce to
1. ω < (ω + σ) |b|2
2. If ω = |b|2 (ω + σ) then γ(ω − σ)
(ω + σ)
> 0 (6.60)
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Examples of three-player symmetric games are easy to find for which a pure strategy is a NE for
the whole range |b|2 ∈ [0, 1], but it is not an ESS for some particular value of |b|2. An example
of a class of such games is for which σ = 0, ω < 0, and η ≤ 0. In this class the strategy ⋆p2 = 0
is a NE for all |b|2 ∈ [0, 1] but not an ESS when |b|2 = 1.
Apart from the pure strategies, the mixed strategy equilibrium
⋆
p1 forms the most interesting
case. It makes the payoff difference
{
P (
⋆
p1,
⋆
p1,
⋆
p1)− P (p, ⋆p1, ⋆p1)
}
identically zero for every
strategy p. The strategy
⋆
p1 is an ESS when
{
P (
⋆
p1, q,
⋆
p1)− P (q, q, ⋆p1)
}
> 0 but
P (
⋆
p1, q,
⋆
p1)− P (q, q, ⋆p1)
= ±( ⋆p1 − q)2
√
{(σ + ω)2 − (2η)2} |b|2 (1− |b|2) + (η2 − σω) (6.61)
Therefore, out of the two possible roots (
⋆
p1)1 and (
⋆
p1)2 of the quadratic equation
3:
⋆
p1
2
(1− 2 |b|2)(σ + ω − 2η)+
2
⋆
p1
{
|b|2 (σ + ω − 2η)− ω + η
}
+
{
ω − |b|2 (σ + ω)
}
= 0 (6.62)
only (
⋆
p1)1 can exist as an ESS. When the square root term in the equation (6.61) becomes
zero we have only one mixed NE, which is not an ESS. Hence, out of four possible NE in this
three-player game only three can be ESSs.
An interesting class of three-player games is the one for which η2 = σω. For these games
the mixed NE are
⋆
p1 =
{
(w − η)− |b|2 (σ + ω − 2η)
}
± |a| |b| |σ − ω|
(1− 2 |b|2)(σ + ω − 2η) (6.63)
and, when played classically, we can get only one mixed NE that is not an ESS. However for
all |b|2, different from zero, we generally obtain two NE out of which one can be an ESS.
Similar to the two-player case, the equilibria in a three-player symmetric game where quan-
3These roots make the difference
{
P (
⋆
p1, q,
⋆
p1)− P (q, q,
⋆
p1)
}
greater than and less than zero, respectively.
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tization affects evolutionary stability, are the ones that survive for two initial states, one of
which is unentangled and corresponds to the classical game. Suppose
⋆
p1 remains a NE for
|b|2 = 0 and some other non-zero |b|2. It is possible when
(σ − ω)(2 ⋆p1 − 1) = 0 (6.64)
Alternatively the strategy
⋆
p = 12 remains a NE for all |b|2 ∈ [0, 1]. It reduces the defining
quadratic equation (6.62) for
⋆
p1 to
σ + ω + 2η = 0 (6.65)
and makes the difference
{
P (
⋆
p1, q,
⋆
p1)− P (q, q, ⋆p1)
}
independent of |b|2. Therefore the strategy
⋆
p = 12 , even when it is retained as an equilibrium for all |b|2 ∈ [0, 1], cannot be an ESS in only
one version of the symmetric three-player game. For the second possibility σ = ω the defining
equation for
⋆
p1 is reduced to
(1− 2 |b|2)
{
⋆
p1 − (η − σ)−
√
η2 − σ2
2(η − σ)
}{
⋆
p1 − (η − σ) +
√
η2 − σ2
2(η − σ)
}
= 0 (6.66)
for which
P (
⋆
p1, q,
⋆
p1)− P (q, q, ⋆p1) = ±2( ⋆p1 − q)2
∣∣∣∣|b|2 − 12
∣∣∣∣√η2 − σ2 (6.67)
Here the difference
{
P (
⋆
p1, q,
⋆
p1)− P (q, q, ⋆p1)
}
still depends on |b|2 and becomes zero for |b|2 =
1/2.
Hence, for the class of games for which σ = ω and η > σ, one of the mixed strategies
(
⋆
p1)1, (
⋆
p1)2 remains a NE for all |b|2 ∈ [0, 1] but not an ESS when |b|2 = 1/2. In this class of
three-player quantum games the evolutionary stability of a mixed strategy can, therefore, be
changed while the game is played using initial quantum states in the form (6.55).
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6.6 Quantum Rock-Scissors-Paper game
Long played as a children’s pastime, or as an odd-man-out selection process, the Rock-Scissors-
Paper (RSP) is a game for two players typically played using the players’ hands. The players
opposite each others, tap their fist in their open palm three times (saying Rock, Scissors, Paper)
and then show one of three possible gestures. The Rock wins against the scissors (crushes it)
but looses against the paper (is wrapped into it). The Scissors wins against the paper (cuts
it) but looses against the rock (is crushed by it). The Paper wins against the rock (wraps it)
but looses against the scissors (is cut by it). The game is also played in nature like many other
games. Lizards in the Coast Range of California play this game [77] using three alternative male
strategies locked in an ecological never ending process from which there seems little escape.
6.6.1 Rock-Scissors-Paper in a slightly modified version
In a slightly modified version of the RSP game both players get a small premium ǫ for a draw.
This game can be represented by the payoff matrix:
R
S
P
R S P

−ǫ 1 −1
−1 −ǫ 1
1 −1 −ǫ

 (6.68)
where −1 < ǫ < 0. The matrix of the usual game is obtained when ǫ is zero.
6.6.2 Nash equilibrium and ESS in Rock-Scissors-Paper game
One cannot win if one’s opponent knew which strategy was going to be picked. For example,
picking Rock consistently all the opponent needs to do is pick Paper and s/he would win.
Players find soon that in case predicting opponent’s strategy is not possible the best strategy
is to pick Rock, Scissors, or Paper at random. In other words, the player selects Rock, Scissors,
or Paper with a probability of 1/3. In case opponent’s strategy is predictable picking a strategy
at random with a probability of 1/3 is not the best thing to do unless the opponent is doing
the same [33].
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Analysis [32] of the modified RSP game of matrix (6.68) shows that its NE consists of playing
each of the three different pure strategies with a fixed equilibrial probability 1/3. However it is
not an ESS because ǫ is negative.
Here we want to study the effects of quantization on evolutionary stability for the modified
RSP game. The game is different, from others considered earlier, because classically each player
now possesses three pure strategies instead of two. A classical mixed NE exists which is not an
ESS. Our motivation is to explore the possibility that the classical mixed NE becomes an ESS
for some quantum form of the game.
6.6.3 Quantization of Rock-Scissors-Paper game
Using simpler notation: R ∼ 1, S ∼ 2, P ∼ 3 we quantize this game via Marinatto and Weber’s
scheme [52]. We assume the two players are in possession of three unitary and Hermitian
operators Iˆ , Cˆ and Dˆ defined as follows.
Iˆ |1〉 = |1〉 , Cˆ |1〉 = |3〉 , Dˆ |1〉 = |2〉
Iˆ |2〉 = |2〉 , Cˆ |2〉 = |2〉 , Dˆ |2〉 = |1〉
Iˆ |3〉 = |3〉 , Cˆ |3〉 = |1〉 , Dˆ |3〉 = |3〉 (6.69)
where Cˆ† = Cˆ = Cˆ−1 and Dˆ† = Dˆ = Dˆ−1 and Iˆ is the identity operator.
Consider a general two-player payoff matrix when each player has three strategies:
1
2
3
1 2 3

(α11, β11) (α12, β12) (α13, β13)
(α21, β21) (α22, β22) (α23, β23)
(α31, β31) (α32, β32) (α33, β33)

 (6.70)
where αij and βij are the payoffs to Alice and Bob, respectively, when Alice plays i and Bob
plays j and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3. Suppose Alice and Bob apply the operators Cˆ, Dˆ, and Iˆ with the
probabilities p, p1, (1− p− p1) and q, q1, (1− q− q1) respectively. The initial state of the game
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is ρin. Alice’s move changes the state changes to
A
ρin = (1− p− p1)IˆAρinIˆ†A + pCˆAρinCˆ†A + p1DˆAρinDˆ†A (6.71)
The final state, after Bob too has played his move, is
A,B
ρf = (1− q − q1)IˆB AρinIˆ†B + qCˆB
A
ρinCˆ
†
B + q1DˆB
A
ρinDˆ
†
B (6.72)
This state can be written as
A,B
ρf = (1− p− p1)(1− q − q1)
{
IˆA ⊗ IˆBρinIˆ†A ⊗ Iˆ†B
}
+ p(1− q − q1)×{
CˆA ⊗ IˆBρinCˆ†A ⊗ Iˆ†B
}
+ p1(1− q − q1)
{
DˆA ⊗ IˆBρinDˆ†A ⊗ Iˆ†B
}
+
(1− p− p1)q
{
IˆA ⊗ CˆBρinIˆ†A ⊗ Cˆ†B
}
+ pq
{
CˆA ⊗ CˆBρinCˆ†A ⊗ Cˆ†B
}
+
p1q
{
DˆA ⊗ CˆBρinDˆ†A ⊗ Cˆ†B
}
+ (1− p− p1)q1
{
IˆA ⊗ DˆBρinIˆ†A ⊗ Dˆ†B
}
+ pq1
{
CˆA ⊗ DˆBρinCˆ†A ⊗ Dˆ†B
}
+ p1q1
{
DˆA ⊗ DˆBρinDˆ†A ⊗ Dˆ†B
}
(6.73)
The nine basis vectors of initial quantum state with three pure classical strategies are |ij〉 for
i, j = 1, 2, 3. We consider the initial state to be a pure quantum state of two qutrits i.e.
|ψin〉 =
∑
i,j=1,2,3
cij |ij〉 , where
∑
i,j=1,2,3
|cij |2 = 1 (6.74)
The payoff operators for Alice and Bob are [52]
(PA,B)oper = (α, β)11 |11〉 〈11|+ (α, β)12 |12〉 〈12|+ (α, β)13 |13〉 〈13|+
(α, β)21 |21〉 〈21|+ (α, β)22 |22〉 〈22| + (α, β)23 |23〉 〈23|+
(α, β)31 |31〉 〈31|+ (α, β)32 |32〉 〈32| + (α, β)33 |33〉 〈33|
(6.75)
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The players’ payoffs are then
PA,B = Tr[{(PA,B)oper}A,Bρf ] (6.76)
Payoff to Alice, for example, can be written as
PA = ΦΩΥ
T (6.77)
where T is for transpose, and the matrices Φ, Ω, and Υ are
Φ = [ (1− p− p1)(1 − q − q1) p(1− q − q1) p1(1− q − q1)
(1− p− p1)q pq p1q (1− p− p1)q1 pq1 p1q1 ]
Υ = [ α11 α12 α13 α21 α22 α23 α31 α32 α33 ]
Ω =


|c11|2 |c12|2 |c13|2 |c21|2 |c22|2 |c23|2 |c31|2 |c32|2 |c33|2
|c31|2 |c32|2 |c33|2 |c21|2 |c22|2 |c23|2 |c11|2 |c12|2 |c13|2
|c21|2 |c22|2 |c23|2 |c11|2 |c12|2 |c13|2 |c31|2 |c32|2 |c33|2
|c13|2 |c12|2 |c11|2 |c23|2 |c22|2 |c21|2 |c33|2 |c32|2 |c31|2
|c33|2 |c32|2 |c31|2 |c23|2 |c22|2 |c21|2 |c13|2 |c12|2 |c11|2
|c23|2 |c22|2 |c21|2 |c13|2 |c12|2 |c11|2 |c33|2 |c32|2 |c31|2
|c12|2 |c11|2 |c13|2 |c22|2 |c21|2 |c23|2 |c32|2 |c31|2 |c33|2
|c32|2 |c31|2 |c33|2 |c22|2 |c21|2 |c23|2 |c12|2 |c11|2 |c13|2
|c22|2 |c21|2 |c23|2 |c12|2 |c11|2 |c13|2 |c32|2 |c31|2 |c33|2


(6.78)
The payoff (6.77) corresponds to the matrix (6.70). Payoffs in classical mixed strategy game
can be obtained from Eq. (6.76) for the initial state |ψin〉 = |11〉. The game is symmetric when
αij = βji in the matrix (6.70). The quantum game played using the quantum state (6.74) is
symmetric when |cij |2 = |cji|2 for all constants cij in the state (6.74). These two conditions
together guarantee a symmetric quantum game. The players’ payoffs PA, PB then do not need
a subscript and we can simply use P (p, q) to denote the payoff to the p-player against the
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q-player.
The question of evolutionary stability in quantized RSP game is addressed below.
6.6.4 Consideration of evolutionary stability
Assume a strategy is defined by a pair of numbers (p, p1) for players playing the quantized
RSP game. These numbers are the probabilities with which the player applies the operators
Cˆ and Dˆ. The identity operator Iˆ is, then, applied with probability (1 − p − p1). Similar to
the conditions 1 and 2 in Eq. (2.20), the conditions making a strategy (p⋆, p⋆1) an ESS can be
written as [29, 32]
1. P{(p⋆, p⋆1), (p⋆, p⋆1)} > P{(p, p1), (p⋆, p⋆1)}
2. if P{(p⋆, p⋆1), (p⋆, p⋆1)} = P{(p, p1), (p⋆, p⋆1)} then
P{(p⋆, p⋆1), (p, p1)} > P{(p, p1), (p, p1)} (6.79)
Suppose (p⋆, p⋆1) is a mixed NE then
{
∂P
∂p
| p=q=p⋆
p1=q1=p⋆1
(p⋆ − p) + ∂P
∂p1
| p=q=p⋆
p1=q1=p⋆1
(p⋆1 − p1)
}
≥ 0 (6.80)
Using substitutions
|c11|2 − |c31|2 = △1, |c21|2 − |c11|2 = △´1
|c13|2 − |c33|2 = △2, |c22|2 − |c12|2 = △´2
|c12|2 − |c32|2 = △3, |c23|2 − |c13|2 = △´3
(6.81)
we get
∂P
∂p
| p=q=p⋆
p1=q1=p⋆1
= p⋆(△1 −△2) {(α11 + α33)− (α13 + α31)}+
p⋆1(△1 −△3) {(α11 + α32)− (α12 + α31)}−
△1 (α11 − α31)−△2(α13 − α33)−△3(α12 − α32) (6.82)
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∂P
∂p1
| p=q=p⋆
p1=q1=p⋆1
= p⋆(△´3 −△´1) {(α11 + α23)− (α13 + α21)}+
p⋆1(△´2 −△´1) {(α11 + α22)− (α12 + α21)}+
△´1 (α11 − α21) +△´2(α12 − α22) +△´3(α13 − α23) (6.83)
For the matrix (6.68) the equations (6.82, 6.83) can be written as
∂P
∂p
| p=q=p⋆
p1=q1=p⋆1
= △1 {−2ǫp⋆ − (3 + ǫ)p⋆1 + (1 + ǫ)}+
△2 {2ǫp⋆ + (1− ǫ)}+△3 {(3 + ǫ)p⋆1 − 2} (6.84)
∂P
∂p1
| p=q=p⋆
p1=q1=p⋆1
= △´1 {−p⋆(3− ǫ) + 2ǫp⋆1 + (1− ǫ)}−
△´2 {2ǫp⋆1 − (1 + ǫ)}+△´3 {(3− ǫ)p⋆ − 2} (6.85)
The payoff difference in the second condition of an ESS given in the Eq. (6.79) reduces to
P{(p⋆, p⋆1), (p, p1)} − P{(p, p1), (p, p1)}
= (p⋆ − p)[−△1 {2ǫp+ (3 + ǫ)p1 − (1 + ǫ)}+
△2 {2ǫp+ (1− ǫ)}+△3{(3 + ǫ)p1 − 2}]+
(p⋆1 − p1)[−△´1 {(3− ǫ)p− 2ǫp1 − (1− ǫ)}−
△´2 {2ǫp1 − (1 + ǫ)}+△´3{(3− ǫ)p− 2}] (6.86)
With the substitutions (p⋆ − p) = x and (p⋆1 − p1) = y the above payoff difference is
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P{(p⋆, p⋆1), (p, p1)} − P{(p, p1), (p, p1)}
= △1x {2ǫx+ (3 + ǫ)y} −△2(2ǫx2)−△3xy(3 + ǫ)−
△´1 y {2ǫy − (3− ǫ)x}+△´2(2ǫy2)−△´3xy(3− ǫ) (6.87)
provided
∂P
∂p
| p=q=p⋆
p1=q1=p⋆1
= 0
∂P
∂p1
| p=q=p⋆
p1=q1=p⋆1
= 0 (6.88)
The conditions in Eq. (6.88) together define the mixed NE (p⋆, p⋆1). Consider now the modified
RSP game in classical form obtained by setting |c11|2 = 1. The Eqs. (6.88) become
−2ǫp⋆ − (ǫ+ 3)p⋆1 + (ǫ+ 1) = 0
(−ǫ+ 3)p⋆ − 2ǫp⋆1 + (ǫ− 1) = 0 (6.89)
and p⋆ = p⋆1 =
1
3 is obtained as a mixed NE for all the range −1 < ǫ < 0. From Eq. (6.87) we
get
P{(p⋆, p⋆1), (p, p1)} − P{(p, p1), (p, p1)}
= 2ǫ(x2 + y2 + xy) = ǫ
{
(x+ y)2 + (x2 + y2)
} ≤ 0 (6.90)
In the classical RSP game, therefore, the mixed NE p⋆ = p⋆1 =
1
3 is a NE but not an ESS,
because the second condition of an ESS given in the Eq. (6.79) does not hold.
Now define a new initial state as
|ψin〉 = 1
2
{|12〉+ |21〉 + |13〉 + |31〉} (6.91)
and use it to play the game, instead of the classical game obtained from |ψin〉 = |11〉. The
strategy p⋆ = p⋆1 =
1
3 still forms a mixed NE because the conditions (6.88) hold true for it.
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However the payoff difference of Eq. (6.87) is now given below, when −1 < ǫ < 0 and x, y 6= 0:
P{(p⋆, p⋆1), (p, p1)} − P{(p, p1), (p, p1)}
= −ǫ{(x+ y)2 + (x2 + y2)} > 0 (6.92)
Therefore the mixed NE p⋆ = p⋆1 =
1
3 , not existing as an ESS in the classical form of the RSP
game, becomes an ESS when the game is quantized and played using an initial (entangled)
quantum state given by the Eq. (6.91).
Note that from Eq. (6.76) the sum of the payoffs to Alice and Bob (PA + PB) can be
obtained for both the classical mixed strategy game (i.e. when |ψin〉 = |11〉) and the quantum
game played using the quantum state of Eq. (6.91). For the matrix (6.68) we write these sums
as (PA + PB)cl and (PA + PB)qu for classical mixed strategy and quantum games respectively.
We obtain
(PA + PB)cl = −2ǫ {(1− p− p1)(1− q − q1) + p1q1 + pq} (6.93)
and
(PA + PB)qu = −
{
1
2
(PA + PB)cl + ǫ
}
(6.94)
In case ǫ = 0 both the classical and quantum games are clearly zero sum. For the slightly
modified version of the RSP game we have −1 < ǫ < 0 and both versions of the game become
non zero-sum.
6.7 Stability of a mixed Nash equilibrium
In a classical symmetric bi-matrix game, played in an evolutionary set up involving a population,
all the members of the population are indistinguishable and each individual is equally likely to
face the other. In such a set-up individuals interact only in pair-wise encounters.
Assume a finite set of pure strategies {1, 2, ..., n} is available to each player. In one pair-wise
encounter let a player A receives a reward aij by playing strategy i against another player B
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playing strategy j. In symmetric situation the player B, then, gets aji as a reward. The value
aij is an element in the n × n payoff matrix M. We assume that the players also have an
option to play a mixed strategy. It means he/she plays the strategy i with probability pi for all
i = 1, 2, ..., n. A strategy vector p, with components pi, represents the mixed strategy played by
the player. In standard notation an average, or expected, payoff for player A playing strategy
p against player B playing q is written as P (p,q) [78]:
P (p,q) =
∑
aijpiqj = p
TMq (6.95)
where T is for transpose.
In evolutionary game theory mixed strategies play a significant role. The well-known Bishop-
Cannings theorem (BCT) [79] describes an interesting property of mixed ESSs in symmetric
bi-matrix games. Introducing the concept of support of an ESS is helpful to understand the
BCT [78, 80]. Suppose a strategy vector p = (pi) is an ESS. Its support S(p) is the set S(p) =
{i : pi > 0}. Hence the support of p is the set of pure strategies that can be played by a p-
player. BCT states that if p is an ESS with support I and r 6= p is an ESS with support J , then
I + J . For bi-matrix games the BCT shows that no pure strategy can be evolutionary stable
when a mixed ESS exists [78]. Naturally one, then, asks about the classical pure ESSs when a
switch-over to a quantum form of a classical symmetric bi-matrix game also gives evolutionary
stability to a mixed symmetric NE.
Following the approach developed for quantum RSP game, we now consider a general form
of a two-qubit initial quantum state. Our results show that for this form of the initial quantum
state, the corresponding quantum version of a bi-matrix game can give evolutionary stability
to a mixed symmetric NE when classically it is not stable. It is interesting to observe that by
ensuring evolutionary stability to a mixed NE in a quantum form of the game, the BCT forces
out the pure ESSs present in classical form of the game.
The payoff to a player in the quantized version of the RSP game can also be written in
similar form to (6.95), provided the matrix M is replaced with a matrix corresponding to
quantum version of this game.
For example, Alice’s payoff, who plays the strategy p (where pT=[(1 − p − p1) p1 p])
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against Bob who plays the strategy q (where qT=[(1− q − q1) q1 q]), can be written as
PA(p,q) = p
Tωq (6.96)
where the matrix ω is given by
ω =


ω11 ω12 ω13
ω21 ω22 ω23
ω31 ω32 ω33

 (6.97)
and the elements of ω are given by the following matrix equation
(
ω11 ω12 ω13 ω21 ω22 ω23 ω31 ω32 ω33
)
=
(
α11 α12 α13 α21 α22 α23 α31 α32 α33
)
×

|c11|2 |c12|2 |c13|2 |c21|2 |c22|2 |c23|2 |c31|2 |c32|2 |c33|2
|c12|2 |c11|2 |c12|2 |c22|2 |c21|2 |c22|2 |c32|2 |c31|2 |c32|2
|c13|2 |c13|2 |c11|2 |c23|2 |c23|2 |c21|2 |c33|2 |c33|2 |c31|2
|c21|2 |c22|2 |c23|2 |c11|2 |c12|2 |c13|2 |c21|2 |c22|2 |c23|2
|c22|2 |c21|2 |c22|2 |c12|2 |c11|2 |c12|2 |c22|2 |c21|2 |c22|2
|c23|2 |c23|2 |c21|2 |c13|2 |c13|2 |c11|2 |c23|2 |c23|2 |c21|2
|c31|2 |c32|2 |c33|2 |c31|2 |c32|2 |c33|2 |c11|2 |c12|2 |c13|2
|c32|2 |c31|2 |c32|2 |c32|2 |c31|2 |c32|2 |c12|2 |c11|2 |c12|2
|c33|2 |c33|2 |c31|2 |c33|2 |c33|2 |c31|2 |c13|2 |c13|2 |c11|2


(6.98)
The matrix (6.97) reduces to its classical form (6.70) by fixing |c11|2 = 1.
In a symmetric game the exchange of strategies by Alice and Bob also exchanges their
respective payoffs. The quantum game corresponding to the matrix (6.70), when played using
90
the initial quantum state of Eq. (6.74), becomes symmetric when
|cij |2 = |cji|2 for i 6= j (6.99)
The two-player quantum game, with three pure strategies, gets a form similar to a classical
matrix game. The payoff matrix of the classical game, however, is replaced with its quantum
version (6.97). Also the matrix (6.97) now involves the coefficients cij of the initial quantum
state (6.74).
To reduce the above mathematical formalism to two-player, two-strategy quantum game
lets fix p1 = q1 = 0, that is, both players do not use the operator Dˆ at all, and apply only the
operators Cˆ and Iˆ on the initial quantum state. Payoff to the player who plays the strategy
vector p (where pT=[1 − p p]) against the player who plays the strategy vector q (where
qT=[1 − q q]) can again be written as P (p,q) = pTωq. Nevertheless, ω is reduced to its
simpler form:
ω =

 ω11 ω13
ω31 ω33

 (6.100)
where elements of the matrix are


ω11
ω13
ω31
ω33


=


|c11|2 |c13|2 |c31|2 |c33|2
|c13|2 |c11|2 |c33|2 |c31|2
|c31|2 |c33|2 |c11|2 |c13|2
|c33|2 |c31|2 |c13|2 |c11|2




α11
α13
α31
α33


(6.101)
It becomes a bi-matrix game played with the initial quantum state (6.74). The available pure
strategies are 1 and 3 only and the terms with subscripts containing 2 disappear. Take x = 1−p
and y = 1 − q, so that x and y are probabilities with which players apply identity operator
on the initial state |ψini〉. The strategy vectors p and q can now be represented only by the
numbers x and y, respectively. Payoff to a x-player against a y-player is then obtained as
P (x,y) = pTωq =x {ω11y + ω13(1− y)}+ (1− x) {ω31y + ω33(1− y)} . (6.102)
Suppose (x⋆, x⋆) is a NE, i.e.
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P (x⋆, x⋆)− P (x, x⋆)
= (x⋆ − x) {x⋆(ω11 − ω13 − ω31 + ω33) + (ω13 − ω33)} ≥ 0 (6.103)
for all x ∈ [0, 1]. The mixed strategy x⋆ = x⋆q = (ω33 − ω13)/(ω11 − ω13 − ω31 + ω33) makes the
payoff difference P (x⋆, x⋆) − P (x, x⋆) identically zero. The subscript q is for ‘quantum’. Let
△x = x⋆ − x then
P (x⋆q , x)− P (x, x) = −(△x)2 {ω11 − ω13 − ω31 + ω33} (6.104)
Now x⋆q is an ESS if
{
P (x⋆q , x)− P (x, x)
}
> 0 for all x 6= x⋆q, which leads to the requirement
(ω11 − ω31 − ω13 + ω33) < 0.
The classical game corresponds when |c11|2 = 1 and it gives ω11 = α11, ω13 = α13, ω31 = α31,
and ω33 = α33, in accordance with the Eq. (6.98). In case (α11 − α13 − α31 + α33) > 0, the
mixed NE of a classical game, i.e. x⋆ = x⋆c = (α33−α13)/(α11−α13−α31+α33), is not an ESS.
Here the subscript c is for ‘classical’. Since we look for a situation where evolutionary stability
of a symmetric NE changes — while the corresponding NE remains intact — in a switch-over
of the game from its classical to quantum form, lets take
x⋆c = x
⋆
q =
α33 − α13
α11 − α31 − α13 + α33 =
ω33 − ω13
ω11 − ω31 − ω13 + ω33 . (6.105)
saying that the classical NE x⋆c is also a NE in quantum form of the game. Now from the matrix
in the Eq. (6.101)
(ω11 − ω31 − ω13 + ω33)
= (α11 − α13 − α31 + α33)(|c11|2 − |c13|2 − |c31|2 + |c33|2) (6.106)
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and
ω33 − ω13 = |c11|2 (α33 − α13) + |c13|2 (α31 − α11)+
|c31|2 (α13 − α33) + |c33|2 (α11 − α31) (6.107)
A substitution from Eqs. (6.106,6.107) into the Eq. (6.105) gives α33 − α13 = α11 − α31, and
this leads to x⋆c = x
⋆
q = 1/2. Therefore the mixed strategy x
⋆ = 1/2 remains a NE in both
the classical and quantum form of the game. Consider this mixed NE for a classical game with
(α11 − α13 − α31 + α33) > 0, a condition that assures that it is not an ESS. The Eq. (6.106)
shows an interesting possibility that one can have (ω11 − ω31 − ω13 + ω33) < 0 if
(|c11|2 + |c33|2) < (|c13|2 + |c31|2) (6.108)
In other words, the evolutionary stability of a mixed strategy, which is a NE in both classical
and quantum versions of the game, changes when the game switches-over between its two forms.
To have a symmetric game also in its quantum form we need |c13|2 = |c31|2, which reduces the
inequality (6.108) to 12(|c11|2 + |c33|2) < |c13|2.
Hence, a quantum version of a symmetric bi-matrix classical game with the matrix:

 (α11, α11) (α13, α31)
(α31, α13) (α33, α33)

 (6.109)
can be played if both the players have access to two unitary and Hermitian operators and the
game starts with a two-qubit quantum state of the form:
|ψini〉 =
∑
i,j=1,3
cij |ij〉 (6.110)
where
∑
i,j=1,3
|cij |2 = 1. In case α33 − α13 = α11 − α31 the mixed strategy x⋆ = 1/2 is not an
ESS in the classical game if (α33 − α13) > 0. Nevertheless, the strategy x⋆ = 1/2 becomes an
ESS when |c11|2 + |c33|2 < |c13|2 + |c31|2. In case (α33 − α13) < 0 the strategy x⋆ = 1/2 is an
ESS classically but does not remain so if again |c11|2 + |c33|2 < |c13|2 + |c31|2. Now suppose
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|c13|2 = |c31|2 = 0, the Eq. (6.106) reduces to
(ω11 − ω13 − ω31 + ω33) = (α11 − α13 − α31 + α33) (6.111)
It is observed from the equation (6.111) that if a quantum game is played by the following
simple form of the initial quantum state:
|ψini〉 = c11 |11〉 + c33 |33〉 (6.112)
then it is not possible to influence the evolutionary stability of a mixed NE.
6.7.1 Discussion
Mixed ESSs appear in many games of interest that are played in the natural world. The exam-
ples of the RSP and Hawks and Doves games are well known from evolutionary game theory.
The Bishop-Cannings theorem of evolutionary game theory does not permit pure ESSs when a
mixed ESS exists in a population engaged in a bi-matrix game. The possibility of changing evo-
lutionary stability of a pure symmetric NE has been considered earlier with normalized states
of the form |ψini〉 = c11 |1, 1〉+ c22 |2, 2〉. Using such initial states, however, cannot change evo-
lutionary stability of a mixed strategy. In this section, following an approach developed for the
quantum RSP game, we play a bi-matrix game with a general two-qubit pure initial quantum
state. Such state allows changing evolutionary stability of a mixed NE. For a bi-matrix game a
symmetric mixed NE is found that remains intact in both the classical and quantum versions
of the game. For this mixed NE conditions are then found allowing the change of evolutionary
stability with a switch-over of the game, between its two forms, one classical and the other
quantum.
6.8 Equilibria of replicator dynamics in quantum games
6.8.1 Introduction
Maynard Smith and Price [29] introduced the idea of an ESS essentially as a static concept.
Nothing in the definition of an ESS guarantees that the dynamics of evolution in small mu-
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tational steps will necessarily converge the process of evolution to an ESS. In fact directional
evolution may also become responsible for the establishment of strategies that are not evolu-
tionary stable [36].
What are the advantages involved in a dynamic approach towards theory of ESSs? A
stated reason [82] is that dynamic approach introduces structural stability into game theory.
Historically Liapunov provided a classic definition of stability of equilibria for general dynamical
systems. This definition can also be adapted for the stability of a NE. A pair of strategies (p⋆, q⋆)
is Liapunov stable when for every trajectory starting somewhere in a small neighborhood of
radius ǫ > 0 around a point representing the pair (p⋆, q⋆) another small neighborhood of radius
δ > 0 can be defined such that the trajectory stays in it. When every trajectory starting in a
small neighborhood of radius σ > 0 around the point (p⋆, q⋆) converges to (p⋆, q⋆) the strategy
pair (p⋆, q⋆) becomes an attractor. Trajectories are defined by the dynamics underlying the
game.
Taylor and Jonker [34] introduced a dynamics into evolutionary games with the hypothesis
that the growth rate of those playing each strategy is proportional to the advantage of that
strategy. This hypothesis is now understood as one of many different forms of replicator dy-
namics [36, 83]. In simple words assume that pi is the frequency (i.e. relative proportion) of
the individuals using strategy i and p, where pT = [p1, p2...pi...pn] and T is the transpose, is a
vector whose components are the frequencies with
n
Σ
i=1
pi = 1. Let Pi(p) be the average payoff
for using i when the population is in the state p. Let P¯ = ΣpjPj be the average success in the
population. The replicator equation is, then, written as [84]
p˙i = pi(Pi(p)− P¯ ) (6.113)
where the dot is derivative with respect to time. Let the payoff matrix be A = (aij) with aij
being the average payoff for strategy i when the other player uses j. The average payoff for the
strategy i in the population (with the assumption of random encounters of the individuals) is
(Ap)i = ai1p1 + ...+ ainpn and the Eq. (6.113) becomes
p˙i = pi((Ap)i − pTAp) (6.114)
95
The population state is then given as a point in n simplex △ [85]. The hypothesis of Taylor
and Jonker [34] gives a flow on △ whose flow lines represent the evolution of the population.
In evolutionary game theory it is agreed [32] that every ESS is an attractor of the flow defined
on △ by the replicator equation (6.113), however, the converse does not hold: an attractor is
not necessarily an ESS.
Our motivation is to find how equilibria of replicator dynamics are affected when a matrix
game played by a population is quantized. It should, of course, be sensitive to quantization
procedure selected for the matrix game. We find the effects when the matrix game is quantized
via Marinatto and Weber’s scheme.
6.8.2 Equilibria and attractors of replicator dynamics
Early studies about the attractors of replicator dynamic by Schuster, Sigmund and Wolff [86,
87] reported the dynamics of enzymatic actions of chemicals in a mixture when their relative
proportions could be changed. For example, in the case of a mixture of three chemicals added
in a correct order, such that corresponding initial conditions are in the basin of an interior
attractor, it becomes a stable cooperative mixture of all three chemicals. But if they are
added in a wrong order the initial conditions then lie in another basin and only one of the
chemicals survives with others two excluded. Eigen and Schuster [86, 87, 27] also studied
resulting dynamics in the evolution of macromolecules before the advent of life.
Schuster and Sigmund [88] applied the dynamic to animal behavior in BoS and described
the evolution of strategies by treating it as a dynamical system. They wrote replicator Eqs.
(6.114) for the payoff matrix:
Male’s strategy
X1
X2
Female’s strategy
Y1 Y2
 (a11, b11) (a12, b21)
(a21, b12) (a22, b22)

 (6.115)
where a male can play pure strategies X1, X2 and a female can play pure strategies Y1, Y2
respectively. Let in a population engaged in this game the frequencies of X1 and X2 are p1 and
p2 respectively. Similarly the frequencies of Y1 and Y2 are q1 and q2 respectively. Obviously
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p1 + p2 = q1 + q2 = 1
where pi ≥ 0, qi ≥ 0, for i = 1, 2 (6.116)
the replicator equations (6.114) for the matrix (6.115) with conditions (6.116) are, then, written
as
p˙ = p(1− p) {q(a11 − a12 − a21 + a22) + (a12 − a22)}
q˙ = q(1− q) {p(b11 − b12 − b21 + b22) + (b12 − b22)} (6.117)
where p1 = p and q1 = q. These are Lotka-Volterra type equations describing the evolution of
two populations identified as predator and prey [89]. Schuster and Sigmund [88] simplified the
problem by taking
a11 = b11 = a22 = b22 = 0
a12 = a a21 = b and
b12 = c b21 = d (6.118)
which does not restrict generality of the problem and the replicator Eqs. (6.117) remain similar.
Payoffs to the male PM (p, q) and to the female PF (p, q), when the male playsX1 with probability
p (he then plays X2 with the probability (1− p)) and the female plays Y1 with the probability
q (she then plays Y2 with the probability (1− q)) are written as [30]
PM (p, q) = p
TMq
PF (p, q) = q
TFp (6.119)
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where
M =

 a11 a12
a21 a22

 , and F =

 b11 b12
b21 b22

 (6.120)
also
p =

 p
1− p

 , and q =

 q
1− q

 (6.121)
and T is for transpose.
Now a quantum form of the matrix game (6.115) can be played using Marinatto and Weber’s
scheme [52]. The players have at their disposal an initial quantum state:
|ψini〉 =
∑
i,j=1,2
cij |ij〉 (6.122)
with
∑
i,j=1,2
|cij |2 = 1 (6.123)
In quantum version the male and female players apply the identity Iˆ on |ψini〉 with probabilities
p and q respectively. Also they apply σˆx with probabilities (1 − p) and (1 − q), respectively.
Payoffs to the players are written in a similar form, as in the Eq. (6.119):
PM (p, q) = p
Tωq
PF (p, q) = q
Tχp (6.124)
ω and χ are quantum forms of the payoff matrices M and F respectively i.e.
ω =

 ω11 ω12
ω21 ω22

 and χ =

 χ11 χ12
χ21 χ22

 (6.125)
where
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ω11 = a11 |c11|2 + a12 |c12|2 + a21 |c21|2 + a22 |c22|2
ω12 = a11 |c12|2 + a12 |c11|2 + a21 |c22|2 + a22 |c21|2
ω21 = a11 |c21|2 + a12 |c22|2 + a21 |c11|2 + a22 |c12|2
ω22 = a11 |c22|2 + a12 |c21|2 + a21 |c12|2 + a22 |c11|2 (6.126)
similarly
χ11 = b11 |c11|2 + b12 |c12|2 + b21 |c21|2 + b22 |c22|2
χ12 = b11 |c12|2 + b12 |c11|2 + b21 |c22|2 + b22 |c21|2
χ21 = b11 |c21|2 + b12 |c22|2 + b21 |c11|2 + b22 |c12|2
χ22 = b11 |c22|2 + b12 |c21|2 + b21 |c12|2 + b22 |c11|2 (6.127)
For the initial state |ψini〉 = |11〉 the matrices ω and χ are same as M and F respectively. The
classical game is, therefore, embedded in the quantum game. Simplified matrices ω and χ can
be obtained by the assumption of Eq. (6.118), that is
ω11 = a |c12|2 + b |c21|2 , ω12 = a |c11|2 + b |c22|2
ω21 = a |c22|2 + b |c11|2 , ω22 = a |c21|2 + b |c12|2
χ11 = c |c12|2 + d |c21|2 , χ12 = c |c11|2 + d |c22|2
χ21 = c |c22|2 + d |c11|2 , χ22 = c |c21|2 + d |c12|2 (6.128)
The replicator Eqs. (6.117) can now be written in the following ‘quantum’ form:
x˙ = x(1− x)[aK1 + bK2 − (a+ b)(K1 +K2)y]
y˙ = y(1− y)[cK1 + dK2 − (c+ d)(K1 +K2)x] (6.129)
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where K1 = |c11|2 − |c21|2 and K2 = |c22|2 − |c12|2. These equations reduce to Eqs. (6.117) for
|ψini〉 = |11〉 i.e. |c11|2 = 1. Similar to the classical version [88] the dynamics (6.129) has five
rest or equilibrium points x = 0, y = 0; x = 0, y = 1; x = 1, y = 0; x = 1, y = 1;
and an interior equilibrium point:
x =
cK1 + dK2
(c+ d)(K1 +K2)
, y =
aK1 + bK2
(a+ b)(K1 +K2)
(6.130)
This equilibrium point is the same as in the classical game [88] for |ψini〉 = |11〉 i.e.
x =
c
c+ d
, y =
a
a+ b
(6.131)
We use the method of linear approximation [89] at equilibrium points to find the general char-
acter of phase diagram of the system (6.129). Write the system (6.129) as
x˙ = X(x, y), y˙ = Y(x, y) (6.132)
The matrix for linearization [89] is

 Xx Xy
Yx Yy

 (6.133)
where, for example, Xx denotes
∂X
∂x
. The matrix (6.133) is evaluated at each equilibrium point
in turn. Write now these terms as
Xx = (1− 2x) {aK1 + bK2 − (a+ b)(K1 +K2)y}
Xy = −x(1− x)(a+ b)(K1 +K2)
Yx = −y(1− y)(c+ d)(K1 +K2)
Yy = (1− 2y) {cK1 + dK2 − (c+ d)(K1 +K2)x} (6.134)
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and the characteristic equation [89] at an equilibrium point is obtained from
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(Xx − λ) Xy
Yx (Yy − λ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 0 (6.135)
The patterns of phase paths around equilibrium points classify the points into a few principal
cases. Suppose λ1, λ2 are roots of the characteristic Eq. (6.135). A few cases are as follows:
1. λ1, λ2 are real, different, non-zero, and of same sign. If λ1, λ2 > 0 then the equilibrium
point is an unstable node or a repeller. If λ1, λ2 < 0 the node is stable or an attractor.
2. λ1, λ2 are real, different, non-zero, and of opposite sign. The equilibrium point is a saddle
point.
3. λ1, λ2 = α ± iβ, and β 6= 0. The equilibrium is a stable spiral (attractor) if α < 0, an
unstable spiral (repeller) if α > 0, a center if α = 0.
Consider an equilibrium or rest point x = 1, y = 0, written simply as (1, 0). At this point
the characteristic Eq. (6.135) has the roots:
λ1 = −aK1 − bK2, λ2 = −cK2 − dK1 (6.136)
For the classical game, i.e. |ψini〉 = |11〉, these roots are λ1 = −a, λ2 = −d. Therefore in case
a, d > 0 the equilibrium point (1, 0) is an attractor in the classical game.
Consider the interior equilibrium point (x, y) of Eq. (6.130). The terms of the matrix of
linearization of Eq. (6.134) are:
Xx = 0, Yy = 0
Xy =
−(cK1 + dK2)(cK2 + dK1)(a+ b)
(c+ d)2(K1 +K2)
Yx =
−(aK1 + bK2)(aK2 + bK1)(c+ d)
(a+ b)2(K1 +K2)
(6.137)
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the roots of the characteristic Eq. (6.135) are numbers ±λ where
λ =
√
(aK1 + bK2)(aK2 + bK1)(cK1 + dK2)(cK2 + dK1)
(a+ b)(c+ d)(K1 +K2)2
(6.138)
the term in square root can be a positive or negative real number. Therefore:
• A saddle (center) in classical game can be a center (saddle) in certain quantum form of
the game.
• A saddle or a center in a classical (quantum) game can not be an attractor or a repeller
in quantum (classical) form of the game.
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Chapter 7
Relevance of evolutionary stability
in quantum games
Evolutionary game theory considers attractors of a dynamics and ESSs with reference to popu-
lation models. Extending these ideas to a quantum setting requires an assumption of population
of individuals, or entities, with access to quantum states and quantum mechanical operators.
What is the possible relevance of such an assumption in the real world? To answer it we observe
that the concept of evolutionary stability is based on the following assumptions, that also define
its population setting:
• There are random and pair-wise interactions between the participating players forming
a population. These interactions can be re-expressed in game-theoretic language by con-
structing symmetric bi-matrices.
• A step-wise selection mechanism that ensures that a successful strategy has better chance
to spread itself in the population at the expense of other strategies.
While bringing the ESS concept to quantum games, we retain the population setting of
evolutionary game theory as well as the step-wise selection mechanism. However, the games
played among the players, during pair-wise interactions, are replaced with their quantum coun-
terparts. Questions now naturally arise how such a switch-over to a quantum game changes
the evolutionary outcome.
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Following are the some suggestions where a relevance of quantization of games may affect,
and even decide, an evolutionary outcome.
7.1 Quantum mechanics deciding an evolutionary outcome
Evolutionary game theory was developed to provide game-theoretic models of animal conflicts
that occur in our macro-world. However, recent work in biology [90] suggests that nature
also plays classical games at micro-level. Bacterial infections by viruses are classical game-like
situations where nature prefers dominant strategies. The game-theoretical explanation of stable
states in a population of interacting individuals can be considered a model of rationality which
is physically grounded in natural selection.
A motivation to study evolutionary stability in quantum games exists because the population
setting of evolutionary game theory can also be introduced to quantum games. It can be done
on the same ground as it is done in the classical games. The notion of a Nash equilibrium, that
became the topic of pioneering work on quantum games, was itself motivated by a population
setting.
Consideration of evolutionary stability in quantum games shows how quantization of games,
played in a population, can lead to new stable states of the population. It shows that the
presence of quantum interactions, in a population undergoing evolution, can alter its stable
states resulting from the evolutionary dynamics. When quantum effects decide the evolutionary
outcomes, the role for quantum mechanics clearly increases, from just keeping atoms together,
to deciding the outcome of an evolutionary dynamics.
7.2 Development of complexity and self-organization
This new role for quantum mechanics can be to define and maintain complexity emerging from
quantum interactions among a collection of molecules. Eigen, Schuster, Sigmund and Wolf
[86, 87] consider an example of a mixture in which an equilibrium is achieved from compet-
ing chemical reactions. Such an equilibrium can also be an outcome of quantum interactions
occurring at molecular level. When quantum nature of molecular interactions can decide an
equilibrium state, there is a clear possibility for the quantum mechanical role in the models of
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self-organization in matter. These considerations seem quite relevant to the evolution of macro-
molecules before the advent of life. The possibility that stability of solutions (or equilibria) can
be affected by quantum interactions provides a new approach towards understanding of rise of
complexity in groups of quantum-interacting entities.
Physicists have expressed opinions [91] about the possibility of quantum mechanics ‘fast
tracking’ a chemical soup to states that are biological and complex, and the debate continues.
We suggest that quantum game theory also have contributions to make towards the attempts
to understand quantum mechanical role in life, especially evolution and development of self
organization and complexity in molecular systems, and possibly the origin of consciousness.
Considering development of quantum mechanical models of life, in a recent paper Flitney
and Abbott [92] studied a version of John Conway’s game of Life [93] where the normal binary
values of the cells are replaced by oscillators which can represent a superposition of states.
They showed that the original game of Life is reproduced in the classical limit, but in general
additional properties not seen in the original game are present that display some of the effects
of a quantum mechanical Life.
7.3 Genetic code evolution
Genetic code is the relationship between sequence of bases in DNA and the sequence of amino
acids in proteins. Suggestions have been made earlier about quantum mechanical role in the
genetic code. For example, supersymmetry in particle physics, giving a unified description
of fermions and bosons, have been suggested [94] to provide an explanation of coding assign-
ments in genetic code. Recent work [95] about evolvability of the genetic code suggests that
the code, like all other features of organisms, was shaped by natural selection. The question
about the process and evolutionary mechanism by which the genetic code was optimized is still
unanswered. Two suggested possibilities are:
• A large number of codes existed out of which the adaptive one was selected.
• Adaptive and error-minimizing constraints gave rise to an adaptive code via code expan-
sion and simplification.
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The second possibility of code expansion from earlier simpler forms is now thought to be
supported by much empirical and genetic evidence [96] and results suggest that the present
genetic code was strongly influenced by natural selection for error minimization.
Patel [97] suggested quantum dynamics played a role in the DNA replication and in the
optimization criteria involved in genetic information processing. He considers the criteria as
a task similar to an unsorted assembly operation, with possible connection to the Grover’s
database search algorithm [8], given different optimal solutions result from the classical and
quantum dynamics.
The assumption in this approach is that an adaptive code was selected out of a large numbers
that existed earlier. The suggestion of natural selection being the process, for error minimiza-
tion in the mechanism of adaptive code evolution, puts forward an evolutionary approach for
this optimization problem. We believe that, in the evolution and expansion of the code from
its earlier simpler forms, quantum dynamics has played a role. The mechanism leading to this
optimization will be, however, different. Our result that stable outcomes, of an evolutionary
process based on natural selection, may also depend on the quantum nature of interactions
clearly implies the possibility that such interactions may decide the optimal outcome of evolu-
tion.
We believe that the code optimization is a problem having close similarities to the problem
of evolutionary stability. And this optimization was probably achieved by interactions that
were quantum mechanical in nature.
7.4 Quantum evolutionary algorithms
A polynomial time algorithm that can solve an NP problem is not known yet. A viable al-
ternative approach, shown to find acceptable solutions within a reasonable time period, is the
evolutionary search [98]. Iteration of selection based on competition, random variation or mu-
tation, and exploration of the fitness landscape of possible solutions, are the basic ingredients
of many distinct paradigms of evolutionary computing [99]. On the other hand superposition
of all possible solution states, unitary operators exploiting interference to enhance the ampli-
tude of the desired states, and final measurement extracting the solution are the components
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of quantum computing. These two approaches in computing are believed to represent different
philosophies [100].
Finding ESSs can also be formulated as an evolutionary algorithm. The view that quantum
mechanics has a role in the theory of ESSs suggests that the two philosophies – considered
different so far – may have common grounds uniting them. It also hints the possibility of
evolutionary algorithms that utilize, or even exploit, quantum effects. In such an evolutionary
algorithm, we may have, for example, fitness functions depending on the amount of entangle-
ment present. The natural question to ask is then how the population will evolve towards an
equilibrium state in relation to the amount of entanglement.
7.5 Evolutionary quantum optimization and computation
The perspective that matrix game theory provides, on what should be an outcome of evolution,
has been studied in this thesis. Another perspective is provided by optimization models [101].
In evolutionary matrix games a frequency-dependent selection takes place and all alternative
strategies become equally fit when an ESS establishes itself. On the other hand, in optimiza-
tion models the selection is frequency-independent and evolution is imagined as a hill-climbing
process. Optimal solution is obtained when fitness is maximized. Evolutionary optimization is
the basis of evolutionary and genetic algorithms and is generally considered to be a different
approach from ESSs in matrix games. These are not, however, in direct contradiction and
give different outlooks on evolutionary process. We suggest that evolutionary optimization is
another area where a role for quantum mechanics exists and quantum game theory provides
hints to find it.
It seems appropriate to mention here the evolutionary quantum computation (EQC) de-
scribed in the Ref [102]. In EQC an ensemble of quantum subsystems is considered changing
continually such a way as to optimize some measure of emergent patterns between the system
and its environment. It seems reasonable that this optimization is related to an equilibrium
or some of its properties. When quantum interactions decide the equilibria and their stability
properties, it implies that the optimization itself depends on it. Brain also has been proposed
[102] as an evolutionary quantum computer.
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Chapter 8
Cooperation in quantum games
8.1 Introduction
In contrast to non-cooperative games the players in cooperative games are not able to form
binding agreements even if they may communicate. The distinctive feature of cooperative
games is a strong incentive to work together to receive the largest total payoff. These games
allow players to form coalitions, binding agreements, pay compensations, make side payments
etc. Von Neumann and Morgenstern [2] in their pioneering work on the theory of games offered
models of coalition formation where the strategy of each player consists of choosing the coalition
s/he wishes to join. In coalition games, that are part of cooperative game theory, the possibilities
for the players are described by the available resources of different groups (coalitions) of players.
Joining a group or remaining outside is part of strategy of a player affecting his/her payoff.
Recent work in quantum games arises a natural and interesting question: what is the
possible quantum mechanical role in cooperative games that are considered an integral part
of the classical game theory? In our view it may be quite interesting, and fruitful as well,
to investigate coalitions in quantum versions of cooperative games. Our present motivation
is to investigate what might happen to the advantage of forming a coalition in a quantum
game compared to its classical analogue. We rely on the concepts and ideas of von Neumann’s
cooperative game theory [2] and consider a three-player coalition game in a quantum form. We
then compare it to the classical version of the game and see how the advantage of forming a
coalition can be affected.
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In classical analysis of coalition games the notion of a strategy disappears; the main features
are those of a coalition and the value or worth of the coalition. The underlying assumption is
that each coalition can guarantee its members a certain amount called the ‘value of a coalition’.
“The value of coalition measures the worth the coalition possesses and is characterized as the
payoff which the coalition can assure for itself by selecting an appropriate strategy, whereas
the ‘odd man’ can prevent the coalition from getting more than this amount” [104]. Using this
definition we study cooperative games in quantum settings to see how advantages of making
coalitions can be influenced in the new setting.
Within the framework of playing a quantum game given by Marinatto and Weber, we find
a quantum form of a symmetric cooperative game played by three players. In classical form
of this game any two players, out of three, get an advantage when they successfully form a
coalition and play the same strategy. We investigate how the advantage for forming a coalition
are affected when the game switches its form from classical to quantum.
8.2 A three-player symmetric cooperative game
8.2.1 Classical form
A classical three-person normal form game [104] is given by:
• Three non-empty sets ΣA, ΣB, and ΣC . These are the strategy sets of the players A, B,
and C.
• Three real valued functions PA, PB , and PC defined on ΣA × ΣB × ΣC .
The product space ΣA×ΣB×ΣC is the set of all tuples (σA, σB , σC) with σA ∈ ΣA, σB ∈ ΣB
and σC ∈ ΣC . A strategy is understood as such a tuple (σA, σB , σC) and PA, PB , PC are payoff
functions of the three players. The game is denoted as Γ = {ΣA,ΣB ,ΣC ;PA, PB , PC}. Let
ℜ = {A,B,C} be the set of players and ℘ be an arbitrary subset of ℜ. The players in ℘ may
form a coalition so that, for all practical purposes, the coalition ℘ appears as a single player.
It is expected that players in (ℜ − ℘) will form an opposing coalition and the game has two
opposing “coalition players” i.e. ℘ and (ℜ− ℘).
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We study quantum version of an example of a classical three player cooperative game dis-
cussed in Ref. [104]. Each of the three players A, B, and C chooses one of the two strategies 1,
2. If the three players choose the same strategy there is no payoff; otherwise, the two players
who have chosen the same strategy receive one unit of money each from the ‘odd man.’ Payoff
functions PA, PB and PC for players A, B and C, respectively, are given as [104]:
PA(1, 1, 1) = PA(2, 2, 2) = 0
PA(1, 1, 2) = PA(2, 2, 1) = PA(1, 2, 1) = PA(2, 1, 2) = 1
PA(1, 2, 2) = PA(2, 1, 1) = −2 (8.1)
with similar expressions for PB and PC . Suppose ℘ = {B,C}, hence ℜ−℘ = {A}. The coalition
game represented by Γ℘ is given by the payoff matrix [104]:
[11]
[12]
[21]
[22]
[1] [2]

0 2
−1 −1
−1 −1
2 0


(8.2)
Here the strategies [12] and [21] are dominated by [11] and [22]. After eliminating these domi-
nated strategies the payoff matrix becomes
[11]
[22]
[1] [2]
 0 2
2 0

 (8.3)
It is seen that the mixed strategies:
1
2
[11] +
1
2
[22] , (8.4)
1
2
[1] +
1
2
[2] . (8.5)
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are optimal for ℘ and (ℜ − ℘) respectively. With these strategies a payoff 1 for players ℘
is assured for all strategies of the opponent; hence, the value of the coalition υ(Γ℘) is 1 i.e.
υ({B,C}) = 1. Since Γ is a zero-sum game υ(Γ℘) can also be used to find υ(Γℜ−℘) as υ({A}) =
−1. The game is symmetric and one can write
υ(Γ℘) = 1, and υ(Γℜ−℘) = −1 or
υ({A}) = υ({B}) = υ({C}) = −1
υ({A,B}) = υ({B,C}) = υ({C,A}) = 1 (8.6)
8.2.2 Quantum form
In quantum form of this three-player game the players – identified as A, B and C – play their
strategies by applying the identity operator Iˆ with probabilities p, q, and r, respectively, on a
three-qubit initial quantum state. The players apply the operator σˆx with probabilities (1− p),
(1 − q), and (1 − r) respectively. If ρin is the initial state, the final state, after players have
played their strategies, becomes
ρfin =
∑
Uˆ=Iˆ ,σˆx
Pr(UˆA) Pr(UˆB) Pr(UˆC)UˆA ⊗ UˆB ⊗ UˆCρinUˆ †A ⊗ Uˆ †B ⊗ Uˆ †C (8.7)
where the unitary and Hermitian operator Uˆ can be either Iˆ or σˆx. Pr(UˆA), Pr(UˆB) and Pr(UˆC)
are the probabilities with which players A, B, and C apply the operator Uˆ on the initial state
respectively. ρfin corresponds to a convex combination of players’ quantum operations. Let the
arbiter prepares a three-qubit pure initial quantum state:
|ψin〉 =
∑
i,j,k=1,2
cijk |ijk〉 , where
∑
i,j,k=1,2
|cijk|2 = 1 (8.8)
where the basis vectors of the quantum state are |ijk〉 for i, j, k = 1, 2. The state (8.8) is in
2⊗ 2⊗ 2 dimensional Hilbert space and corresponds to three qubits.
Assume the matrix of the three-player game is given by 24 constants αt, βt, γt with 1 ≤ t ≤ 8.
Write the payoff operators for players A, B and C as
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(PA,B,C)oper = α1, β1, γ1 |111〉 〈111| + α2, β2, γ2 |211〉 〈211|+
α3, β3, γ3 |121〉 〈121| + α4, β4, γ4 |112〉 〈112|+
α5, β5, γ5 |122〉 〈122| + α6, β6, γ6 |212〉 〈212|+
α7, β7, γ7 |221〉 〈221| + α8, β8, γ8 |222〉 〈222| (8.9)
Payoffs to the players A, B and C are then obtained as mean values of these operators:
PA,B,C(p, q, r) = Tr [(PA,B,C)operρfin] (8.10)
Where the players’ moves are identified by the numbers p, q and r, respectively. Fig. (8-1)
shows the three-player quantum game. The cooperative game of Eq. (8.1) with the classical
payoff functions PA, PB and PC for players A, B and C respectively, together with the definition
of payoff operators for these players in Eq. (8.9), imply that
α1 = α8 = 0, α3 = α4 = α6 = α7 = 1, and α2 = α5 = −2 (8.11)
With these constants, in quantum version of the game, the payoff to player A, for example, can
be found as
PA(p, q, r) =
(−4rq − 2p + 2pr + 2pq + r + q)(|c111|2 + |c222|2)
+(−4rq + 2p− 2pr − 2pq + 3r + 3q − 2)(|c211|2 + |c122|2)
+(4rq + 2pr − 2pq − 3r − q + 1)(|c121|2 + |c212|2)
+(4rq − 2pr + 2pq − r − 3q + 1)(|c112|2 + |c221|2)
(8.12)
Similarly, payoffs to players B and C can be obtained. Classical mixed strategy payoffs can be
recovered from the Eq. (8.12) by taking |c111|2 = 1. The classical game is therefore imbedded
in its quantum form.
The classical form of this game is symmetric in the sense that payoff to a player depends on
his/her strategy and not on his/her identity. These requirements that result in a three-player
symmetric game are written as
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and payoffs  
Initial quantum state 
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Final quantum state 
Players B and C 
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Player A is “leftout” 
Figure 8-1: A three-player quantum game played with Marinatto and Weber’s scheme. Players
B and C form a coalition. Iˆ is the identity and σˆx is the inversion operator.
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PA(p, q, r) = PA(p, r, q) = PB(q, p, r) = PB(r, p, q)
= PC(r, q, p) = PA(q, r, p) (8.13)
Now in this quantum form of the game, PA(p, q, r) becomes same as PA(p, r, q) when [105]:
|c121|2 + |c212|2 = |c112|2 + |c221|2 (8.14)
Similarly PB(q, p, r) = PB(r, p, q) and PC(r, q, p) = PC(q, r, p) when the following conditions
hold [105]:
|c211|2 + |c122|2 = |c112|2 + |c221|2
|c211|2 + |c122|2 = |c121|2 + |c212|2 (8.15)
Combining Eq. (8.14) and Eq. (8.15) give
|c211|2 + |c122|2 = |c121|2 + |c212|2 = |c112|2 + |c221|2 (8.16)
and then payoff to a p-player remains same when other two players interchange their strategies.
The symmetry conditions (8.13) hold if, together with Eqs. (8.14), the following relations are
also true
α1 = β1 = γ1, α5 = β6 = γ7
α2 = β3 = γ4, α6 = β5 = γ6
α3 = β2 = γ3, α7 = β7 = γ5
α4 = β4 = γ2, α8 = β8 = γ8
(8.17)
These form the extra restrictions on the constants of payoff matrix and, together with the
conditions (8.14), give a three player symmetric game in a quantum form. No subscript in a
payoff expression is then needed and P (p, q, r) represents the payoff to a p-player against two
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other players playing q and r. The payoff P (p, q, r) is found as
P (p, q, r) = (|c111|2 + |c222|2 − |c211|2 − |c122|2)(−4rq − 2p+ 2pr + 2pq + r + q) (8.18)
Assume now that the pure strategies [1] and [2] correspond to p = 0 and p = 1, respectively.
The mixed strategy n [1] + (1 − n) [2], where 0 ≤ n ≤ 1, means that the strategy [1] is played
with probability n and [2] with probability (1 − n). Also suppose that coalition ℘ plays the
mixed strategy1:
l[11] + (1− l)[22] (8.19)
where the strategy [11] means that both players in the coalition ℘ apply the identity operator
Iˆ with zero probability. Similarly the strategy [22] can be defined. The strategy in the Eq.
(8.19) is such that the coalition ℘ plays [11] with probability l and [22] with probability (1− l).
Similarly assume that the player in (ℜ− ℘) plays the mixed strategy:
m[1] + (1−m)[2] (8.20)
The payoff to the coalition ℘ is then obtained as
P℘ = (lm)P℘[111] + l(1−m)P℘[112]+
(1− l)mP℘[221] + (1− l)(1 −m)P℘[222] (8.21)
where P℘[111] is the payoff to ℘ when all three players play p = 0 i.e. the strategy [1]. Similarly
P℘[221] is the coalition payoff when the coalition players play p = 1 and the player in (ℜ − ℘)
plays p = 0. Now from Eq. (8.18) we get
1In a Comment on “Quantum cooperative games” that appeared in Physics Letters A, Volume 328, Issues
4-5, Pages 414-415, 2 August 2004, Liang Dai and Qing Chen have pointed out that because the mixed strategies
[12] and [21] are not always dominated by [11] and [22] in quantum form, there is no ground for assuming that
the coalition ℘ always plays the mixed strategy l[11] + (1− l)[22].
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P℘[111] = 2P (0, 0, 0) = 0
P℘[112] = 2P (0, 0, 1) = 2(|c111|2 + |c222|2 − |c211|2 − |c122|2)
P℘[221] = 2P (1, 1, 0) = 2(|c111|2 + |c222|2 − |c211|2 − |c122|2)
P℘[222] = 2P (1, 1, 1) = 0 (8.22)
Also from Eq. (8.21):
P℘ = 2(|c111|2 + |c222|2 − |c211|2 − |c122|2) {l(1−m) + (1− l)m} (8.23)
To find the value of coalition υ(Γ℘) in the quantum game we find
∂P℘
∂m
and equate it to zero
i.e. P℘ is such a payoff to ℘ that the player in (ℜ − ℘) cannot change it by changing his/her
strategy given in Eq. (8.20). It gives, interestingly, l = 12 and the classical optimal strategy of
the coalition 12 [11]+
1
2 [22] becomes optimal in the quantum game as well. In the quantum game
the coalition then secures following payoff, which is also termed as the value of the coalition:
υ(Γ℘) = (|c111|2 + |c222|2)− (|c211|2 + |c122|2) (8.24)
Similarly we get the value of coalition for (ℜ− ℘):
υ(Γℜ−℘) = −
{
|c111|2 + |c222|2 + |c211|2 + |c122|2
}
(8.25)
Note that these values reduce to their classical counterparts of Eq. (8.6) when the initial
quantum state becomes unentangled and is given by |ψin〉 = |111〉. Classical form of the
coalition game is, therefore, a subset of its quantum version.
Suppose the arbiter now has at his disposal a quantum state:
|ψin〉 = c111 |111〉 + c222 |222〉 + c211 |211〉 + c122 |122〉
with (|c211|2 + |c122|2) > (|c111|2 + |c222|2) (8.26)
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If we assume that, with this initial state, the coalition ℘ still plays the mixed strategy2 l[11] +
(1 − l)[22] of the classical case, then υ(Γ℘) becomes a negative quantity and υ(Γ(ℜ−℘)) = −1
because of the normalization given in Eq. (8.8). Another possible case is when the arbiter has
the state:
|ψin〉 = c211 |211〉 + c122 |122〉 (8.27)
at his disposal. Because now both υ(Γ℘) and υ(Γℜ−℘) are −1 and the players are left with no
motivation to form the same coalition as they do in the classical game.
Liang Dai and Qing Chen [105] have observed 3 that in case |c111|2+|c222|2 6= |c211|2+|c122|2,
the motivation to form a coalition remains in the quantum form. In case |c111|2 + |c222|2 =
|c211|2 + |c122|2, every player’s payoff becomes zero whatever strategies they adapt, and hence
the motivation to form a coalition is lost.
2Liang Dai and Qing Chan have also indicated that when (|c211|
2 + |c122|
2) > (|c111|
2 + |c222|
2) the strategies
1
2
[12] + 1
2
[21] and 1
2
[1] + 1
2
[2] are optimal.
3Liang Dai and Qing Chen [105] pointed out a flaw in the calculations in the Ref. [103] by Iqbal and Toor. We
argue that even after the detection of the indicated flaw by Liang Dai and Qing Chen [105] the main conclusion
of the Ref. [103] remains intact. It can be seen as follows.
In their comment Liang Dai and Qing Chen [105] wrote “In quantum form, the authors (Iqbal and Toor [103])
concluded that the game was not zero-sum, and, in some cases, the players had no motivation to make a coalition
because the advantage was lost. In this comment we argue that the conclusions in Ref. [103] are incorrect and led
to invalid conclusions.” Now we refer to the main conclusion of the Ref. [103], written in its abstract, saying “In
its classical form (of a three-player game) making a coalition gives advantage to players and they are motivated
to do so. However, in its quantum form the advantage is lost and players are left with no motivation to make a
coalition.” We argue that this conclusion remains intact because:
1. Consider the quote from the page 108 of the Ref. [103] “The underlying assumption in this approach
is that because the arbiter, responsible for providing three-qubit pure quantum initial states to be later
unitarily manipulated by the players, can forward a quantum state that corresponds to the classical game,
therefore, other games corresponding to different initial pure quantum states are quantum forms of the
classical game.This assumption makes possible to translate the problem of finding a quantum version of
the classical coalition game, having the property that the advantage of making a coalition is lost, to finding
some pure initial quantum states. We showed that such quantum states can be found and, therefore, there
are quantum versions of the three-player coalition game where the motivation for coalition formation is
lost.”
2. In view of this quote along with Liang Dai and Qing Chen’s finding that when |c111|
2 + |c222|
2 = |c211|
2 +
|c122|
2 their remains no motivation to form a coalition, it can be observed that, even after the indicated
flaw in the calculation, the main conclusion of the Ref. [103] remain intact. It is because the assumption
made in the Ref. [103], which is quoted above in detail, allows to consider the corresponding game when
|c111|
2 + |c222|
2 = |c211|
2 + |c122|
2 as a quantum form of the classical game. So that, Liang Dai and Qing
Chen [105] main conclusion is same as in the Ref. [103], apart from their identification of the correct
mathematical conditions that are required to find the particular quantum form of the game in which the
advantages of forming a coalition are lost.
117
8.3 Discussion
There may appear several guises in which the players can cooperate in a game. One possibility
is that they are able to communicate and, hence, able to correlate their strategies. In certain
situations players can make binding commitments before or during the play of a game. Even
in the post-play behavior the commitments can make players to redistribute their final payoffs.
Two-player games are different from multi-player games in an important aspect. In two-
player games the question before the players is whether to cooperate or not. In multi-player
case the players are faced with a more difficult task. Each player has to decide which coalition
to join. There is also certain uncertainty that the player faces about the extent to which players
outside his coalition may coordinate their actions.
Recent developments in quantum games provide a motivation to see how forming a coali-
tion, and its associated advantages, can be influenced in quantum versions of these classical
cooperative games. To study this we selected an interesting, but simple, cooperative game and
a recently proposed scheme telling how to play a quantum game. We allowed the players in the
quantum version of the game to form a coalition similar to the classical game.
The underlying assumption in this approach is that because the arbiter, responsible for
providing three-qubit pure initial quantum states, to be later manipulated by the players, can
forward a quantum state that corresponds to the classical game, therefore, other games that
result from different initial pure quantum states are quantum forms of the classical game. This
assumption reduces the problem of finding a quantum version of the classical coalition game to
finding some pure initial quantum states. It is shown that a quantum version of the three-player
coalition game can be found where the motivation for coalition formation is lost.
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Chapter 9
Backwards-induction outcome in
quantum games
9.1 Introduction
The notion of NE, the central solution-concept in non-cooperative game theory, was developed
by John Nash in early 1950s. In fact Cournot (1838) [25] anticipated Nash’s definition of
equilibrium by over a century but only in the context of a particular model of a market which
is dominated by only two producers. In economics an oligopoly is a form of market in which a
number n of producers, say, n ≥ 2, and no others, provide the market with a certain commodity.
In the special case where n = 2 it is called a duopoly. Cournot’s work [25] is one of the classics
of game theory and also a cornerstone of the theory of industrial organization [106].
In Cournot model of duopoly two-firms simultaneously put certain quantities of a homoge-
neous product in the market. Cournot obtained an equilibrium value for the quantities both
firms will decide to put in the market. This equilibrium value was based on a rule of behavior
which says that if all the players except one abide by it, the remaining player cannot do better
than to abide by it too. Nash gave a general concept of an equilibrium point in a noncooperative
game but existence of an equilibrium in duopoly game was known much earlier. The “Cournot
equilibrium” refers to NE in non-cooperative form of duopoly that Cournot considered.
In an interesting later development, Stackelberg (1934) [107, 108] proposed a dynamic model
of duopoly in which – contrary to Cournot’s assumption of simultaneous moves – a leader (or
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dominant) firm moves first and a follower (or subordinate) firm moves second. A well known
example is the General Motors playing this leadership role in the early history of US automobile
industry when more than one firms like Ford and Chrysler acted as followers. In this sequential
game a “Stackelberg equilibrium” is obtained using the backwards-induction outcome of the
game. Stackelberg equilibrium refers to sequential nature of the game and it is a stronger
solution-concept than the NE because sequential move games sometimes have multiple NE ,
only one of which is associated with the backwards-induction outcome of the game [108].
In this chapter we present a quantum perspective on the interesting game of Stackelberg
duopoly. We start with the same assumption that a game is decided only by players’ unitary
manipulations, payoff operators, and the measuring apparatus deciding payoffs. When these
are same a different input quantum initial state gives a different form of the same game. With
this assumption we studied evolutionary stability of a mixed NE in the RSP game. Hence, a
game obtained by using a general two-qubit pure state is a quantum form of the classical game
provided the rest of the procedures in playing the quantum game remain same.
We now present an analysis of the Stackelberg duopoly by raising a question: Is it possible
to find a two-qubit pure quantum state that generates the classical Cournot equilibrium as
a backwards-induction outcome of the quantum form of Stackelberg duopoly? Why can this
question be of interest? It is interesting because in case the answer is yes, then, quantization can
potentially be a useful element for the follower in the leader-follower model of the Stackelberg
duopoly [108]. It is due to a known result that, in classical setting, when static duopoly changes
to a dynamic form, the follower becomes worse-off compared to the leader who becomes better-
off. We find that, under certain restrictions, it is possible to find the needed two-qubit quantum
states. Hence a quantum form of a dynamic game of complete information has an equilibrium
that corresponds to classical static form of the same game. The leader, thus, does not become
better-off in the quantum form of the dynamic duopoly.
9.2 Backwards-induction outcome
Consider a simple three step game:
1. Player 1 chooses an action a1 from the feasible set A1.
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2. Player 2 observes a1 and then chooses an action a2 from the feasible set A2.
3. Payoffs are u1(a1, a2) and u2(a1, a2).
This game is an example of the dynamic games of complete and perfect information. Key
features of such games are:
1. The moves occur in sequence.
2. All previous moves are known before next move is chosen, and
3. The players’ payoffs are common knowledge.
Given the action a1 is previously chosen, at the second stage of the game, when player 2
gets the move s/he faces the problem:
Max
a2∈A2
u2(a1, a2) (9.1)
Assume that for each a1 in A1, player 2’s optimization problem has a unique solution R2(a1),
which is also known as the best response of player 2. Now player 1 can also solve player 2’s
optimization problem by anticipating player 2’s response to each action a1 that player 1 might
take. So that player 1 faces the problem:
Max
a1∈A1
u1(a1, R2(a1)) (9.2)
Suppose this optimization problem also has a unique solution for player 1 and is denoted by
a⋆1. The solution (a
⋆
1, R2(a
⋆
1)) is the backwards-induction outcome of this game.
In a simple version of the Cournot’s model two firms simultaneously decide the quantities
q1 and q2 respectively of a homogeneous product they want to put into market. Suppose Q is
the aggregate quantity i.e. Q = q1 + q2 and P (Q) = a−Q be the market-clearing price, which
is the price at which all products or services available in a market will find buyers. Assume the
total cost to a firm producing quantity qi is cqi i.e. there are no fixed costs and the marginal
cost is a constant c with c < a. In a two-player game theoretical model of this situation a firm’s
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payoff or profit can be written as [108]
Pi(qi, qj) = qi [P (Q)− c] = qi [a− c− (qi + qj)] = qi [k − (qi + qj)] (9.3)
Solving for the NE easily gives the Cournot equilibrium:
q⋆1 = q
⋆
2 =
k
3
(9.4)
At this equilibrium the payoffs to both the firms from Eq. (9.3) are
P1(q
⋆
1 , q
⋆
2)Cournot = P2(q
⋆
1 , q
⋆
2)Cournot =
k2
9
(9.5)
Consider now the classical form of duopoly game when it becomes dynamic. In dynamic form of
the game the payoffs to players are given by Eq. (9.3) as they are for the Cournot’s game. We
find backwards-induction outcome in classical and a quantum form of the Stackelberg’s duopoly.
Taking advantage from a bigger picture given to this dynamic game, by the Hilbert structure
of its strategy space, we then find two-qubit pure quantum states that give classical Cournot’s
equilibrium as the backwards-induction outcome of the quantum game of Stackelberg’s duopoly.
9.3 Stackelberg duopoly
9.3.1 Classical form
A leader (or dominant) firm moves first and a follower (or subordinate) firm moves second in
Stackelberg model of duopoly [108]. The sequence of events is
1. Firm A chooses a quantity q1 ≥ 0.
2. Firm B observes q1 and then chooses a quantity q2 ≥ 0.
3. The payoffs to firms A and B are given by their respective profit functions as
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PA(q1, q2) = q1 [k − (q1 + q2)]
PB(q1, q2) = q2 [k − (q1 + q2)] (9.6)
The backwards-induction outcome is found by first finding firm B’s reaction to an arbitrary
quantity by firm A. Denoting this quantity as R2(q1) we find
R2(q1) =Max
q2≥0
PB(q1, q2) =
k − q1
2
(9.7)
with q1 < k. Firm A can now solve also the firm B’s problem. Firm A can anticipate that a
choice of the quantity q1 will meet a reaction R2(q1). In the first stage of the game firm A can
then compute a solution to his/her optimization problem as
Max
q1≥0
PA [q1, R2(q1)] =Max
q1≥0
q1(k − q1)
2
(9.8)
It gives
q⋆1 =
k
2
and R2(q
⋆
1) =
k
4
(9.9)
It is the classical backwards-induction outcome of dynamic form of the duopoly game. At this
equilibrium payoffs to the players A and B are given by Eqs. (9.6) and (9.9)
PA [q
⋆
1 , R2(q
⋆
1)]Stackelberg =
k2
8
, PB [q
⋆
1, R2(q
⋆
1)]Stackelberg =
k2
16
(9.10)
From Eq. (9.10) find the ratio:
PA [q
⋆
1, R2(q
⋆
1)]Stackelberg
PB [q⋆1, R2(q
⋆
1)]Stackelberg
= 2 (9.11)
showing that in comparison with the Cournot game, the leader firm becomes better-off and the
follower firm becomes worse-off in the Stackelberg game. This aspect also hints an important
difference between single and multi-person decision problems. In single-person decision theory
having more information can never make the decision maker worse-off. In game theory, how-
123
ever, having more information (or, more precisely, having it made public that one has more
information) can make a player worse-off [108].
Now we look at the backwards-induction outcome in a quantum perspective. Our motivation
is an interesting aspect that quantum form can bring into the backwards-induction outcome.
It is the possibility of firm B not becoming worse-off because of having extra information.
9.3.2 Quantum form
Stackelberg duopoly is a two-player sequential game. Meyer [19] considered a quantum form
of the sequential game of PQ penny flip by unitary operations on single qubit. Important
difference between Meyer’s game and Stackelberg duopoly is that at the second stage player in
PQ penny flip doesn’t know the previous move but in Stackelberg duopoly he knows that.
We prefer Marinatto and Weber’s scheme to play the sequential game of Stackelberg duopoly
for two reasons:
1. The classical game is obtained for a product initial state.
2. When players’ actions and payoff-generating measurement are exactly the same, we as-
sume other games, corresponding to every pure two-qubit initial state, are quantum forms
of the classical game.
As discussed earlier, the second assumption originates from the fact that the classical game
corresponds to a pure two-qubit initial product state. The assumption reduces the problem
of finding a quantum form of Stackelberg duopoly, with the property that its equilibrium is
the same as in Cournot’s duopoly, to the problem of finding conditions on the parameters of
two-qubit pure initial quantum state. If the conditions are realistic then the corresponding
quantum game gives Cournot’s equilibrium as the backwards-induction outcome.
Stackelberg duopoly is a dynamic game of complete information. Its quantum form in
Marinatto and Weber’s scheme starts by preparing a pure two-qubit initial quantum state.
Suppose Alice plays first and she announces her move immediately, so that Bob knows Alice’s
move before playing his move. Bob plays his move and both players forward their qubits for
measurement.
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Information about the previous moves is crucial for the game considered here. A compar-
ison of the sequential game of Stackelberg duopoly with the simultaneous-move game of BoS
makes evident different information structure in these games. For example let BoS be played
sequentially. But Alice does not announce her first move to Bob before he makes his. It makes
the game sequential but the information structure is still the same as in its static form. Hence,
a sequential BoS in the above form has the same NE as in its static form. An unobserved-action
form of a game has the same NE as its simultaneous-move form. This observation led us to play
a quantum form of Stackelberg duopoly while keeping intact the original structure of a scheme
designed for simultaneous moves. A consideration of playing a sequential game in a quantum
way brings to mind the Meyer’s PQ penny-flip [19] where only one qubit is used. Contrary to
this, in present section we use the two-qubit system of a simultaneous-move game, to play a
sequential game.
Why to use two qubits when a quantum form of this sequential game can also be played
by only one qubit, in similar way as Meyer’s PQ penny-flip. We prefer two qubits because in
this case a comparison between classical and a quantum form of the game translates itself to
comparing two games resulting from using a product and an entangled initial quantum state.
We do not rule out the possibility that a consideration of the dynamic game using only single
qubit gives equally, or even more, interesting results. We let classical payoffs in Stackelberg
duopoly, given by Eq. (9.6), reproduced when the initial state |ψin〉 = |11〉 is used to play the
game. The upper state of a qubit is then represented by 2. The state |ψin〉 in density matrix
notation is
ρin = |11〉 〈11| (9.12)
Assume the player Alice and Bob apply Iˆ with probabilities x and y respectively. The state
(9.12) changes to
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ρfin = xyIˆA ⊗ IˆBρinIˆ†A ⊗ Iˆ†B + x(1− y)IˆA ⊗ σˆxBρinIˆ†A ⊗ σˆ†xB+
y(1− x)σˆxA ⊗ IˆBρinσˆ†xA ⊗ Iˆ†B + (1− x)(1− y)σˆxA ⊗ σˆxBρinσˆ†xA ⊗ σˆ†xB
(9.13)
where x, y ∈ [0, 1] are identified as the players’ moves. The moves by Alice and Bob in classical
duopoly game are given by quantities q1 and q2 where q1, q2 ∈ [0,∞). We assume that Alice
and Bob agree on a function that can uniquely define a real positive number in the range (0, 1]
for every quantity q1, q2 in [0,∞). A simple such function is 1/(1 + qi). So that, Alice and Bob
find x and y, respectively, as
x =
1
1 + q1
, y =
1
1 + q2
(9.14)
and use these real positive numbers as the probabilities with which they apply the identity
operator Iˆ on the quantum state at their disposal. With a substitution from Eqs. (9.12, 9.14)
the final state (9.13) becomes
ρfin =
1
(1 + q1)(1 + q2)
[|11〉 〈11|+ q1q2 |22〉 〈22|+ q1 |21〉 〈21|+ q2 |12〉 〈12|] (9.15)
We now assume that in the measurement and payoffs-finding phase the quantities q1 and q2
are also known to the referee. The referee applies the following payoff operators on the final
quantum state:
(PA)oper = (1 + q1)(1 + q2)q1 [k |11〉 〈11| − |21〉 〈21| − |12〉 〈12|]
(PB)oper = (1 + q1)(1 + q2)q2 [k |11〉 〈11| − |21〉 〈21| − |12〉 〈12|] (9.16)
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Note that the classical payoffs of Eq. (9.6) are reproduced with the initial state |ψin〉 = |11〉 as
PA,B(q1, q2) = Tr [(PA,B)operρfin] (9.17)
A more general form of quantum duopoly can now be played by keeping the payoff operators
of Eq. (9.16) in the referee’s possession and preparing an initial two-qubit pure state:
|ψin〉 =
∑
i,j=1,2
cij |ij〉 , with
∑
i,j=1,2
|cij |2 = 1 (9.18)
Payoffs to Alice and Bob can now be obtained, in this quantum game, from Eqs. (9.17) that
use the payoff operators of Eqs. (9.16). The payoffs to Alice and Bob are written as
[PA(q1, q2)]qtm =
(ω11 + ω12q2) + q1(ω21 + ω22q2)
(1 + q1)(1 + q2)
[PB(q1, q2)]qtm =
(χ11 + χ12q2) + q1(χ21 + χ22q2)
(1 + q1)(1 + q2)
(9.19)
where the subscript qtm is for ‘quantum’ and


ω11
ω12
ω21
ω22


=


|c11|2 |c12|2 |c21|2 |c22|2
|c12|2 |c11|2 |c22|2 |c21|2
|c21|2 |c22|2 |c11|2 |c12|2
|c22|2 |c21|2 |c12|2 |c11|2




kq1(1 + q1)(1 + q2)
−q1(1 + q1)(1 + q2)
−q1(1 + q1)(1 + q2)
0




χ11
χ12
χ21
χ22


=


|c11|2 |c12|2 |c21|2 |c22|2
|c12|2 |c11|2 |c22|2 |c21|2
|c21|2 |c22|2 |c11|2 |c12|2
|c22|2 |c21|2 |c12|2 |c11|2




kq2(1 + q1)(1 + q2)
−q2(1 + q1)(1 + q2)
−q2(1 + q1)(1 + q2)
0


(9.20)
The classical payoffs of duopoly game given in Eqs. (9.6) are recovered from the Eqs. (9.19)
when the initial quantum state is |ψini〉 = |11〉. Classical duopoly is, therefore, a subset of its
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Figure 9-1: Playing a quantum form of Stackelberg duopoly.
quantum version.
We now find the backwards-induction outcome in this quantum form of Stackelberg duopoly.
Fig. (9-1) shows the overall idea to play the game. We proceed in exactly the same way as
it is done in the classical game except that players’ payoffs are now given by Eqs. (9.19) and
not by Eqs. (9.6). The first step in the backwards-induction in quantum game is to find Bob’s
reaction to an arbitrary quantity q1 chosen by Alice. Denoting this quantity as [R2(q1)]qtm we
find
[R2(q1)]qtm =Max
q2≥0
[PB(q1, q2)]qtm =
q1△1 +△2
−2 {q1△3 +△4} (9.21)
where
|c11|2 + |c22|2 − k |c21|2 = △1, |c12|2 + |c21|2 − k |c11|2 = △2
|c12|2 + |c21|2 − k |c22|2 = △3, |c11|2 + |c22|2 − k |c12|2 = △4 (9.22)
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This reaction reduces to its classical value of Eq. (9.7) when |c11|2 = 1. Similar to the classical
game Alice can now solve Bob’s problem as well. Alice can anticipate that a choice of quantity
q1 will meet a reaction [R2(q1)]qtm. In the first stage of the game, like its classical version, Alice
can compute a solution to her optimization problem as
Max
q1≥0
[
PA
{
q1, {R2(q1)}qtm
}]
qtm
(9.23)
To find it Alice calculates the quantity:
d [PA(q1, q2)]qtm
dq1
=
(|c11|2 + |c22|2 − |c12|2 − |c21|2)
(1 + q1)
{−2q21 + q1(k − 2) + k}
+ (1 + 2q1)
{
(k − 1) |c21|2 − |c12|2
}
+ k(|c12|2 − |c22|2)
− q1dq2
dq1
{△4 + q1△3} − q2 {2q1△3 +△4}
(9.24)
and replaces q2 in Eq. (9.24) with [R2(q1)]qtm given by Eq. (9.21) and then equates Eq. (9.24)
to zero to find a q⋆1 that maximizes her payoff [PA(q1, q2)]qtm. For a maxima she would ensure
that the second derivative of PA
{
q1, {R2(q1)}qtm
}
with respect to q1 at q1 = q
⋆
1 is a negative
quantity. The quantity q⋆1 together with [R2(q
⋆
1)]qtm will form the backwards-induction outcome
of the quantum game.
An interesting situation is when the backwards-induction outcome in quantum version of
Stackelberg duopoly becomes same as the classical Cournot equilibrium of duopoly. The classi-
cal situation of leader becoming better-off, while the follower becomes worse-off, is then avoided
in the quantum form of Stackelberg duopoly. To look for this possibility we need such an initial
state |ψini〉 that at q⋆1 = q⋆2 = k/3 we have the following relations to be true, along with the
normalization condition given in Eq. (9.18):
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d
[
PA
{
q1, {R2(q1)}qtm
}]
qtm
dq1
|q1=q⋆1= 0 (9.25)
d
2
[
PA
{
q1, {R2(q1)}qtm
}]
qtm
dq21
|q1=q⋆1

 < 0 (9.26)
q⋆2 = {R2(q⋆1)}qtm (9.27)
The conditions (9.25, 9.26) simply say that the backwards-induction outcome of the quantum
game is the same as Cournot equilibrium in classical game. The condition (9.27) says that
Bob’s reaction to Alice’s choice of q⋆1 = k/3 is q
⋆
2 = k/3. To show that such quantum states can
exist for which the conditions (9.25, 9.26, 9.27), with the normalization (9.18), to be true, we
give an example where |c11|2 , |c12|2 and |c21|2 are written as functions of k, with our assumption
that |c22|2 = 0. Though this assumption puts its own restriction, on the possible range of k for
which the above conditions hold for these functions, but still it shows clearly the possibility of
finding the required initial quantum states. The functions are found as
|c12(k)|2 = −f(k) +
√
f(k)2 − 4g(k)h(k)
2g(k)
where
f(k) = j(k)
{−7
18
k2 +
1
3
k +
1
2
}
+
{
k2
9
+
k
3
+
1
2
}
g(k) = j(k)2
{−1
9
k3 +
7
18
k2 − 1
2
}
+ j(k)
{
2
9
k3 +
5
18
k2 − 1
2
k − 1
}
+{−1
9
k2 − 1
2
k − 1
2
}
h(k) =
−1
6
k, j(k) =
9− 4k2
k2 − 9 (9.28)
also
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|c21(k)|2 = j(k) |c12(k)|2 (9.29)
|c11(k)|2 = 1− |c12(k)|2 − |c21(k)|2 (9.30)
Now, interestingly, given that allowed range of k is 1.5 ≤ k ≤ 1.73205, all of the conditions
(9.18, 9.25, 9.26, 9.27) hold at q⋆1 = q
⋆
2 = k/3. So that in this range of k a quantum form
of Stackelberg duopoly exists that gives the classical Cournot equilibrium as the backwards-
induction outcome. The restriction on allowed range of k is the result of our assumption that
|c22(k)|2 = 0, which is introduced to simplify the calculations. Nevertheless it does not forbid
obtaining a quantum form of Stackelberg duopoly, without the mentioned restriction of the
range of k, when the quantum game still possesses the same properties.
9.4 Discussion
What can be a possible relevance of considering a quantum form of a game that models a
competition between two firms in macroscopic world of economics? Quantum mechanics was
developed to understand phenomena in the regime of atomic and subatomic interactions and it
is still mostly used in that domain. What is of interest in extending a game-theoretical model of
interaction between firms towards quantum domain? These questions naturally arise not only
with reference to Stackelberg duopoly considered in this paper but also other related works in
quantum games.
We believe that like other notions of game theory, finding some relevance in quantum infor-
mation, a consideration of backwards-induction can be of interest for exactly the same reasons.
It does not seem hard to imagine situations in quantum information where moves occur in
sequence, all previous moves are observed before the next move is chosen, and players’ payoffs
from each feasible combination of moves are common knowledge. Interesting questions then
arise about how a quantum version of dynamic game of complete information can influence the
outcome.
The duopoly game models economic competition between firms and applied economics is
the area where it is studied in detail. The fact that quantum game theory can give entirely
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new views on games, which are important in economics, is apparent in recent interesting papers
by Piotrowski and Sladkowski [56, 57] proposing a quantum-like description of markets and
economies where players’ strategies belong to Hilbert space. It shows that quantum games
certainly have features of interest to applied economists. Reciprocating with it we showed that
games played by firms in economic competition can give counter-intuitive solutions when played
in the quantum world.
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Chapter 10
Quantum repeated games
10.1 Introduction
The PD attracted early attention [20] in recent studies in quantum game theory. In classical
game theory [108] a two-stage repeated version of this game consists of two players playing the
game twice, observing the outcome of the first play before the second play begins. The payoffs
for the entire game are simply taken as the sum of the payoffs from the two stages. Generally a
two-stage repeated game has more complex strategic structure than its one-stage counterpart
and players’ strategic choices in the second stage are affected by the outcome of their moves in
the first stage. For the classical one-stage PD the strategy of ‘defection’ by both the players is a
unique NE. In its two-stage version the same NE appears again at the second stage because the
first stage payoffs are added as constants to the second stage. In fact in all of finitely repeated
versions of the PD ‘defection’ by both the players appears as unique NE at every stage [108].
Eisert et al.’s study [20] of the one-stage quantum PD raises a question: what can possibly
be a role for quantum mechanics when the game is played twice? It seems that this role
should be relevant to the new feature showing itself in the game i.e. the two-stages. A role for
quantum mechanics exists if it inter-links the two stages of the game in some way of interest.
Classically both the players ‘defect’ at each stage and strategic choices remain the same because
of uniqueness of the NE at each stage. In our search for a quantum role we find useful the idea of
subgame-perfect outcome (SGPO) [108] in a two-stage repeated bi-matrix game in its quantum
form.
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For a two-stage repeated game the idea of a SGPO is natural analog of the backwards-
induction outcome (BIO) [108] from the games of complete and perfect information. In the
last chapter we considered the BIO idea in a quantum form of duopoly game and showed how
a quantum version of this game can give an outcome corresponding to the static form of the
duopoly, even when the game is played dynamically. In present chapter we study the natural
analogue of BIO for a two-stage repeated PD quantum game, i.e., the idea of SGPO in a
situation that can be said to lie in quantum domain. We solve the two-stage PD quantum
game in the spirit of backwards-induction from the last section; but now the first step in
working backwards from the end of the game involves solving a real game rather than solving
a single-person optimization problem.
In game theory the idea of SGPO comes out as a stronger solution concept especially when
multiple NE appear in a stage. Our motivation is the observation that a quantization scheme for
the PD is known in which the NE in a stage is not unique – thus making relevant a consideration
of the concept of SGPO in the two-stage game played in a quantum setting. For the purpose of
completeness, we will first describe how SGPO works for the classical two-stage PD. Afterwards,
we quantize the game using a known scheme, and then, show how a SGPO can exist that is
counter-intuitive compared to the classical SGPO for the two-stage repeated PD.
10.2 Two-stage games of complete but imperfect information
Like dynamic game of complete and perfect information – for example the Stackelberg duopoly
– the play in a two-stage game of complete but imperfect information proceeds in a sequence,
with the moves in the first stage observed before the next stage begins. The new feature is
that within each stage now there are simultaneous moves. The simultaneity of moves within
each stage means that information is imperfect in the game. A two-stage game of complete but
imperfect information consists of the steps [108]:
1. Players A and B simultaneously choose actions p and q from feasible sets P and Q,
respectively.
2. Players A and B observe outcome of the first stage, (p, q), and then simultaneously choose
actions p1 and q1 from feasible sets P and Q, respectively.
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3. Payoffs are Pi(p, q, p1, q1) for i = A, B.
A usual approach to solve a game from this class uses the method of backwards-induction. In
the last section the first step in working backwards involves solving a single-person optimization
problem. Now the first step involves solving a simultaneous-move game between players A and
B in the second stage, given the outcome from stage one. If the players A and B anticipate that
their second-stage behavior will be given by (p⋆1(p, q), q
⋆
1(p, q)), then the first-stage interaction
between them amounts to the simultaneous-move game:
1. Players A and B simultaneously choose actions p and q from feasible sets P and Q,
respectively.
2. Payoffs are Pi(p, q, p
⋆
1(p, q), q
⋆
1(p, q)) for i = A,B.
When (p⋆, q⋆) is the unique NE of this simultaneous-move game, the set of four numbers
(p⋆, q⋆, p⋆1(p, q), q
⋆
1(p, q)) is known as the SGPO [108] of this two-stage game. This outcome is
the natural analog of BIO in games of complete and perfect information.
10.3 Two-stage Prisoners’ Dilemma
10.3.1 Classical form
We use a normal form of the PD given by the matrix:
A
C
D
B
C D
 (3, 3) (5, 0)
(0, 5) (1, 1)

 (10.1)
The players play this simultaneous-move game twice. The outcome of the first play is observed
before the second stage begins. Payoff for the entire game is simply the sum of the payoffs from
the two stages. It is a two-stage game of complete but imperfect information [108].
Assume players A and B play the pure strategy C with probabilities p and q, respectively,
in the stage 1. Also assume the players A and B play the strategy C with probabilities p1
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and q1, respectively, in the stage 2. Call [PA1]cl and [PB1]cl the payoffs to players A and B,
respectively, in the stage 1, where the symbol cl is for ‘classical’. These payoffs can be found
from the matrix (10.1) as
[PA1]cl = −pq + 4q − p+ 1, [PB1]cl = −pq + 4p − q + 1 (10.2)
The NE conditions for this stage are
[PA1(p
⋆, q⋆)− PA1(p, q⋆)]cl ≥ 0, [PB1(p⋆, q⋆)− PB1(p⋆, q)]cl ≥ 0 (10.3)
giving p⋆ = q⋆ = 0 (i.e. defection for both the players) as the unique NE in this stage. Likewise,
in the second stage the payoffs to players A and B are written as [PA2]cl and [PB2]cl respectively,
where
[PA2]cl = −p1q1 + 4q1 − p1 + 1, [PB2]cl = −p1q1 + 4p1 − q1 + 1 (10.4)
and once again the strategy of defection, i.e. p⋆1 = q
⋆
1 = 0, comes out as the unique NE in the
second stage. To compute SGPO of this two-stage game, we analyze its first stage given that
the second-stage outcome is also the NE of that stage —namely p⋆1 = q
⋆
1 = 0. For this NE the
players’ payoffs in the second stage are
[PA2(0, 0)]cl = 1, [PB2(0, 0)]cl = 1 (10.5)
The players’ first-stage interaction, therefore, in the two-stage PD amounts to a one-shot game,
in which the payoff pair (1, 1) from the second stage is added to their first-stage payoff pair.
Write the players’ payoffs in the one-shot game as
[
PA(1+2)
]
cl
= [PA1 + PA2(0, 0)]cl = −pq + 4q − p+ 2[
PB(1+2)
]
cl
= [PB1 + PB2(0, 0)]cl = −pq + 4p− q + 2 (10.6)
It has again (0, 0) as the unique NE. Therefore, the unique SGPO of the two-stage PD is (0, 0)
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in the first stage, followed by (0, 0) in the second stage. The strategy of defection in both the
stages comes out as SGPO for the two stage classical PD.
It is now shown how it becomes possible, in a quantum form of this two-stage PD, to achieve
a SGPO in which the players decide to cooperate in the first stage while knowing that they
both will defect in the second. The quantum form of the two-stage PD is played using a system
of four qubits. Players manipulate these qubits in Marinatto and Weber’s scheme to play a
quantum form of a matrix game.
10.3.2 Quantum form
Marinatto and Weber’s scheme can be extended to play a two-stage version of a bi-matrix game.
For example, a quantum version of the two-stage PD starts by making available a four-qubit
pure quantum state to the players. This state can be written as
|ψin〉 =
∑
i,j,k,l=1,2
cijkl |ijkl〉 where
∑
i,j,k,l=1,2
|cijkl|2 = 1 (10.7)
where i, j, k and l are identifying symbols for four qubits. The upper and lower states of a qubit
are 1 and 2 respectively; and cijkl are complex numbers. It is a quantum state in 2⊗ 2⊗ 2⊗ 2-
dimensional Hilbert space. We suppose the qubits i and j are manipulated by the players in
the first stage of the game and, similarly, the qubits k and l are manipulated in the second
stage. Let ρin denote the initial state (10.7) in the density matrix formalism. Assume during
their moves in the first stage of the game, the players A and B apply the identity operator Iˆ on
the initial state with probabilities p and q, respectively. Also they apply the operator σˆx with
probabilities (1− p) and (1− q), respectively. The players’ actions in the first stage changes ρin
to
ρfin = pqIˆA ⊗ IˆBρinIˆ†A ⊗ Iˆ†B + p(1− q)IˆA ⊗ σˆxBρinIˆ†A ⊗ σˆ†xB+
q(1− p)σˆxA ⊗ IˆBρinσˆ†xA ⊗ Iˆ†B + (1− p)(1− q)σˆxA ⊗ σˆxBρinσˆ†xA ⊗ σˆ†xB
(10.8)
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The players’ actions in this stage are simultaneous and they remember their moves (i.e. the
numbers p and q) also in the next stage. In the second stage, players A and B apply the identity
operator with probabilities p1 and q1, respectively, on ρfin. The operator σˆx is, then, applied
with probabilities (1− p1) and (1− q1) on ρfin, respectively. Fig. (10-1) shows the overall idea
of playing the two-stage game. Players’ moves in the two stages of the game are done on two
different pairs of qubits.
After the moves performed in the second stage the quantum state changes to
ρffin = p1q1IˆA ⊗ IˆBρfinIˆ†A ⊗ Iˆ†B + p1(1− q1)IˆA ⊗ σˆxBρfinIˆ†A ⊗ σˆ†xB+
q1(1− p1)σˆxA ⊗ IˆBρfinσˆ†xA ⊗ Iˆ†B+
(1− p1)(1− q1)σˆxA ⊗ σˆxBρfinσˆ†xA ⊗ σˆ†xB (10.9)
which is ready for measurement, giving payoffs for the two stages of the game. If classically
the bi-matrix game (10.1) is played at each stage, the possession of the following four payoff
operators by the referee corresponds to a ‘quantum version’ of the two-stage game:
[
(PA)oper
]
1
=
∑
k,l=1,2
{3 |11kl〉 〈11kl|+ 5 |21kl〉 〈21kl|+ |22kl〉 〈22kl|}
[
(PA)oper
]
2
=
∑
i,j=1,2
{3 |ij11〉 〈ij11| + 5 |ij21〉 〈ij21| + |ij22〉 〈ij22|}
[
(PB)oper
]
1
=
∑
k,l=1,2
{3 |11kl〉 〈11kl|+ 5 |12kl〉 〈12kl|+ |22kl〉 〈22kl|}
[
(PB)oper
]
2
=
∑
i,j=1,2
{3 |ij11〉 〈ij11| + 5 |ij12〉 〈ij12| + |ij22〉 〈ij22|}
(10.10)
The corresponding payoffs are, then, obtained as mean values of these operators. For
example, Alice’s payoff in stage 1 is
[PA1]qu = Tr
{[
(PA)oper
]
1
ρffin
}
(10.11)
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Figure 10-1: Playing a two-stage quantum game of Prisoners’ Dilemma.
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We consider a two-stage quantum PD played with pure four-qubit initial state in the form:
|ψini〉 = c1 |1111〉 + c2 |1122〉 + c3 |2211〉 + c4 |2222〉 (10.12)
with
4∑
t=1
|ct|2 = 1. For this state the payoffs to the players A and B in the two stages are found
as
[PA1]qu = (|c1|2 + |c2|2)(−pq − p+ 4q + 1)+
(|c3|2 + |c4|2)(−pq + 2p − 3q + 3)
[PA2]qu = (|c1|2 + |c3|2)(−p1q1 − p1 + 4q1 + 1)+
(|c2|2 + |c4|2)(−p1q1 + 2p1 − 3q1 + 3)
[PB1]qu = (|c1|2 + |c2|2)(−pq − q + 4p + 1)+
(|c3|2 + |c4|2)(−pq + 2q − 3p+ 3)
[PB2]qu = (|c1|2 + |c3|2)(−p1q1 − q1 + 4p1 + 1)+
(|c2|2 + |c4|2)(−p1q1 + 2q1 − 3p1 + 3) (10.13)
The players’ payoffs in the classical two-stage PD given by Eqs. (10.2, 10.4) can now be
recovered from the Eq. (10.13) by taking |c1|2 = 1. The classical game is, therefore, a subset
of its quantum version.
One now proceeds, in the spirit of backwards-induction, to find a NE in the second stage of
the quantum game. Suppose (p⋆1, q
⋆
1) is a NE in the second stage, then
[PA2(p
⋆
1, q
⋆
1)− PA2(p1, q⋆1)]qu ≥ 0, [PB2(p⋆1, q⋆1)− PB2(p⋆1, q1)]qu ≥ 0 (10.14)
With the players’ payoffs of the two stages given by Eq. (10.13), the Nash inequalities (10.14)
can be written as
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(p⋆1 − p1)
{
−q⋆1 + 2(|c2|2 + |c4|2)− (|c1|2 + |c3|2)
}
≥ 0
(q⋆1 − q1)
{
−p⋆1 + 2(|c2|2 + |c4|2)− (|c1|2 + |c3|2)
}
≥ 0 (10.15)
and the strategy of defection by both the players, i.e. p⋆1 = q
⋆
1 = 0, becomes a NE in the second
stage of the quantum game, if
{
2(|c2|2 + |c4|2)− (|c1|2 + |c3|2)
}
≤ 0 (10.16)
Similar to the classical analysis, players’ payoffs can be found when both decide to defect in
the second stage:
[PA2(0, 0)]qu = [PB2(0, 0)]qu = 3(|c2|2 + |c4|2) + (|c1|2 + |c3|2) (10.17)
The classical payoffs, when both players defect, of the Eq. (10.5) can be recovered from Eq.
(10.17) when |c1|2 = 1, i.e. for an unentangled initial state.
Similar to the classical case the players’ first-stage interaction, in the two-stage quantum
PD, amounts to a one-shot game. In this one-shot game the payoff 3(|c2|2+|c4|2)+(|c1|2+|c3|2),
from the second stage, is added to their first-stage payoffs:
[
PA(1+2)
]
qu
= [PA1 + PA2(0, 0)]qu = |c1|2 (−pq + 4q − p+ 2)+
|c2|2 (−pq + 4q − p+ 4) + |c3|2 (−pq − 3q + 2p+ 4)+
|c4|2 (−pq − 3q + 2p + 6)[
PB(1+2)
]
qu
= [PB1 + PB2(0, 0)]qu = |c1|2 (−pq + 4p − q + 2)+
|c2|2 (−pq + 4p− q + 4) + |c3|2 (−pq − 3p+ 2q + 4)+
|c4|2 (−pq − 3p+ 2q + 6) (10.18)
The strategy of cooperation (that is p⋆1 = q
⋆
1 = 1) can now be a NE for the first-stage interaction
141
in this two-stage quantum game, if
{
2(|c1|2 + |c2|2)− (|c3|2 + |c4|2)
}
≤ 0 (10.19)
The inequalities (10.16) and (10.19) are the conditions on the initial state when the players
cooperate in their first-stage interaction while both defect in the next stage. These conditions
can be rewritten as
|c1|2 + |c2|2 ≤ 1
3
, |c2|2 + |c4|2 ≤ 1
3
(10.20)
For example, at |c1|2 = |c2|2 = |c4|2 = 16 and |c3|2 = 12 these conditions hold. Because for
the classical game the inequalities (10.20) together cannot hold, showing why classically it is
not possible that players cooperate in the first stage knowing that they both will defect in the
second.
10.4 Discussion
Essentially, the repeated games differ from one-shot games in that players’ current actions
can depend on their past behavior. In a repeated bi-matrix game the same matrix game is
played repeatedly, over a number of stages that represent the passing of time. The payoffs are
accumulated over time. Accumulation of information about the “history” of the game changes
the structure of the game with time. With each new stage the information at the disposal of
the players changes and, since strategies transform this information into actions, the players’
strategic choices are affected. If a game is repeated twice, the players’ moves at the second stage
depend on the outcome of the first stage. This situation becomes more and more complex as the
number of stages increases, since the players can base their decisions on histories represented
by sequences of actions and outcomes observed over increasing number of stages.
Recent findings in quantum game theory motivate a study of repeated games in the new
quantum setting. It is because useful and extensive analysis of repeated games is already found
in literature of classical game theory. In present chapter – to look for a quantum role in repeated
games – we consider a quantum form of a well-known bi-matrix game of PD.
142
Classical analysis of the PD has been developed in many different formats, including its
finitely and infinitely repeated versions. In the history of quantum games the PD became a
focus of early and important study [20] telling how to play a quantum form of a bi-matrix
game. To play a quantum form of repeated PD we select Marinatto and Weber’s scheme. In
this scheme a repeated game is played when the players select positive numbers in the range
[0, 1], giving the probabilities with which they apply the identity operator Iˆ on a four-qubit
pure initial quantum state. The players’ actions in each stage are performed on two different
pairs of qubits. The classical two-stage PD corresponds to an unentangled initial state, and the
classical SGPO consists of players defecting in both the stages. It is shown that a SGPO where
the players go for cooperation in a stage is a non-classical feature that can be made to appear
in quantum setting.
The argument presented here is based on the assumption that other games, resulting from
a play starting with a four-qubit quantum state of the form of the Eq. (10.7), are ‘quantum
forms’ of the classical two-stage game. This assumption originates from the fact that the
classical game corresponds to a particular four-qubit pure quantum state which is unentangled.
The assumption makes possible to translate the desired appearance of cooperation in a stage
to certain conditions on the parameters of the initial state, thus giving a SGPO where players
decide to cooperate in their first-stage interaction while they both defect in the next stage.
One may ask about the compelling reason to choose a 2 ⊗ 2 ⊗ 2 ⊗ 2 dimensional Hilbert
space instead of a 2⊗ 2 dimensional one. A 2⊗ 2 dimensional treatment of this problem, in the
same quantization scheme, involves denominator terms in the expressions for payoff operators,
when these are obtained under the condition that classical game corresponds to an unentangled
initial state. It then leads to many ‘if-then’ conditions before one gets finally the payoffs. On
the contrary, a treatment in 2 ⊗ 2 ⊗ 2 ⊗ 2 dimensions is much smoother. Also a study of the
concept of SGPO in a two-stage repeated quantum game, then, becomes a logical extension of
the backwards-induction procedure proposed in the last chapter.
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Chapter 11
New proposals to play quantum
games
11.1 Introduction
Meyer [19] and Du et al. [109] have shown that entanglement may not be essential for a quantum
game. Eisert et al.’s quantum PD was the first proposal where entanglement was used as a
resource. There has been noticeably greater attention paid in exploiting entanglement for
quantum games. It is not unusual and can be traced back to exciting and counter-intuitive
properties of this phenomenon, as well as to its recent enthusiastic investigation in quantum
information theory [21].
Local unitary manipulations of entangled qubits to play matrix games is indeed an interest-
ing concept that gives new dimensions to classical game theory. But it does not forbid the use
of other quantum mechanical effects to play other ‘quantum forms’ of matrix games – games
for which extensive analysis in the classical domain already exists in literature [104, 108]. A
look at the Eisert et al.’s set-up [20, 46] makes apparent some of its similarities to well-known
Young’s double-slit apparatus [110]. Simultaneous and local unitary manipulation of a maxi-
mally entangled two-qubit quantum state, and its later measurement, is the essential feature of
Eisert et al.’s set-up. In Young’s double-slit set-up, however, coherent light passes through two
slits to form a diffraction pattern on a screen facing the slits. Similarity between these setups
becomes noticeable if a comparison is made between:
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• The properties of entanglement and coherence.
• Players’ moves in manipulations of qubits and the process of opening or closing the slits.
• Wavefunction-collapsing measurement and the appearance of the diffraction pattern.
Such a comparison, in its turn, asks for a quantum feature that can be exploited to give new
dimension to a matrix game, when it is played using a Young’s double-slit like apparatus. In
Eisert et al.’s set-up this quantum feature is obviously the quantum phenomenon of entangle-
ment. In Young’s apparatus this feature is the association of wave-like properties to material
objects like electrons, producing a diffraction pattern on a screen. Section (11.2) exploits such
association of waves as a resource to play quantum versions of classical games.
Playing of a game requires resources for its physical implementation. For example, to
play a bi-matrix game the resources may consist of pairs of two-valued ‘objects’, like coins,
distributed between the players. The players perform their moves on the objects and later a
referee decides payoffs after observing the objects. Game theory usually links players’ actions
directly to their payoffs, without a reference to the nature of the objects on which the players
have made their moves. However, playing quantum games [20] show that radically different
‘solutions’ can emerge when the same game is physically implemented on distributed objects
which are quantum mechanically correlated.
In Section (5.4) Enk and Pike’s argument [73] is briefly discussed. Essentially it says that
the emergence of new equilibrium in quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma can also be understood as an
equilibrium in a modified form of the game. They constructed another matrix game, in which
players have access to three pure classical strategies instead of the usual two, commenting that
it ‘captures’ everything quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma has to offer. Constructing an extended
matrix with an extra pure classical move, in their view, is justified because also in quantum
Prisoners’ Dilemma players can play moves which are superpositions of the two classical moves.
Truly quantum pairs of objects possess non-local correlations. Though it is impossible to
have a local model of a quantum game set-up, producing exactly the same data, but how
such unusual correlations may explicitly affect solutions of a game when implemented with
quantum objects. To how far extent solutions of a quantum game themselves can be called
‘truly quantum’ in nature. Section (10.3) tries to address these questions.
145
11.2 Quantum games with a diffraction set-up
Historically speaking, the De Broglie’s original idea [110, 111] – that travelling material particles
have waves associated with them – was undoubtedly the key concept behind the development of
quantum physics in early part of the twentieth century. Soon afterwards, Davisson and Germer
[110] verified the idea in their experimental demonstration of the diffraction of electrons by
crystals. De Broglie’s proposed that a travelling electron with momentum p has an associated
wave of wavelength λ = h/p, where h is the Plank’s constant. To make λ a measurable quantity,
under normal laboratory conditions, the momentum p should have similar order of magnitude
as h. h being a very small quantity shows why it is very hard to detect waves associated with
macroscopic objects. Our motivation is to take this quantum feature – associating wave-like
properties to micro objects – as a resource that can be used to play a quantum game. Such a
quantum game can be realized using an apparatus consisting of travelling electrons, multiple
slits intercepting them, and a resulting diffraction pattern. In this set-up a player’s choice of a
‘pure strategy’ consists of opening or closing slits at his/her disposal. Suppose the apparatus
is adjusted such that when λ approaches zero the classical game is reproduced. It can then be
argued that because an observation of a value of λ quite away from zero is entirely a quantum
feature, therefore, the resulting different payoffs for the players correspond to a quantum form
of the classical game. In this setup the players’ payoffs are to be found from the diffraction
pattern formed on the screen. We show the possibility of finding a value for λ that makes
appear a non-classical equilibrium in the PD when the players play only the pure strategies.
The classical game remains a subset of its quantum version because with λ approaching zero
the classical game is reproduced.
The motivation to play a quantum form of PD, without using the phenomenon of entan-
glement, also derives from Feynman’s excellent exposition [112] of quantum behavior of atomic
objects. He describes and compares the diffraction patterns in two similar set-ups that are
imaginary but experimentally realizable. The two set-ups consist of bullets and electrons pass-
ing through a wall with two slits. Feynman then describes the well-known quantum property –
associating waves to all material particles – to distinguish the diffraction patterns of bullets and
electrons. The disappearance of a pattern for the bullets, he explains, is due to tiny wavelengths
of the associated waves. For such waves the pattern becomes very fine and, with a detector
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of finite size, one cannot distinguish the separate maxima and minima. We ask why not to
play a game, in the Feynman’s imaginary experimental set-up, such that the classical game
corresponds when, in Feynman’s words, bullets are fired; and a quantum game corresponds
when electrons replace the bullets.
11.2.1 Playing Prisoners’ Dilemma
We select the PD to be played in a diffraction set-up. The classical PD, in its general form, is
represented by the following matrix:
Alice
C
D
Bob
C D
 (r, r) (s, t)
(t, s) (u, u)

 (11.1)
where t > r > u > s. To make the classical game imbedded in its quantum version the positive
coefficients u, r, s and t, appearing in the matrix (11.1), are translated into distances between
the slits. Each player is in control of two slits such that his/her strategy consists of opening
one of the slits and closing the other. For example, if Alice decides to cooperate then she
opens the slit C and closes the slit D. Because Bob has a similar choice, therefore, all possible
moves by the players leads to the opening of two slits and closure of the other two, with the
separation between the two open slits depending on the moves of the players. It happens when
only the so-called ‘pure-strategies’ can be played by the players, which in the present setup
means to open a slit and close the other. Now, at the final stage of the game, the action of the
arbiter – responsible for finding the payoffs when the players have made their moves – consists
of measuring the distance between two peaks of the diffraction pattern. This peak-to-peak
distance is known [110] to be λ/d, where d is the separation between the open sits and λ is
the wavelength associated with the bombarded material objects, like electrons. Payoffs to the
players are functions of λ/d and it, then, explains why it is useful to translate the coefficients
of the matrix of the classical game into the separations d between the slits. When bullets are
fired, which means the particles become heavier and corresponding λ is very nearly zero, the
payoffs become classical and depend only on d i.e. the separation between the slits. A payoff
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Figure 11-1: A multi-slit diffraction set-up to play a quantum form of Prisoners’ Dilemma. A
window with four slits faces an electron source. Each player has access to two slits. A player
plays a pure strategy by opening a slit and closing the other. Referee finds the players’ payoffs
by measuring the peak-to-peak distance on the diffraction pattern formed on the screen.
representation in terms of λ/d contains both the classical and quantum aspects of the matrix
game played in this set-up. The experimental set-up shown in the Fig. (11-1) sketches the
diffraction set-up to play a quantum game.
For PD the payoffs are symmetric for the players and a single equation can describe the
payoffs to both the players when their strategies are known. A usual way to express it is to
write P (s1, s2) for the payoff to the s1-player against the s2-player. Such a single equation
representation is usually used in evolutionary games [32] consisting of symmetric bi-matrix
conflicts. The s1-player is referred to as the ‘focal’ player and the s2-player as just the ‘other’
player. The PD is one such example for which a single payoff equation can capture the essence
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of the idea of a symmetric NE. A strategy s⋆ is a symmetric NE if
P (s⋆, s⋆)− P (s, s⋆) ≥ 0, for all s (11.2)
saying that the focal player cannot be better off by diverging away from s⋆. Because the set-up
of the Fig. (11-1) involves coefficients in the classical payoff matrix corresponding to the first
player, therefore, finding a symmetric NE with Eq. (11.2) becomes immediately possible when
the first player is taken as focal. It also shows why writing payoff as P (s1, s2) is relevant to the
set-up of the Fig. (11-1). For example, classically the strategy of defection D is a symmetric
NE because P (D,D) − P (C,D) = (u − s) > 0, where the players’ moves consist of only the
pure strategies.
In the set-up of Fig. (11-1) for every pure strategy move the players have option to play, a
unique separation d between the slits is obtained that can have four possible values i.e. u, r, s
or t. Classically P (C,C) = r, P (C,D) = s, P (D,C) = t and P (D,D) = u. It is observed in
the Fig. (11-1) that the classical payoff to the focal player, against the other, can be equated
to the separation between the two open slits d.
Now assume that instead of simply P (s1, s2) = d the arbiter uses the payoff equation:
P (s1, s2) = d+ k(λ/d) (11.3)
where k is a positive constant that can be called a scaling factor. P (s1, s2), obviously, reduces
to its classical counterpart when λ is very nearly zero. Suppose the strategy of cooperation C
is a symmetric NE:
P (C,C)− P (D,C) = {kλ(1/r − 1/t) − (t− r)} ≥ 0 (11.4)
It requires λ ≥ rt/k. For electrons of mass m travelling with velocity v it gives v ≤ (kh/mrt).
Supposing r and t are both non-zero, the arbiter’s problem consists of finding an appropriate
value for the scaling factor k that brings v into a reasonable range from experimental point
of view. When the electrons have associated wavelength λ ≥ rt/k the strategy of cooperation
becomes a symmetric NE, and each player gets a payoff r + kλ/r. Similarly when the pure
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strategy of defection is a symmetric NE in the quantum game, we have
P (D,D)− P (C,D) = {−kλ(1/s − 1/u) + (u− s)} ≥ 0 (11.5)
It requires λ ≤ su/k. After the scaling factor k is decided the wavelength λ determines which
pure strategy should be a symmetric NE. Two ranges for λ can be indicated as λ ≤ su/k
and λ ≥ rt/k. Defection and cooperation are symmetric NE for these ranges, respectively.
Because the constants t, r, u, s and k are all positive the classical game is in the first range of
λ. Non-classical equilibrium of cooperation shows itself in the second range of λ.
Du et al.’s recent analysis [113] of the quantum PD, with players’ access to Eisert’s two-
parameter set of unitary operators, has shown an intriguing structure in the game as a function
of the amount of entanglement. The game becomes classical when the entanglement vanishes.
In the set-up of Fig. (11-1) the quantity λ behaves in a way similar to the amount of
entanglement in Du et al.’s analysis [113, 114]. But this set-up is devoid of the notion of
entanglement and relies instead on a different quantum aspect. An aspect which is as much
‘quantum’ in nature as the phenomenon of entanglement for qubit systems.
There is however a difference, to be noticed, between the set-ups of Eisert et al. and that
of the Fig. (11-1). Players’ actions in Eisert et al.’s set-up are quantum mechanical in nature
in that they make moves with quantum operators. In the present set-up, on the contrary,
the players’ actions are entirely classical consisting of opening or closing slits. In a sense it is
similar to the players’ actions in Marinatto and Weber’s scheme. In their scheme players possess
quantum operators but they apply them on an initial quantum state with classical probabilities;
so that the players’ moves can be considered classical as well. It can be said that, apart from
the work of Eisert et al., the set up of Fig. (11-1) is also motivated, to an almost equal extent,
by the Marinatto and Weber’s idea of playing a quantum version of a matrix game.
11.3 Performing EPR type experiments to play a bi-matrix
game
To address the question raised in the Section (11.1), i.e. to how much extent a quantum game
can be called ‘truly quantum’, following two constraints are suggested [115] which a quantization
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scheme should follow:
(C1). In both classical and quantum version of the game the same set of moves should be
made available to the players.
(C2). The players agree together on explicit expressions for their payoffs which must not
be modified when introducing the quantized version of the game.
With these constraints one can hope that only the nature of correlations, existing between
the objects the players receive, will decide whether the resulting game is classical or quantum.
Consider a symmetric bi-matrix game between two players Alice and Bob with the matrix
representation:
Alice
Bob
S1
S2
S1 S2
(r, r) (s, t)
(t, s) (u, u)
(11.6)
For which the mixed strategy payoffs for the players can be written as
PA(p, q) = Kpq + Lp+Mq +N
PB(p, q) = Kpq +Mp+ Lq +N (11.7)
where the constants K,L,M and N can be found in terms of r, s, t and u, the coefficients of
the bi-matrix (11.6). The NE defining conditions are
PA(p
∗, q∗)− PA(p, q∗) ≥ 0
PB(p
∗, q∗)− PB(p∗, q) ≥ 0 (11.8)
For example, for PD we may have r = 3, s = 0, t = 5 and u = 1 that reduce the inequalities
(11.8) to
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(p∗ − p)(1 + q∗) ≤ 0
(q∗ − q)(1 + p∗) ≤ 0 (11.9)
It produces p∗ = q∗ = 0 or (D,D) as the unique equilibrium.
11.3.1 Quantum correlation games
The idea of a ‘correlation game’ in the Ref. [115] was introduced to put forward a scheme to play
a quantum version of a bi-matrix game that respects the constraints C1 and C2 of the Section
(11.3). Its motivation comes from EPR type experiments performed on singlet states involving
correlations of the measurement outcomes. In such experiments the Bell’s inequalities [38] are
well-known to be the constraints – derived under the principle of local causes – on correlations
of measurement outcomes of two-valued (dichotomic) variables. Truly quantum correlations
are non-local in character and violate the inequalities.
The two parties involved in the usual EPR type setting are recognized as the players.
Repeated measurements are performed on correlated pairs of objects by the two players, each
receiving one half.
Players Alice and Bob share a Cartesian coordinate system between them and each player’s
move consists of deciding a direction in a given plane. For Alice and Bob these are the x-z and
y-z planes respectively. Call α and β the unit vectors representing the players’ moves. Both
players have a choice between two different orientations i.e. α and z for Alice and β and z for
Bob. Each player measures the angular momentum or spin of his/her respective half in one of
two directions. Let the vectors α and β make angles θA and θB, respectively, with the z-axis.
To link the players’ moves, represented now by angles θA and θB, to the usual probabilities
p and q appearing in a bi-matrix game, an invertible function g is made public at the start of
a game. The g-function maps [0, π] to [0, 1] and allows to translate the players’ moves to the
probabilities p and q.
The results of measurements performed on dichotomic variables may take only the values
±1. These are represented by a, b and c for the directions α, β and the z-axis respectively.
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Correlations 〈ac〉, 〈cb〉 and 〈ab〉 can then be found from the measurement outcomes, where the
two entries in a bracket represent the players’ chosen directions.
In a correlation experiment in which the z-axis is the common direction for the players, the
Bell’s inequality1 is written [38] as
|〈ab〉 − 〈ac〉| ≤ 1− 〈bc〉 (11.10)
The classical correlations corresponding to the above situation, when written in terms of θA
and θB , are known [38] to be invertible. This invertibility allows to express θA and θB in terms
of the correlations 〈ac〉 and 〈cb〉. The g-function allows now to translate θA and θB to p and q,
respectively. In effect the classical bi-matrix payoffs are re-expressed in terms of the classical
correlations 〈ac〉 and 〈cb〉.
One can now claim that the classical game is given by definition in terms of the correlations.
The point for such a re-expression of the classical game is that it opens the way to ‘quantum’
version of the game. It, of course, happens when the correlations become quantum mechanical.
In the setting of a correlation game the players’ payoffs involve only the correlations 〈ac〉
and 〈cb〉, instead of the three correlations 〈ac〉, 〈cb〉 and 〈ab〉 present in the inequality (11.10),
when z-axis is the common direction between the players. This aspect results in [115] obtaining
‘quantum’ payoffs even when the correlations are local and satisfy the inequality (11.10).
The motivation for introducing EPR type setting to bi-matrix games is to exploit quantum
correlations to generate quantum payoffs. So that, when the correlations are local, the classical
game must be produced. We show below the possibility of such a connection by a different
setting in which the classical payoffs are always obtained whenever the correlations 〈ac〉, 〈cb〉
and 〈ab〉 satisfy the Bell’s inequality (11.10).
11.3.2 A new approach towards defining a correlation game
Consider an EPR type set-up to play a game between two players. Following rules apply:
1. A player’s move consists of defining a direction in space by orientating a unit vector.
However, this direction is not confined to only the x-z or y-z planes. A player’s choice
1For perfectly anticorrelated pairs the right hand side of the inequality is 1 + 〈bc〉.
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of a direction can be anywhere in three-dimensional space. Therefore, Alice’s move is to
define a unit vector α and, similarly, Bob’s move is to define a unit vector β.
2. The z-axis is shared between the players as the common direction.
3. On receiving a half of a correlated pair, a player measures its spin in one of the two
directions. For Alice these directions are α and z and for Bob these directions are β and
z.
4. Each player measures spin with equal probability in his/her two directions.
5. Players agree together on explicit expressions giving their payoffs PA and PB in terms of
all three correlations i.e.
PA = PA(〈ac〉, 〈cb〉, 〈ab〉)
PB = PB(〈ac〉, 〈cb〉, 〈ab〉) (11.11)
A game defined by these rules eliminates the need for introducing the g-functions. The rules
are also consistent with the constraints C1 and C2 and the idea of a correlation game essentially
retains its spirit.
11.3.3 Defining correlation payoffs
A possible way is shown now to define the correlation payoffs (11.11) which reduce to the
classical payoffs (11.7) whenever the correlations 〈ab〉, 〈ac〉 and 〈bc〉 satisfy the inequality (11.10).
Consider two quantities ε and σ defined as:
ε =
√
3 + 〈bc〉2 + 2〈ab〉〈ac〉, σ =
√
2(1 + 〈bc〉) + 〈ab〉2 + 〈ac〉2 (11.12)
The quantities ε and σ can adapt only real values because the correlations 〈ac〉, 〈cb〉 and 〈ab〉
are always in the interval [−1, 1]. Consider now the quantities (ε−σ) and (ε+σ). By definition
ε and σ are non-negative, therefore, the quantity (ε + σ) always remains non-negative. It
is observed that if 0 ≤ (ε − σ) then the correlations 〈ac〉, 〈cb〉 and 〈ab〉 always satisfy the
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inequality (11.10). It is because if 0 ≤ (ε − σ) then 0 ≤ (ε + σ)(ε − σ) = ε2 − σ2. But
ε2 − σ2 = (1 − 〈bc〉)2 − |〈ab〉 − 〈ac〉|2 so that |〈ab〉 − 〈ac〉|2 ≤ (1 − 〈bc〉)2 which results in the
inequality (11.10). All the steps in the proof can be reversed and it follows that whenever
the correlations 〈ac〉, 〈cb〉 and 〈ab〉 satisfy the Bell’s inequality, the quantity (ε − σ) remains
non-negative
For a singlet state satisfying the inequality (11.10) both the quantities (ε+σ) and (ε−σ) are
non-negative and must have maxima. Hence, it is possible to find two non-negative numbers
(ε−σ)
max(ε−σ) and
(ε+σ)
max(ε+σ) in the range [0, 1], whenever the inequality (11.10) holds. Because
0 ≤ ε, σ ≤ √6 we have max(ε − σ) = √6 and max(ε + σ) = 2√6. The numbers (ε − σ)/√6
and (ε + σ)/2
√
6 are in the range [0, 1] when the inequality holds. These numbers are also
independent from each other.
The above argument paves the way to associate a pair (p, q) of independent numbers to the
players’ moves (α, β), that is
p = p(α, β), q = q(α, β) (11.13)
where the numbers p, q are in the interval [0, 1] when the input states do not violate the in-
equality (11.10) for all direction pairs (α, β). The pair (p, q) is related to the two directions
as
α = α(p, q), β = β(p, q) (11.14)
It can be noticed that more than one pair (α, β) of directions may, however, correspond to a
given pair of numbers. The converse, although, is not true for known input states. That is, for
known input states, only one pair (p, q) can be obtained from a given pair (α, β) of directions.
Players’ payoffs can now be re-expressed by making the replacements:
p(α, β) ∼ (ε− σ)/
√
6, q(α, β) ∼ (ε+ σ)/2
√
6 (11.15)
which lead to re-writing the classical payoffs (11.7) as
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PA(α, β) = Kp(α, β)q(α, β) + Lp(α, β) +Mq(α, β) +N
PB(α, β) = Kp(α, β)q(α, β) +Mp(α, β) + Lq(α, β) +N (11.16)
or more explicitly:
PA(α, β) =
K
12
(ε2 − σ2) + L√
6
(ε− σ) + M
2
√
6
(ε+ σ) +N
PB(α, β) =
K
12
(ε2 − σ2) + M√
6
(ε− σ) + L
2
√
6
(ε+ σ) +N (11.17)
This expression shows that a player’s payoff now depends on the direction s/he has chosen. The
payoffs (11.17) are obtained under the constraints C1 and C2 and are functions of all the three
correlations.
The relations (11.13) can also imagined as follows. When Alice decides a direction α in
space, it corresponds to a curve in the p-q plane. Similarly, Bob’s decision of the direction β
defines another curve in the p-q plane. The relations (11.15) assure that only one pair (p, q)
can then be obtained as the intersection between the two curves.
The set-up assures that for input product states all of the players’ moves (α, β) result in
the correlation payoffs (11.17) generating identical to the classical payoffs (11.7). For such
input states the relations (11.15) give the numbers p, q in the interval [0, 1], which can then
be interpreted as probabilities. However, for input states for which the inequality (11.10) is
violated in some directions, a pair (p, q) ∈ [0, 1] cannot be associated to those directions. It is
because for entangled states there exist pairs of directions for which the corresponding quantity
(ε − σ) becomes negative. For those directions the correlation payoffs (11.17) would generate
results that can only be understood, within the structure of classical payoffs (11.7), by invoking
negative probabilities.
11.3.4 Nash equilibria of quantum correlation games
Because the players’ moves consist of defining directions in space, the Nash inequalities are
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PA(α0, β0)− PA(α, β0) ≥ 0
PB(α0, β0)− PB(α0, β) ≥ 0 (11.18)
where the pair (α0, β0) corresponds to the pair (p
∗, q∗) via the relations (11.15). The inequalities
(11.18) are same as the inequalities (11.8), except their re-expression in terms of the directions.
When the correlations in the input state correspond to an entangled state, the payoff rela-
tions (11.17) would lead to disappearance of the classical equilibria. It can be seen, for example,
by considering the Nash inequalities for the Prisoners’ Dilemma (11.9). Let the directional pair
(αD, βD) correspond to the equilibrium (D,D), that is, the inequalities (11.18) are
PA(αD, βD)− PA(α, βD) ≥ 0
PB(αD, βD)− PB(αD, β) ≥ 0 (11.19)
Assume the players receive input states that are entangled. There will now exist pairs of players’
moves α and β that would make the quantity (ε− σ) < 0. The pair (α, β) will not correspond
to a point in the p-q plane where p, q ∈ [0, 1].
It can also be noticed that for entangled input states the directional pair (αD, βD) does not
remain a NE. It is because the pair (αD, βD) is a NE only if players’ choices of any directional
pair (α, β) corresponds to a point in the p-q plane where p, q ∈ [0, 1].
Because for entangled input states there exist pairs of players’ moves (α, β) that do not
correspond to points in the p-q plane with p, q ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, the directional pair (αD, βD)
does not remain a NE in the quantum game. Interestingly, the disappearance of the classical
equilibrium now becomes directly linked with the violation of the inequality (11.10) by the
correlations in the input states.
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11.3.5 Quantum game as another classical game?
Coming back to the questions raised in the Section (11.1), we now try to construct a classical
bi-matrix game corresponding to a quantum game resulting from the payoff relations (11.17).
The classical game is assumed to have the same general structure of players’ payoffs as given in
Eqs. (11.7). This assumption derives from the hope that the quantum game, corresponding to
correlations in the input states that violate the inequality (11.10), is also equivalent to another
symmetric bi-matrix game. It is shown below that such a construction cannot be permitted.
Suppose the correlations in the input states violate the inequality (11.10). A pair of direc-
tions (α, β) can now be found for which the Bell’s inequality is violated. For Alice’s move to
select the direction α her payoff, given by the Eqs. (11.17), is
PA(α, β) = K
′pq + L′p+Mq +N (11.20)
where K ′ = −K and L′ = −L and p, q ∈ [0, 1]. Assuming that the constants K ′, L′,M, and N
define a ‘new’ symmetric bi-matrix game the Bob’s payoff is
PB(p, q) = K
′pq +Mp+ L′q +N (11.21)
But in fact (11.21) is not obtained as the Bob’s payoff in our quantum game when he goes for
the direction β. Bob’s payoff is, in fact, given as
PB(p, q) = K
′pq +M ′p+ Lq +N (11.22)
which may not necessarily coincide with the payoff given in the Eq. (11.21). Hence, the
game resulting from the presence of quantum correlations in the input states cannot be simply
explained as another classical symmetric bi-matrix game: a game obtained by defining new
coefficients of the matrix involved. Players’ payoffs in the quantum game are found to reside
outside the structure of payoffs in a classical symmetric bi-matrix game. The payoffs can be
explained within this structure only by invoking negative probabilities.
An asymmetric bi-matrix game can, of course, be constructed having identical solutions to
the quantum game. In fact for any quantum game a classical model can always be constructed
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that summarizes the complete situation and has identical to the quantum solutions, as far as
the players’ payoffs are concerned. It would be a model that relates players’ moves to their
payoffs in accordance with the usual approach in game theory. But constructing such a model is
not an answer to our original question: How solutions of a game are affected by the presence of
quantum correlations between the physical objects used to implement the game? It is because
the question can then simply be rephrased as: What if the modified classical game is played
with physical objects having quantum correlations?
11.3.6 Discussion
The idea of a correlation game is about re-expression of payoffs of a classical bi-matrix game in
terms of correlations of measurement outcomes made on pairs of disintegrating particles. The
measurement outcomes are dichotomic variables and their correlations are obtained by averaging
over a large number of pairs. Bell’s inequalities represent constraints on these correlations
obtained under the principle of local causes. A re-expression of the classical payoffs of a bi-
matrix game in terms of correlations opens the way to explicitly see the effects of quantum
correlations on the solutions of the game.
We have proposed a new setting where two players play a bi-matrix game by repeatedly
performing measurements on correlated pairs of objects. The setting is motivated by EPR
type experiments performed on singlet states. On receiving a half of a pair, a player makes a
measurement of its spin in one of the two directions available to him/her. The measurements are
performed with equal probability in the two directions. Both players share a common direction
and defining the other direction is a player’s move.
We show how within this set-up a correlation version of a symmetric bi-matrix game can be
defined. The correlation game shows some interesting properties. For example the correlation
game reduces to the corresponding classical game when the correlations in the input states
are local and do not violate the Bell’s inequality (11.10). However, when the inequality is
violated, the stronger correlations generate results that can be understood, within the structure
of classical payoffs in a symmetric bi-matrix game, only by invoking negative probabilities.
It is shown that a classical NE is affected when the game is played with input states having
quantum correlations. The proposed set-up also provides a new perspective on the possibility of
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reformulating the Bell’s inequalities in terms of a bi-matrix game played between two spatially-
separated players.
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Chapter 12
Conclusions
To conclude a summary of the results developed in this thesis is presented below. The results 1
– 8 refer to Eisert et al.’s and Marinatto and Weber’s schemes of quantization of matrix games.
1. In a population engaged in symmetric bi-matrix classical game of Prisoners’ Dilemma an
invasion of classical ESS is possible by the mutants exploiting Eisert’s two-parameter set of
quantum strategies. We presented an example of an asymmetric quantum game between
two players in which a strategy pair can be an ESS for either classical or quantum version
of the game, even when it remains a NE in both the versions. It shows quantization can
change evolutionary stability of Nash equilibria in certain asymmetric bi-matrix games.
2. ESS concept was originally defined for symmetric bi-matrix contests. We showed that
quantization can also change evolutionary stability of a NE in certain types of symmetric
bi-matrix games. It immediately makes study of quantum games also relevant to evolu-
tionary game theory and conversely. Hence, quantization not only leads to new equilibria
but it also presents itself also as another refinement notion of the NE concept.
3. Like pure strategies the evolutionary stability of mixed strategies can also change as a
symmetric bi-matrix game is switched from its classical to quantum form. However, for
mixed strategies we require more general initial quantum states.
4. Rock-Scissors-Paper (RSP) is a two-player three-strategy game. We consider a slightly
modified form of RSP played in its classical version. A mixed NE exists that is not an
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ESS. We find a quantum form of the same game in which the classical NE becomes an
ESS. The quantum form is obtained when the game is played with an initial entangled
state.
5. Quantization can change properties of equilibria of replicator dynamics. We consider a
game played in a population setting with the underlying process of replicator dynamics.
We found a ‘quantum form’ of the replicator equations, which retain their form as that of
Lotka-Volterra type. The effects of quantization of the game on a saddle or a center of the
dynamics are then studied. It is found that a saddle (center) in the classical game can be
a center (saddle) in certain quantum form of the game. A saddle or center in a classical
(quantum) game can not be, however, an attractor or a repeller in quantum (classical)
form of the game.
6. A symmetric cooperative game played by three players is analyzed in its classical and
quantum forms. In classical form of this game forming a coalition gives advantage to
players and players are motivated to do so. In quantum form of the game, however, an
initial quantum state can be prepared by the arbiter such that forming the same coalition
is of no advantage.
7. A comparison between the NE in Cournot game with the backwards-induction outcome in
classical Stackelberg duopoly shows that having Alice (who acts first) know that Bob (who
acts second) knows Alice’s move hurts Bob. In fact in classical version of the Stackelberg
game Bob should not believe that Alice has chosen its Stackelberg quantity. We have
shown that there can be a quantum version of Stackelberg duopoly where Bob is not hurt
even if he knows the quantity chosen by Alice. The backwards-induction outcome of this
quantum game is same as the NE in classical Cournot game, where decisions are made
simultaneously and there is no such information that hurts a player.
8. In infinitely repeated versions of the classical game of Prisoners’ Dilemma it is established
[108] that cooperation can occur in every stage of a subgame-perfect outcome (SGPO),
even though the only NE in the stage game is defection. We find how cooperation in two-
stage Prisoners’ Dilemma can be achieved by quantum means. In two-stage Prisoners’
Dilemma getting a SGPO where players cooperate in the first stage is a result with no
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classical analogue. We have also introduced a possible way to study the concept of SGPO
in repeated quantum games.
9. In the standard set-ups to play a quantum game a measure of entanglement for a qubit
system is introduced. Quantum version of the game reduces to classical when the measure
becomes zero. We suggested a set-up that exploits another resource from quantum physics,
i.e. the association of waves with travelling material objects like electrons. We show how
in this set-up such association of waves can lead to a non-classical equilibrium in the
Prisoners’ Dilemma. With associating wavelength approaching zero the quantum aspect
disappears and the classical game is reproduced.
10. Playing a symmetric bi-matrix game is usually physical implemented by sharing pairs
of ‘objects’ between two players. We proposed a new setting that explicitly shows the
effects of quantum correlations between the pairs on the structure of payoff relations
and ‘solutions’ of the game. The setting is based on a re-expression of the game such
that the players play the classical game only if their moves are performed on pairs of
objects having correlations that satisfy the Bell’s inequalities. On players receiving pairs
with quantum correlations the resulting game cannot be considered another classical
symmetric bi-matrix game. Also the Nash equilibria of the game are found to be decided
by the nature of the correlations.
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